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Berisha Signs Decree Creating Defense College

AU0404121295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In his capacity as chairman of the Council of Defense, Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania, today signed a decree on the creation of a College of Defense in Tirana, the first of its kind in our country.

The college will aim to produce qualified civilian and military leaders to deal with problems of security policy and the country's defense, as well as concepts of international relations and regional security.

The College of Defense is to open tomorrow.

Serreqi, Meksi Receive Pakistani Foreign Minister

AU0404124395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 95

[Report by Armir Shkurti]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the invitation of Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali arrived in our country today on a two-day visit.

The Pakistani foreign minister held meetings with Foreign Minister Serreqi and Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi this afternoon.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry reports that Serreqi requested that relations between Albania and Pakistan be expanded, particularly in politics and investments.

Mr. Serreqi mentioned the violation of human and national rights in Kosova and Macedonia [The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. He thanked the Pakistani foreign minister for his supportive stance on the Kosova issue in the UN resolution.

According to a foreign ministry spokesman, the Pakistani foreign minister described the situation in the region around his country with concern, particularly the situation in Kashmir and Tajikistan. Mr. Ali pointed out that the rights of Albanians in Kosova are being trampled underfoot.

Regarding the embargo in the former Yugoslavia, Ali stated that all people have the right to self-defense.

Mr. Ali confirmed his support for Kosova to Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi as well, expressing also his sympathy for the processes of Albania's transformation.

A spokesman for the prime minister's office reports that the Pakistani foreign minister expressed his desire for the conflict in the Balkans to be terminated in a peaceful way. Mr. Ali assessed relations between the two countries, Albania and Pakistan, as indispensable, seeing trade, finance, and military cooperation as the most profitable.

The spokesman reports that Prime Minister Meksi suggested that Pakistan invest in construction and the textile industry, and that problems between the two countries be resolved together.

Through the Pakistani foreign minister, Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi invited Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to visit Albania.

Meksi Outlines 1995 State Draft Budget

AU0404140295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 95

[Report by Gezim Qinami on statement by Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi in Tirana on 3 April]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] This afternoon, the plenary session of the People's Assembly began by discussing in principle the state budget for 1995. The main report in the name of the government was presented by Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi. Finance Minister Dylber Vrioni also spoke about the issue and said that the budget is completely warranted.

The deputies then asked questions about the report. At the end of the session, we interviewed Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi:

[Begin Meksi recording] In our presentation of the state budget, we focused mainly on the achievements attained last year, such as economic stabilization and the advancement of the branches that were ahead of the reform, such as agriculture, trade, services, and transportation in general, as well as the blockage of the economic decline in the industry branches in which an equilibrium was almost reached compared with the decline a year ago.

We presented the results in the field of privatization and in that of employment—in which the figure of 301,000 unemployed at the beginning of the year dropped to 261,000. We also talked about employment in the private sector, in which we have today reached a figure of 129,000 people—at least as regards those who are registered and pay fiscal obligations. This is not a bad figure.

We also talked about public investments, in which we stressed that the state budget will invest 8.5 billion leks—apart from a large amount of money, twice this sum, that will be set up with the contributions by foreign countries, either free contributions or through soft loans.

The government will pursue an active policy in social insurance by supporting the social insurance funds with 5 billion leks from the state budget and by increasing salaries within the possible limits, in which funds for social issues and salaries will be increased by over 20 percent compared to a year ago.

In our opinion, a positive factor this year is that with the program of mass privatization and the preparation of the laws we have drafted, the institutions will be more capable of facing a greater pace in the market economy—thus greater successes in the realization of the government's commitment.

The government also committed itself to drafting a plan on public investments for the period 1995-97 by the end of May, just as it will foster privatization in second-level banks by privatizing the Agricultural Bank almost completely and some branches of the Trade Bank partially. The government will also try to create the first Albanian development bank at the end of the year, apart from private banks and the joint ones that will be opened according to agreements with other countries.

Thus, let us have a more favorable climate that is a warranty for the realization of the budget for next year. The government is mobilized to work within its own possibilities—supported, of course, by parliament and all Albanians. This is an indispensable condition, for the government to meet its commitments.

I would also like to say that a guarantee for the realization is also inflation, which at 16 percent last year, nearing 25 percent of the budget, is expected to be 10 percent this year, while the budget deficit will be reduced from 8 to 7 percent. I think these are acceptable figures. Meanwhile, economic growth will be approximately 7 percent. This is also a good figure for a country that is undergoing transition and that has started reforms under extremely difficult conditions.

I am convinced that the assembly will approve the state budget. That will leave the government to work to meet its commitments. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Regulations for Creation of Banks 'in the Pipeline'

AU0404174195 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 4 Apr 95 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Helping To Create Private Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A regulation entitled "Granting Licenses for Creating Private Banks" is in the pipeline. On the basis of experience that has been gained, the intention is to change the existing legislation in order to make it more comprehensive, transparent, and simple.

The intended changes are in the following spheres:

1. The regulation on granting licenses will relate solely to the creation of private banks in Albania.

2. The definition of the necessary sum of capital will bear in mind the financial potential within the country and the need to attract foreign capital.

3. Regarding the capital of a private bank, a rule has been introduced forbidding the creation of capital on the basis of loans, credit, or other funds hamstrung by guarantees and granted by third persons.

4. The new draft regulation determines that the remaining portion of capital must be paid before a licensed bank submits a request to start its activities.

5. The goal is for private banks in Albania to be national rather than regional.

6. Because the new regulation will be valid only for the licensing of private banks, state banks with purely Albanian and foreign capital and cooperative banks will be licensed according to new procedures to be laid down by the Bank of Albania.

7. Article 2.9, which states that "legal and physical persons who demonstrate that their net assets are no less than three times the portion they contribute to the bank's capital have the right to ask for a license," will be removed from the regulation.

8. Under the new draft regulation, only those signatories who are contributing 5 percent or more of the bank's capital are to submit a "secret personal financial report." The number of forms and questions in this report has been reduced.

9. The bank's founders and administrators are no longer required to submit data concerning their spouses or their relations down to three generations, because this legal requirement will be enforced during the course of the bank's activities.

10. Under the new draft regulation, a license will be issued according to a format defined by the Bank of Albania, and will include a necessary, attached section defining the kinds of operation the bank is allowed to perform.

11. The draft regulation will require that the applicant give information with the help of authorized accountants.

12. Improvements and additions have also been made in connection with applications to expand or change the network of the bank.

These changes will make the licensing procedure more attractive to all Albanian and foreign investors.

Official on Defense and Armed Forces Bill

95BA0198C Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Khristo Biserov, deputy chairman of the Commission on National Security and chief secretary of the National Coordination Council of the SDS, by Major Spirdon Spirdonov; place and date not given: "We Must Meet Expectations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Khristo Biserov, deputy chairman of the Commission on National Security and chief secretary of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], believes that a fresh parliament can pass the military law.*

National representative Khristo Biserov was the head of the first working group of the National Security Commission in the past National Assembly, which drafted the submitted bill on defense and the Armed Forces. He was born in Khaskovo in 1955 and practiced law for 10 years. In the present National Assembly, he is deputy chairman of the Commission on National Security, which makes him even more involved in the future of the draft law.

[Spirdonov] Has your view concerning the draft law on defense and the Armed Forces changed?

[Biserov] There are no major differences between what we supported in the past National Assembly and now. There may be differences in certain details, but this will become clear when we study the supplements to the text of the draft.

[Spirdonov] In the preelectoral period you expressed your view on the possible splitting of the project.

[Biserov] Obviously, we will not go that far. We realized that after the government submitted a draft, with a parliamentary majority backing it, our view on restoring the law would be difficult to implement. It is a question, for example, of two laws based on the familiar draft. Perhaps it will not be proper to concentrate our efforts in that direction but rather in debates on specific texts.

[Spirdonov] Are you not bothered by the substantial size of this law?

[Biserov] I indeed believe that there is too much written on a single law. However, if we start insisting on having it redrafted the results would not be very good. The Army would have to keep waiting.

[Spirdonov] It is expected that by July you will pass the law, so that personnel changes and transfers to the reserves in September could be based on new legal regulations....

[Biserov] This is possible. In the final account, we must meet expectations. We cannot pretend to be people who are not interested in the pressures that were applied. I believe that we shall not have any principled differences. We are not against the law. On the contrary, we believe that it must be passed. In terms of the specific text, we shall be supporting our own positions.

[Spirdonov] Will the law in all likelihood determine the functions of the Armed Forces Inspectorate?

[Biserov] In the past National Assembly we supported that idea. We have no reason to abandon it, regardless of who won the elections. These are matters of principle. It is not a question of the Army alone. The Inspectorate belongs to the Armed Forces.

[Spirdonov] If the state's financial possibilities do not secure the social aspects of the law, is it possible to block it before it is applied?

[Biserov] It is clear that that part of the law will hinder the other. The truth, however, is that the officer corps expects such problems to be solved as well. If we are able to resolve the most global problems and leave the social problems for the future, this would not be honorable. The military personnel expect not only a regulation governing the Armed Forces as a structure but also a regulation on their professional growth and their way of life. This is entirely normal, and one should not hinder the other. They should not be split.

[Spirdonov] You are very familiar with the history of this law in the parliament. What prevented its adoption by the previous National Assembly?

[Biserov] No basic reason. The law was not adopted because voting on it began when the parliament had already exhausted its strength. This was a very difficult and very serious law, for which reason the parliament was less concerned with legislative activities than with the forthcoming elections. Such a difficult law can be adopted only by a new parliament.

[Spirdonov] Could the present parliamentary structure accomplish this?

[Biserov] This parliament works because it has a parliamentary majority. There was no such majority in the past few years. The truth is that we now have conditions for the adoption of the law. The only thing I fear is that there may be some distortions, but in the final account, this is too serious a matter to allow people to make such fluctuations.

Balkan Airlines Official on Finance, Equipment

95BA0198A Sofia BULGARSKI BIZNES in Bulgarian 10-17 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Valeri Doganov, executive director of Balkan Airlines, by Svoboda Gergova; place and date not given: "To Balkan, Russian Airplanes Are a Reserve Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *According to Balkan executive director Valeri Doganov, the airline is seeking cooperation in catering with a foreign company, .*

[Gergova] Mr. Doganov, about a month ago Balkan's leadership submitted to the Ministry of Transportation a report on the condition of the airline, offering several alternate choices for state aid needed by the firm. Have there been any results?

[Doganov] No decision has been reached as yet. What we were able to do as a commercial company, without ignoring the commitments assumed by the state on the basis of bilateral air transport agreements, i.e., excluding the fact that Balkan is a national carrier, is to improve the effectiveness of our activities and reduce operational expenditures in areas unprofitable to us.

We stopped our flights to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Barcelona, and Algeria. Flights to Lagos, Accra, and Madrid have been retained on a seasonal basis.

We have a resolution on closing down six missions and bureaus abroad. A new structure has been developed according to which the personnel will be reduced by 11.5 percent. This will take place after an agreement with the trade unions has been reached. Parallel activities will be organized as separate companies.

[Gergova] However, Balkan is a national carrier with more than 60 agreements for air communications signed by the Bulgarian Government, and this cannot be separated from its other commercial activities. It is obvious that the state must assume some financial commitments, the way governments in other countries have, concerning their own national airline companies.

[Doganov] Since 1989-90 Balkan has not received any financial aid from the state, although it should have been supported by it. Simply stated, the state must give us an assignment for the destinations in which it is interested. We have implemented the resolutions we have adopted as a commercial company.

[Gergova] Have the lines you mentioned been definitely terminated?

[Doganov] No. This is temporary, until the state has responded to our problem. The state is the owner, represented by the ministry—or, more specifically, the minister of transportation. No one has assigned us to be a carrier for specific destinations. We are conducting a business and this task is based on specific indicators, such as profitability, efficiency, and so on. If we obtain corrections and fly to certain destinations that are in the national interest, the state should undertake to finance them.

[Gergova] The airline company is demanding a credit of $67 million from the DFRR [State Fund for Reconstruction and Development]. What will be its purpose?

[Doganov] We have applied to the DFRR for a loan. Some of the funds will be used to purchase airplanes and modernize the fleet. The other part will be needed to update the infrastructure and the equipment, and for several other projects.

We have received proposals from two airplane manufacturers—Boeing and Airbus—to finance the purchasing of aircraft under advantageous, interesting, conditions. At the moment we are analyzing which of these variants suits Balkan better. We are ready to propose a variant including Russian-made airplanes. However, in this case we have certain difficulties, because not all Russian models are suitable for our purposes. And since the airplanes used by the airline should be determined by the owner, the ministry will have to decide. To a certain extent, the choice is also related to the political decisions of the state.

Prior to obtaining the loan from the DFRR, we are asked to submit a plan for repaying the entire loan over a 10-year period. Can you imagine making a 10-year forecast in aviation?

[Gergova] Why is Balkan seeking a new company for joint catering activities? Are you dissatisfied with your present partner, Lili Catering Service, to which you owe about 120 million leva?

[Doganov] At the start of February, we gave Lili Catering Service a six-month notification of the termination of the contract. Within that period we hope to find another partner, whose name we shall submit for approval to the Ministry of Transportion, and organize a joint company. It is true that our relations have improved, of late. On the other hand, however, the price of meals on board has increased substantially. In 1992 it averaged about $6 per passenger; in 1994 it was $9.60. Although by the end of last year expenses for food on board dropped by about 15 percent, the price of the service remains rather high.

We created this activity with a view to improving the product and reducing or maintaining the same expenditures. In the final analysis, we improved the product but expenditures rose. Furthermore the accumulated debt to Lili Catering Service, considering Balkan's worsened financial condition, forces us to seek a company that would assume these obligations as a prerequisite for candidacy. We would like to thus spread payments over a longer term.

[Gergova] You have set the condition that the new candidate must have a minimum of 10 years' experience in catering for other airline companies. The result is that no single Bulgarian company is qualified to meet this requirement.

[Doganov] It is most likely that that is what will happen. We are seeking a company with experience, and not a company that is as yet to begin in such activities.

General Staff Officer on Supply Problems

95BA0198D Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel Dimitur Vasilev, chief of the Materiel Department of the General Staff Logistics Administration, by Major Krasen Buchkov; place and date not given: "The Small Budget Is Like Having a Hole in One's Kit Bag"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There will be no camouflaged reform, and let us hope not to have recruits serving in civilian clothes. We need the position of chief of the Materiel Department of the General Staff Logistics Administration.*

[Buchkov] Colonel, what were the funds at the disposal of the department in 1993 and 1994, and how was this reflected in the material support of the Bulgarian Army?

[Vasilev] Based on the norms for material supply of the Army personnel as stipulated in the January 1986 resolution of the Council of Ministers and supplemented in May 1991, a total of 980 million leva were planned for 1993, and 605 million were approved. The planned amount for 1994 was 1.725 billion, while 881.6 million leva were provided. These circumstances, the high inflation, and the value-added tax that is paid by the Ministry of Defense in the procurement of uniforms had an extremely adverse effect on the material support of the personnel.

[Buchkov] Still, some soldiers were not clothed. How were things dealt with?

[Vasilev] There are no soldiers without uniforms. Nor will there be now, in receiving the March recruits. The pity is that the reserves of material property already created were totally used up. They are maintained at the 50 to 80 percent level of the Bulgarian Army's annual need, such as field boots. The command personnel receives 50 to 60 percent of its uniforms and shoes; drafted personnel receive only their basic uniforms. Dress clothing is granted at the level of 50 percent new and 50 percent old, after cleaning and any necessary repairs.

True, field footwear for the soldiers serving in their second year of service has not been supplied. A certain amount of specialized and work clothing for aviation and navigation personnel, the men in the tanks, the parachutists, the medical personnel, and kitchen personnel, and sports equipment, bedding, and other things have not been secured.

[Buchkov] How has the delayed adoption of the budget been reflected on the material supplies?

[Vasilev] The production of uniforms and shoes demands a long time, technologically. Until 1991, contracts for their procurement were concluded in May of the preceding year in order to provide sufficient time to acquire the necessary raw materials, weave the fabrics, and make and supply the proper uniforms and deliver them to the troops. The late adoption of the budget is creating superproblems.

[Buchkov] How many million leva were allocated to the department for 1995, how much of that comes from last year's budget, and how will you make ends meet in the future?

[Vasilev] In 1995 we are allowed monthly expenditures—until the budget is adopted—totaling one-twelfth of last year's budget. These funds are barely sufficient to supply the most necessary equipment for the March recruits, and noting else. No budget has been approved. This is another thing that hinders us. In particular, disorganized material supplies affect the regularity of payments for goods supplied to the ministry. Although by 28 February 1995 the funds allowed by last year's budget had not been spent, the financial administration did not pay for supplies of uniforms by the Khristo Botev plant in Kalofer totaling 22 million leva. The plant, in turn, owes 14 million leva to the Mak textile combine in Gabrovo for the fabrics, and so on. That is what is blocking the system.

What we owe for last year is no more than 17 million, which is a very small figure and does not influence procurements.

[Buchkov] The "camouflage" reform in the Army had to be developed in the spring. Has it been supplied, and with what?

[Vasilev] The idea of introducing camouflage clothing for the conscripts in the Army was not backed in all three basic areas: legally, by ministerial decree or order.

Financially: By permission to spend, until March, three-twelfths of last year's budget, we could ensure only camouflage clothing for drafted personnel, excluding summer clothing. However, all other procurements had to be blocked. There would have been no funds for shoes, dress clothing, underwear, bedding and other things. No items could have been procured for generals, officers, and noncommissioned officers. In a word, the entire material supplies of the Bulgarian Army would have been disorganized.

Nor was the Army was not ensured technologically. It was impossible to produce camouflage fabrics and the manufacturing of camouflaged clothing over a limited period of time. Furthermore, the problem of available heavy winter and summer clothing for the mobilized reserves was not ensured. This clothing has been kept for 10 to 15 years, and some parts of it even for more than 20 years. If we stop updating it, after years it will become unsuitable for use if required. Efforts to sell part of it were unsuccessful. Nor is it possible to change the wardrobe when we are poorer than ever. In my estimate, with 34 years of experience, I believe that this is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves. That is why the March recruits for the Army and the seasonal replacement of clothing as of 1 May will be based on the already established norms, using old clothing.

[Buchkov] Some listen to the music while others order it. Is this the situation in your case—are some trading with companies while others are responsible for the troops?

[Vasilev] The system that was developed in 1992 for the General Staff to plan and request, for the military-economic bloc to contract and supply, and for the financial administration of the Ministry of Defense to pay turned out to be a rather complex program, inefficient and difficult to control. Here, one-man command, which is the basic principle in Army leadership, was eliminated. The Materiel Department of the General Staff Logistics Administration has no guiding or control functions over the remaining two structures. Thus, conditions that allow for irresponsibility—such as shifting accountability and inaction—have been created.

[Buchkov] If a small budget is voted and the administration goes through the same "eye of the needle" as last year, what will be the reaction of the department chief?

[Vasilev] This is inadmissible. I do not even dare think that the government will allow calling to military service young people who will serve in their civilian clothing. There is no such precedent in our history. That is why I expect that the 1995 budget will provide the necessary funds for material supplies. We can no longer hope for anything else. Existing reserves were spent over the past three years.

As to the reaction of the chief of the Materiel Department, if there are no funds the answer is easy: He will not be needed, for he will be jobless. There will be no Armed Forces!

Timber Exports Examined, Policy Criticized

95BA0198B Sofia BULGARSKI BIZNES in Bulgarian 10-17 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Albena Dimitrova: "Young Forests Are Being Cut Down for Export of Timber"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Timber-processing enterprises are forced to make unprofitable deals with random raw material suppliers.*

Raw timber is exported to Turkey, Greece, and the Arab countries, while Bulgarian timber-processing companies are ready to purchase it at the same price in order to maintain their output. Lesoplast in Troyan accounts for 70 percent of the plywood and 60 percent of the lumber produced in Bulgaria. The market is entirely guaranteed. The problem is ensuring the availability of the main raw material—poplar. Even at a cost of 2,000 leva per cubic meter, the price at which commercial companies are offering materials for export, the Bulgarian enterprise is unable to contract for even one-tenth of the quantity needed. The arguments of the forestry farms and the 15 specialized state commercial firms are that timber-processing enterprises are months and years behind in settling their accounts.

The reorganizations in the administrative structures in this sector are endless, cumbersome, and unsuccessful. In the opinion of all parties concerned, the closing down of the Ministry of Forests was a catastrophic decision. The transfer of the sector to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment, or the Ministry of Industry worsens the problems, instead of creating prerequisites for development.

Experts in this branch are of the opinion that uncontrolled logging is the reason for offering, in Bulgaria, essentially small, untreated timber unsuitable for local production. The big timber supplied until recently from Komi is also unsuitable for some types of production. Nonetheless, contractual relations with Komi balanced, to a certain extent, the raw material supplies. However, for the third year running, supplies have not been reaching us regularly.

The establishment of a specialized exchange for timber has been being discussed for several years, without any decision having been reached. An effort to specialize trade in timber was made by the SSB [Sofia Commodity Exchange] but the initiative was rejected by the merchants. Sporadic offers for timber appear at many of the exchanges in the country. At the recent sessions of the SSB, offers of timber (raw and treated) increased significantly, after a virtual lack for a number of months. For sale is: coniferous round timber (6,000 leva per cubic meter), dry-treated pear and cherry timber (13,000 leva per cubic meter), and oak (16,000 leva per cubic meter).

The export fees (ranging from $5-35 per cubic meter) for both raw and processed timber are too low to block the export of raw materials needed by Bulgarian timber-processing enterprises. At the same time Russian production (flat lumber and worked wood [dogrami]) are competing with the Bulgarian products in terms of both price and quality.

The reorganized forestry farms and state commercial firms within the EOOD [Unified Limited-Liability Companies] are partially interested both in the problems of the enterprises in the timber-processing industry and in exporting Bulgarian raw materials abroad. Private companies, however, are ready to pay cash regardless of where the goods are sold.

The timber-processing industry is under the jurisdiction of the MP [Ministry of Industry]. The Committee on Forests is the heir to the former forestry ministry, but without administrative initiative and adequate control rights. After the agreements with Komi were terminated, the Committee should have sought another suitable system for procuring raw materials from the former republics of the CIS—say economic managers in the timber-processing industry. Now they are forced to make unsuitable deals with random suppliers. Experts in the branch are reporting that specialists holding leading positions in commercial activities, by maintaining contacts with Komi, are now engaged in active private business and, essentially, reexport.

According to the forest reorganization plans approved by the Committee on Forests, up to 6 million cubic meters of timber must be cut annually in order to ensure optimal reproduction of the forestry fund. The problem, however, is that the department's budget is not sufficient to ensure the reforestation of the logged areas.

Data Supplied by the Timber Extraction and Construction SO [Economic Enterprise] in Komi

	Number of Workers	Extracted Timber (cubic meters)
1989	12,970	4,367,000
1990	11,890	3,700,000
1991	7,395	1,648,000
1993	4,500	692,000
1994	3,400	410,000

Prime Minister Discusses Party Integration

AU0404121595 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 31 Mar 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek in Prague on 30 March: "Minimizing the Number of Parties Is an Advantage"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, in our regular interview, we will be asking Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus about the problems connected with a foreign partner joining in the Czech oil refineries, the initiative of the Czech and Sudeten German intellectuals, and the integration of the right-wing parties. Furthermore, we will be returning to the trade unionists' demonstration [25 March] and to the situation in the government coalition.

[Musilek] The economics ministers have set the last day of June as the deadline for talks on the entry of the consortium of foreign oil companies into the Czech refineries. Prime Minister, what controversial issues must be settled for the talks to succeed?

[Klaus] I think that I will disappoint you. I do not know. Of course, I am saying this on purpose, because it is not the prime minister's task to conduct the talks. That is up to the minister of industry and trade. Moreover, the minister has created a negotiation team for this purpose, so it is a question now of whether the negotiation team or the minister himself is to be better informed. Nevertheless, I do not want to comment on this. I see no reason why I should be responsible for everything.

[Musilek] I would like to return to last weekend's trade unionist demonstration. Would you say that it has been made into a much more important issue than it actually is, that the union leaders now and then simply have to drag their members out into the square and show them how beneficial they are for the members, and that we will have to get used to this?

[Klaus] I take it like that and I did not make any dramatic comments. When I first saw footage from the demonstration on Nova television, I had to smile at the slogan "Falbr—father of the working people."

[Musilek] A total of 105 Czech and Sudeten German intellectuals are calling for an immediate start of talks between the Czech Government and the representatives of the Sudeten Germans. What is your opinion about this appeal and is the government going to respond to it?

[Klaus] I do not believe that under any circumstances will the government react to it because, among other things, the Foreign Ministry has already published a statement. If 105 people from both sides tell us that a dialogue is needed, let them conduct a dialogue, though I am convinced that it has been conducted anyway.

[Musilek] Do you see the current attempts to integrate the parties on the right as a sign of a healthy process, the maturing process of our political scene?

[Klaus] Certainly. In my opinion, the idea that the more parties, the better, is nonsense. To put it simply, even if it applies, let us say, to the economic market, that the greater the competition the better, that certainly does not mean that it applies to the political market. Here, it is not true that atomism, the fragmentation of the political spectrum is an advantage in any sense. It may be a topic for a broader comparative study into what the political and what the economic market is. Nevertheless, I believe that minimizing the number of parties is an obvious advantage. Thanks to it, distinctive ideologies will be shaped within these parties, which will become plainly legible, clearly distinguishable, and the main dispute between them will be not personal rivalries but rather their quite distinct political programs. I am looking forward to this moment immensely.

[Musilek] Does this mean that although it is not, I would say, on the daily agenda so far, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] is ready to integrate with some, let us say, minor right-wing parties?

[Klaus] Integration certainly depends on the conditions for integrating and the ODS is aware of the positive value of the elucidation of our political spectrum and also well aware of the need to pay somehow for every positive value.

[Musilek] For a week now, the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party have not threatened to withdraw from the coalition. Does this mean that coalition relations have returned to a more standard level than they have been in recent weeks?

[Klaus] I believe that you have noticed that for a week now no new steps have been taken in this area. I must point out that I predicted and said this a week ago, so the development does not surprise me, and I believe that there really is much more of what unites us than the the other way round. As a matter of fact, during a government session, during a remarkably pleasant chat, I said that if a hidden television camera had recorded the previous five minutes and broadcast it that evening, people would not believe that there could be any truth in the reports of the fratricidal war within the government coalition.

Police Said Uncooperative Against Russian 'Mafia'

AU0404172895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech and Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 31 March carry several items on an alleged lack of support on the part of Czech police for the Russian authorities' struggle against organized crime and the police denial of these allegations.

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 31 March on pages 1 and 2 carries a 250-word report by Zuzana Lochmanova, entitled "Czech Authorities Allegedly Refused

To Help Russia in the Struggle Against Mafia," in which she reports on a news conference on 30 March with Bohuslav Snajder, author of a television series "Russia in the Mist" that deals with organized crime in Russia. Snajder told journalists, she writes, that "the Czech bodies, to which the Russian police and counterintelligence turned asking for help in the struggle against the mafia, allegedly have not replied to any appeals." Moreover, when Snajder "met with high-ranking officers of the Czech police, and offered them a police-prepared list of 120 Russian mafiosi, including their photographs, they did not at all react to this offer." Similarly, when the Russian Department for Combating Organized Crime managed to apprehend "one of the most dangerous criminal groups, which specialized on car theft in the Czech Republic, the Czech authorities did not even respond to the request for evidence against the members of the group, and so the Russian police had to let them go."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 31 March carries in the NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY supplement on pages 1 and 3 two articles by Bohuslav Snajder himself—2,000-word "Everpresent Fear" and 2,700-word "Mafia Without Boundaries" respectively—in which he describes the situation with Russian organized crime. In the latter article, the author, inter alia, transcribes an "interview with Colonel Vyacheslav Razinkin from the Department for Combating Organized Crime, who also is a member of the relevant commission of President Yeltsin." The officer is quoted as praising the cooperation with the United States, Germany, Poland, Italy, and France. With the Czech Republic, however, "the relations are rather unilateral. Our appeals disappear... let us say beyond the blue horizon. They do not come back. We do not even get any operative information from the Czech Republic...." Moreover, Snajder says, "other high-ranking officials confirmed this. Some of them admitted that, out of revenge, the Russian side does not send key information, which is otherwise sent on a reciprocity basis to almost all European countries, in the other direction."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 31 March carries on page 16 a 150-word report on a statement by Czech Police Spokesman Ales Svoboda, which refutes the reports that "the Czech side does not cooperate with the Russian security in the struggle against organized crime and underestimates the threat that Russian mafia represent to the Czech Republic." Svoboda further says that the information Snajder offered to the police officers, with whom he met, has been "in part known to our criminal investigators, and in part useless from the point of view of criminal investigation."

Free Press Threatened by Draft Law on Media

95CH0197D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 21 Mar 95 p 11

[Article by Robin Shepherd: "Free Press Is Jeopardized by 'Right-to-Reply' Clause"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech parliament is currently discussing a draft law on the media proposed by the Ministry of Culture. The draft has excited controversy for the inclusion of a "right-to-reply" clause and the omission of any provision granting access to official information.

It is difficult to decide whether the drafters of the law were simply incompetent or motivated by wicked intent. Either way, if the bill is passed in anything like the form in which it has been proposed, freedom of the press in the Czech Republic could be ended as abruptly as it was born in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution.

The essence of the threat lies in the right-to-reply clause. As drafted, the law would require editors and publishers in both the broadcast and print media to allow any individual who feels aggrieved by what has been said about him or her to reply, at equal length, to the article or program. For example, if TV Nova carried a 20-minute documentary on far-right Republican leader Miroslav Sladek, Nova would be required to furnish Sladek 20 minutes to tell his side of the case. If newspapers printed opinion pieces mentioning individuals by name, they would run the risk of having to allot equal space for a reply.

Note that this has nothing to do with libel, spreading malicious rumors or inciting racial or religious hatred. The point of such a clause would be to give the right of response to individuals whose complaints would not survive the rigorous standards set down by the courts. In practice, the law would simply give public figures the legal right to reply to any criticism, however fairly or reasonably expressed, to which they took exception.

It is not difficult to see where this could lead. Editors would inevitably be discouraged from running editorial and opinion pieces for fear of being deluged with demands to reply.

Last year, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus achieved notoriety for describing journalists as "the worst enemies of mankind"—a comment that seems odd coming from a man who has never yet failed to turn up to a press conference. Later, in a televised roundtable discussion with Czech journalists, he tempered his outburst with the explanation that he has nothing against journalists who stick to their proper business of reporting the facts. His gripe was with those who used their position to write opinion and comment. The current draft media law would certainly go some way toward providing precisely the kind of press Klaus wants. But just because the prime minister is opposed to the internationally accepted role of the press as both a reporter of news and a forum for the discussion and advocacy of ideas, it seems a pity that the Czech Republic should be saddled with a law that would effectively censor debate.

Culture Minister Pavel Tigrid is known to be unhappy with the draft law. He apparently voted for it in the hope that parliament would amend it, and as a compromise measure against proposals that would have been more restrictive.

He justifies the omission of a provision guaranteeing access to official information on the grounds that journalists should not be privileged above other citizens in what they are allowed to know—an argument that would have more force if the republic had some form of freedom of information act.

As an illustration of the government's priorities, it should be noted that the Cabinet is proposing a draft law requiring citizens to hand over information about themselves to the Czech Statistical Office or face a fine of up to 100,000 Kc. In other words, it is prepared to force private citizens to reveal information, sometimes personal data, about themselves and their families, but feels no obligation to provide a framework in which the public has clearly defined, enforceable rights to receive information about the working activities of public servants.

In a recent article in KMIT, the journal of the Center for Independent Journalism, columnist Egon Lansky criticizes Czech journalists for their failure to exploit the full potential of a free press for which many of them fought so hard. What more appropriate issue than this to take up Lansky's challenge and expose with vigor the shambles being proposed by the government as the new law on the rights and freedoms of the press?

Judicial System Seen as Chaotic, Contradictory

95CH0194A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 14 Mar 95 p 11

[Article by Sarah Shaw: "Democracy Demands a New Judicial System"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the early 1980s, I became an active member of Amnesty International. The immediate cause of my transformation from passive to active membership was the case of a playwright named Vaclav Havel, then serving a prison term for his work in VONS, a group that publicized cases of human-rights abuses in Czechoslovakia.

The VONS reports were always dry statements of verified fact. The reason for this was not merely the desire for objectivity and good journalistic practice—the writers were also hoping to avoid prosecution under one of the great catchall laws against dissidence, "slander against the state."

Ten years later, I was dismayed when the new Czech government approved a very similar law, in part forbidding "attacks on representatives of the state." The arguments given in support of the law—that the interwar First Republic had had a similar law, as do several Western European states—seemed spurious. Neither this country's first democratic government nor Western democracies carry the same baggage of repression with which this country still struggles. Citizens here are still learning that criticism of the government is no longer dangerous; politicians are still learning that election to public office does not confer monarchical rights. This law seems designed to slow both learning curves.

It was Feb. 15 when I learned that Jiri Wonka had been arrested on charges stemming from a 1994 case brought against him for "attacking" two judges with crude language.

The name Wonka alone is enough to make anyone who followed human rights under the previous regime sit up and take notice.

Pavel Wonka was sentenced in 1986 to a jail term for the crime of attempting to run for political office.

It must be remembered that the communist regime wore all the trappings of parliamentary democracy: elections, political parties and a judicial system that guaranteed due process. Actions such as Wonka's tore away the veil and exposed the hollowness of the facade. As a result, he suffered exceptional persecution in prison.

By the time Wonka was released in 1988, his health was broken [illegible] refused on principle to appear for weekly "parol[illegible]hecks. But even had he wished to comply, his physical condition would have made such visits extremely difficult. As a result of his intransigence, prosecutor Eliska Rychlikova brought further charges against him. On April 20 of that year, he appeared before Judge Marcela Horvathova in a wheelchair, unable to speak above a whisper. Despite a law forbidding imprisonment of the seriously ill, the judge sentenced him to an additional jail term. Six days later, he was dead at just 35 years of age.

Jiri Wonka is Pavel Wonka's brother. The officials whom Jiri "attacked" are the same two who sent Pavel Wonka to his death. They were able to bring charges against Jiri because, unbelievable as it may seem, they are both still "serving" in judicial positions.

One might suppose that someone whose actions are directly responsible for the death of another would count himself or herself lucky if the victim's family responded with no more than a few unvarnished words. The two women in question, however, have no sense of personal responsibility; after all, they were only doing their jobs. This is hardly surprising, given their histories.

What is surprising is that judges who presided over political trials, trials that scoffed at the international human-rights treaties signed by communist Czechoslovakia, should be considered fit defenders of the law in a democratic Czech Republic.

The current Czech judicial system is necessarily in some chaos: Hundreds of new laws offer a wealth of new loopholes. Many laws conflict with other laws or—as in the case of the law against "attacks" on public figures—with constitutional and international guarantees. In other cases, crucial laws have yet to be enacted. Recently, skinheads shouted threats at a judge in his own courtroom. Due to the absence of a contempt-of-court law, they walked away free.

It will take years to form this unwieldy mass into a coherent and consistent legal system. Those whose main expertise was in warping the previous judicial system to suit the whims of their political masters can have no role in this process.

After Pavel Wonka's death, the human-rights groups Charter 77 made specific recommendations, including that an investigation be made into the degree of personal responsibility of the case's prosecutor and judge and that a commission of lawyers examine the legal validity of the charges. The organization also suggested that a commission study the overall state of the Czech judicial and penal systems.

Five years after the revolution, these suggestions are still valid—and long overdue.

Communist Party Loses Its Headquarters

95CH0197A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
21 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Communists Lose Home, So Seek Sympathy Vote"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) is about to be evicted from its headquarters at Politickych veznu 8, near Prague's main post office. But the situation has its bright side, party leaders said.

The Communists plan to make a campaign issue of their homelessness.

Czech Railways, formerly Czechoslovak State Railways, which sold the building to the Communists in 1990 for 52 million Kc (nearly $2 million), wants its property back. And it appears that it will get it.

The KSCM bought the building in August 1990, after it was kicked out of its massive headquarters at Nabrezi Ludvika Svobody.

The contract was good at the time of the sale, but it ran into trouble several months later when the government passed a law requiring state agencies to register by October 31 of that year sales of property to private individuals or groups. For reasons that remain unclear, railway officials neglected to tell anyone about the sale of its building to the Communist Party.

Michaela Vazvorkova, a spokeswoman for Czech Railways, said the company was in different hands at the time, and little is known about what happened. "Maybe they just didn't do their duty," she said.

On March 1, the Supreme Court came down on Czech Railways' side, ruling the sales contract on the property invalid.

Critics say the government's failure to honor its own contracts sets a dangerous precedent. Vaclav Exner, head of the KSCM's club of deputies, said he thinks it is "obvious that there was political influence on the court's decision."

The property now is worth several times its sale price, and the government simply wants it back, Exner said. He said the Communists might take their case to the Constitutional Court.

In the meantime, though, Exner said the party plans to capitalize on its unfortunate situation. "We feel the party has been harmed; we're already organizing political events to focus on this," he said.

Exner predicted that the surge of sympathy, combined with the party's extensive grassroots organization, put in place during last year's local elections, will result in significant gains in 1996. "We will behave in such a way that we will receive 10 percent of the votes in parliament," Exner said.

Ten deputies out of 200 are KSCM members. The Communist Party ran third among 44 parties in November's local elections, capturing 13.4 percent of the country's district seats and 9.2 percent of city council seats. Only the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Christian Democractic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL) fared better.

Jiri Svoboda, a former chairman of the party who left because he claimed it had become too radical, said the party's property rights should not be violated. "This," he said, "could happen only in a banana republic."

Confidence in ODA Declines After Spy Scandal

95CH0197C Prague PRAGUE POST in English
21 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Tomas Kellner: "Spy Scandal Eating Into ODA Support"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Two months after a flap over alleged political spying, two investigations are still underway, and the man who raised the allegations has been re-elected chairman of his party, despite the public's lagging confidence in the organization.

And not one person implicated in the affair has been punished or reprimanded.

Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) Chairman Jan Kalvoda alleged in mid-January that the Security Information Service (BIS) had been spying on political parties. Despite a lack of tangible proof, the government appointed four ministers to an investigative board, and the parliamentary panel that overseas the BIS has also plunged into the case. So far, neither panel has found any evidence that the agency violated the law.

Kalvoda, however, has played down the investigation findings, telling the news service CTK that the results "reflect the political will to close the affair as soon as possible, not to investigate it quickly."

The chairman of the ODA's parliamentary deputies' club, Ivan Masek, complained that the findings to date by the parliamentary panel are a "political proclamation made by vote. You can vote a hundred times that a dog has five legs, but it still is going to have four."

Nevertheless, it appears as though Kalvoda has little interest in helping to crack the case. Despite his claims that he has information proving that the BIS acted illegally, he has not made that information available to investigators.

Although Kalvoda initially said he would reveal his mysterious evidence after the investigation was closed, he said in an interview with the weekly RESPEKT that he would not release "anything that could harm the people who provided me with the information. I will instead ... keep proposing that the commission interrogate other people."

Despite Kalvoda's entanglement in one of the largest post-1989 political controversies, ODA members have renewed their support for him as party chairman. He was re-elected at the party's eighth national convention, which took place in Hradec Kralove the first weekend of March. He received 174 of the 227 votes cast.

The re-election result came as a surprise. Support for the party has fallen by one-third in public opinion polls, from 12.2 percent to 8.2 percent, since Kalvoda issued his allegation.

Some Czech political analysts labeled the accusations an attempt to divert public attention from a financial scandal surrounding the ODA's controversial debt to Kreditni a prumyslova banka, which has since gone bankrupt. The bank's director, Antonin Moravec, was arrested December 12 for allegedly misrepresenting financial information.

Ironically, the only politician affected by the party's political escapades has been ODA founding member Tomas Jezek, who is chairman of the parliamentary budget committee. Jezek left the party in protest of the Kalvoda controversy. He later joined the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

Aero Offers Israeli Avionics Despite Decision

AU0404174095 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Apr p 1

[Article by Jan Gazdik: "Aero Vodochody Apparently Plans To Produce Two Versions of the Same Aircraft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the L-159 aircraft, which is to become the world leader in its category, is currently being developed at Aero Vodochody, Aero head Zdenek Chalupnik, who, with other industrialists, is accompanying Vaclav Havel on his visit to Australia, is not offering this machine to the antipodes. Instead, Vodochody entered the tender for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) training plane with the L-59 F version, the prototype of which does not exist either, but is to be equipped with electronics from the Israeli Elbit arms manufacturer. The RAAF is interested in 40 training aircraft of this category. The first shipments are expected in 1999.

The L-59 F radarless Israeli version with the U.S. Garrett engine (the same as the L-159) apparently belongs in the same category. It means that Vodochody plans the development of two aircraft of the same type that are to differ only in their electronic equipment.

The 72 Vodochody L-159 fighters developed for the Czech Army will be equipped with the state-of-the-art guidance, telecommunications, and arms electronics from the U.S. firm Rockwell. This order was also courted by Elbit. An expert commission eventually chose Rockwell, whose offer was more advantageous. The Israeli arms manufacturer was, on the contrary, favored by Aero head Chalupnik, who allegedly, according to MLADA FRONTA DNES, is economically connected to Elbit.

The president of the Aero board, Jaroslav Borak, claims that it would not be economical to develop one type of aircraft with different avionics for the Czech Army and for exports. Nevertheless, there is such a danger. Borak has not ruled out that the L-159 (the training version without a radar) could be offered in Australia at a later date instead of the L-59 F, if that version were more desirable. He did not say whether Director Chalupnik will do so.

EKONOM Correspondent Examines Future of Army

95CH0179A Prague EKONOM in Czech Jan 95 pp 27-32

[Study prepared by Vaclav Smejkal: "Where Are the Four Wheels of the Army Vehicle Headed?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The minister, people, money, and weapons. How did these "four wheels of the vehicle" of the Army of the Czech Republic fare at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995? Which way will our Army vehicle be headed this year? A specific answer to such questions is only obtained with difficulty. Information from the Ministry of Defense is overwhelmingly general in nature and "void" of detail, as is also likely true of the initial proposal for the military strategy of the Czech Republic, which was dated November 1994 and which was also so characterized by Prime Minister Klaus. A civilian journalist must have his doubts as to whether he might not come across as an incompetent person or, on the other hand, whether he might not be damaging national security; he must, therefore, compile his picture from variously collected fragments. The results are, nevertheless, always of interest....*

The First 100 Days of the New Minister

The mathematician and diplomat from Northern Moravia, Vilem Holan, assumed the office of minister of defense on his 56th birthday on 23 September 1994. The KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union—Czech People's Party], of which he became a member in 1990, decided that he should replace the first minister of defense of the independent Czech Republic, Antonin Baudys.

The heritage which Holan took over was easy and difficult at the same time. Following the "media" minister Baudys, who, although he was not a soldier, loved to shoot firearms, was intolerant of obese officers, and entertained the public with little scandals which he had originally not caused or which he did not intend to be malicious, it was not difficult to make a solid impression. The new minister also indicated prior to taking office that he "knows in which areas he will be better" than his predecessor. Even an outside observer can estimate today what he obviously had in mind. The difference between both of these politicians, which is observable after a scant three months, does not lie merely in the fact that Holan did serve in the military (with a technical battalion) and does not particularly like to shoot firearms. He appears substantially fewer times on television as well as in the pages of the press and when he does so he speaks with discretion, for the most part, about generalities. He thus successfully gives the impression that he is a contemplative and serious person. And according to people who know him on the basis of having worked together, he is indeed such a person.

However, it is the more difficult portion of the ministerial heritage that is decisive; this involves the partially transformed and, according to the critics of former Minister Baudys, even the partially disintegrated Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), which was incapable of combat. Holan took it over at a time when a concept for its development by 1996 did exist, when the transition to a new system of planning, programming, and budgeting was announced, when a proposal for military strategy was being readied, and at a time the process of reorganization, redeployment, and personnel transformation within the ACR had been "started." On the other hand, this was an extremely obtuse situation which was changing in a somewhat chaotic manner, which was primarily losing its younger and more promising officers. The Army was an organization in which virtually 40 percent of the citizens either definitely or more likely did not believe in and whose rearming was plagued by tales which were full of bribery and behind-the-scenes machinations.

The new minister announced that he will give preference to systems steps rather than a radical purge of the army of individuals or possibly entire categories of soldiers and civilian employees. Systems provisions require time and that is perhaps why there have been so few fundamental provisions and changes over the past three months. The deputy ministers as well as the key officers in the General Staff have remained in place. Some "personnel gleaning", which was not more specifically described, did not occur until the first 10 days of December, following the theft of weapons from the Ministry of Defense guard detail. Career soldiers were clearly most impacted by the change in service rules, which put a halt to their automatic advancements and promotions, based on years of service.

However, some items which had been a long time in preparation were of a fundamental character and it was not until the Holan Ministry of Defense that the appropriate organs and, in part, even the public were familiarized with them. According to the government's work plan, the beginning of November saw the submission for approval of the Military Strategy of the CR [Czech Republic]. The government at first recommended that it be made more specific and then did not adopt a finalized version until the end of December 1994. Representatives of industry as well as journalists were also informed in November with regard to the outline appearance of the Acquisition Plan for the ACR for the Years 1995 Through 2005, on the basis of which the Army intends to attain the required level of equipment, action capability, and cooperation with NATO. Successful realization of this plan depends as early as this year on the smooth start-up of a new system of management in the ACR. This is the so-called system of planning, programming, and budgeting. The very fact that this material was submitted or published (its content will be reviewed later) is certainly not an extraordinary action attributable to the new minister. But it constitutes the essential prerequisite for the planned finalization of the transformation of the ACR by 31 December 1995 and for its subsequent development.

For the present, the ACR is still waiting for any systems changes initiated directly by Minister Holan. Thus far, the Army has not felt the replacement of the central supervisor in any extraordinary way in the majority of units, and so a number of negative manifestations are persisting. The minister does not want to "avoid talking of bad things in the Army," but has wrapped his intentions (through the end of 1994) into general statements regarding the functions of the Army, the defense capability of the country, and the responsibility of its citizens for this ability. If we credit him with having the right to be left in peace for his first 100 days, we could think that, following the stump performance of his predecessor, the new minister has deliberately had no surprises for us "civilians," he has not entertained us, nor has he caused us any grief.

His performance will have to be all the more resolute this year because the status of the Army is virtually calling for measures based on principles. This is not merely a matter of the frequently debated criminality within the Army, of which the robbery assault on the guard detail at the Ministry of Defense by its fellow combatants is only the most visible tip of the iceberg. From the standpoint of the future of the ACR, the greatest problem is presented by its personnel structure, the unbalanced nature of which was mentioned in parliament even by Prime Minister Klaus in his December speech. It is precisely people rather than money or equipment which represent the Achilles' heel of our Army.

There Is a Shortage of People...

This "eternally green" lament is also applicable to the current ACR, but not in terms of the mere quantitative meaning of the word. The order of battle of the Army is being deliberately reduced. The ACR "began" its existence as an army of more than 100,000 (113,000 as of 1 January 1993). At the beginning of 1994, its numbers were around 80,000 and at the end of that year there were only 70,000 men. This year, the number of men under arms is to reach the long-desired 65,000 mark. The principal problem of the ACR has to do primarily with the rank and age imbalance within the personnel structure. This unsatisfactory status, which is frequently characterized as being at a ratio of 2,000 lieutenants and 7,000 colonels, is both the heritage inherited from the old Czechoslovak People's Army [CSLA] and also the consequence of societal changes following 1989. However, Dr. A. Rasek, who is a specialist regarding Army questions, notes that the present status of the ACR is also directly the result of the campaignlike, conflict-filled, and generally unmanaged personnel transformation which has taken place over recent years.

Let us at least specifically list the main reasons for the present problems. Career service in the military has long been considered (and continues to be so today) as lifelong employment. Growing old with the Army and reaching higher rank based on years of service was completely normal and there could be no shortage of higher-ranking officers. Central organs were inflated and within these units the men with gold shoulder boards frequently performed work worthy of incompetent auxiliary personnel. In contrast, the relationship toward military service among young people was deteriorating over the long run and inevitably; perhaps an exception can be made for those interested in equipment, particularly in aircraft. These conflicting tendencies intensified still further following 1989. The Army began verifications, attestations, reattestations, as well as lustrations and rehabilitations. The ministry was headed by several chiefs of unequal quality. The previously silent criticism of the Army in society moreover changed into a vocal one and there was public doubt expressed with regard to the meaning and purpose of this institution. The uncertain prospects of a military career were obvious to the eye in comparison with growing opportunities of jobs and earnings in the civilian sector.

Do you have confidence in the Army of the Czech Republic?

(In Percent)

	Feb 90	Jun 91	Mar 92	Feb 93	Oct 93	Feb 94	Jun 94	Oct 94
Definitely yes, more or less	39	38	56	59	56	57	50	43
More or less not, definitely not	56	45	29	29	36	35	41	37

Note: The balance to make up 100 percent in each column represents the responses of "I do not know," "I am not interested."

Source: Institute for Public Opinion Research

Underscored and added up: The number of professional soldiers in the ACR declined to 67 percent in 1994; openings for students at advanced military schools are not even being successfully filled to the extent of 50 percent; at military medical schools, only about 20 percent of such openings are being filled with younger age classes. Departures from the Army are many times higher than recruitment: In the first half of 1994, 1,008 officers departed and only 46 joined up and, for the most part, joined the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] unit. Recruitment of noncommissioned officers for the same period was somewhat better (397) and warrant officers (157). However, these are drops in the bucket if we consider that over the year and a half which the ACR has existed some 17,756 career soldiers departed and that the ratio of officers to warrant officers in the Army is 2.2:1, whereas in the mixed armies of the Western countries this ratio is running at 1:3 and in professional armies it is even 1:7. If we add to the shortage of noncommissioned officers and lower-ranking officers the effect of shortening compulsory military service to a period of 12 months—during which it is not possible to provide quality training in the handling of some weapons and systems—the doubts regarding the combat capability of the ACR must appear to us to be more than justified.

The optimization of the personnel structure in the Army and the recruitment of young and capable individuals are pretty hard nuts to crack. The halting of automatic advancements and the requirement for postgraduate studies as a condition for further promotion, which was a decision made by Minister Holan, only serves to prevent a further intensification of negative tendencies. According to specialists, the fundamental change for the future should involve the introduction of flexible time-graduated contracts with those interested in professional service. This method could turn the signing up for Army service for five, 10, or more years into an opportunity for a number of young men from socially weaker families to acquire a higher education, to overcome a complicated period for them, to provide relief for the family budget, etc. In the final analysis, things in many Western armies are no different. Of course, this involves a big incursion into the structure of the Army and into well-established stereotypes regarding the way it is perceived, but any other road hardly leads to making it actually semiprofessional in character. All other measures having to do with the career military, pay and emolument regulations, the Army education system, and others can be only a substantial supplement, but not the basis for the personnel transformation of the Army.

The Ministry of Defense will thus, in 1995, be compelled to undertake fundamental steps involved in the recovery of the personnel structure of the ACR. Although the minister assured the public in December 1994 that 30 percent of its officers are already younger than 30 years of age, and if we add to this number the number of warrant officers this age category accounts for 43 percent of all professional soldiers. By coincidence, the supreme commander of NATO forces in central Europe, Helge Hansen, noted at the same time that our Army lacks a spine, that is to say, a professional noncommissioned officer corps, without which it is impossible to forge an Army. Let us hope that the minister of defense will take his words to heart and that not too long a time will pass before he will be able to announce to us that young warrant officers and officers are already the "qualified majority" among professional soldiers.

There Is Even a Shortage of Funds...

State budget expenditures for defense purposes were (approximately) 23 billion korunas [Kc] for 1993; they approached the limit of Kc27 billion for 1994 and will exceed that limit in 1995 by Kc45 million. Just these initial data permit the easy computation indicating that this year defense will "swallow up" 6.6 percent of the expenditure side of the budget and 2.45 percent of the GDP; for the same period, every citizen of the Czech Republic will contribute not quite Kc2,700 for defense against "external risks." These numbers, which are perhaps suitable for making international or time comparisons, are not, however, the most interesting elements in the relationship between the Army and money by a long shot. They only tell us how much society is capable of and willing to spend on its defense (for example, for this year the ACR would like to get 50 percent more resources than it will actually receive), but they say nothing about the method and the effectiveness with which the Army manages these funds. A poorly managed army and uncontrolled management can be covered over with all kinds of sums, but it will not turn into a reliable and combat-capable force, no matter what.

The resources which the ACR receives from the budget annually are, to put it figuratively, "consumed" and "invested." In the past, the ratio between operating and capital expenditures was 5:1 (in the NATO countries, this number is 6:4), and even to a layman it was obvious that the Army was eating up its technical levels by paying an unnecessary amount of high-ranking salaries, military pensions, and elemental operational unthriftiness. However, the unsuitable proportions involving operating and capital expenditures were merely the overture to a tragicomic game involving taxpayer funds. The finances of the CSLA, followed by the Czechoslovak Army [CSA] and, in part, also by the ACR, were for a long time in such a state that no one knew precisely where and how much was being wasted. The Army was being paid as an institution rather than being paid for fulfilling tasks which it was actually charged with supporting. Beginning at a certain level, accounting was done only in terms of units of items consumed rather than in terms of money expended; there was no double-entry bookkeeping system and write-offs did not exist. No one could have a natural overview regarding how much the Army owned, how much it was spending per soldier, unit, or on a given task.

Because of its long years in operation, the system could, understandably, not be changed overnight. After the political changes in the fall of 1989, there was no doubt that the system was not tenable, and the Army, which was undergoing a multilayered transformation and shortly thereafter being divided into Czech and Slovak parts, gradually worked its way through toward accepting a new system of planning, programming, and budgeting. This method of management, taken over from the practices of the armies of developed democratic nations (originally this was the so-called Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System—PPBS), is becoming the alpha and omega of Army financing as of this year. The PPBS allocates not only an untouchable 30 percent of the budget of the Army to investments, but primarily also brings along the completely new concept of quantifying the requirements of the Army and using the allocated funds to meet these requirements.

The basis for the new system of management is made up of tasks, the fulfillment of which the ACR is supposed to assure. The identification of these tasks is based on the fundamental document, represented by the Military Strategy of the CR, which defines security risks. Its principal doctrinal theses are known, and it is therefore possible to state that management of the ACR for the year 1995 is based on the following tasks assigned to the Defense Department:

- to assure that the state has a credible capability to defend its sovereignty;
- to provide for the security of the citizenry and to thus create the prerequisites for repulsing aggression;
- to effectively build the military defense system of the Czech Republic, commensurate to external threats and the economic opportunities of the state and to coordinate preparations for defense;
- to assure the readiness of the state and its armed forces to make the transition from a peacetime footing to a wartime footing in the event of a threat in an organized manner and use its armed forces to resist an opponent;

- to create the conditions for having the defense forces join transatlantic and European collective defense organizations of democratic nations;
- to assure the efficient fulfillment of tasks within the framework of having ACR units join in UN peaceful operations, or possibly the CSCE and other international organizations.

These general goals were specifically worked out by the Ministry of Defense and inserted into programs designed to achieve them in such a manner that every unit knew what was expected of it. Unit commanders were then expected to formulate their requirements for personnel staffing, finances, and equipment on the basis of the tasks assigned. Because the PPBS is just being introduced, the "expenditures" for 1995 could only be estimated. It will not be possible to base the amount requested by the ACR to assure defense capability for the state on a realistic and comparable foundation until the transition is made to double-entry bookkeeping and after controls are instituted to monitor fulfillment of tasks and the effectiveness of resources expended on them during 1995. But already resources are being allocated according to the priority of assigned tasks, with preference naturally going to those tasks (and subsequently to those units) whose quantified share in eliminating the risk of threat to the state is the greatest. Similarly, it should be possible to come up with an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of expended human, material, and financial resources.

According to information made available by the Ministry of Defense, the new system is sufficiently flexible to provide for planning for 10 years (long-range), five years (medium-range), and for annual periods, including making allowances for modifications according to changing priorities, as well as in line with available resources. Thus, the basic tasks of the ACR should be assured adequate resources under any circumstances. On the other hand, the ACR is counting on the fact that among its requirements there will be those for which resources will not be found in the budget for a certain period of time. In such a case, the PPBS must be sufficiently elastic in order to find the necessary resources on a gradual basis. The conditions for such a functioning system are the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping (effective on 1 January 1995), the finalization of plans for computer support and integration of logistics, as well as the methodical provision of supplemental training for personnel to handle the new method of work. In short, accountants and economists, even those at the regimental level, will have to become respected individuals, otherwise it will be a long time yet before the ACR becomes an efficiently and transparently managing institution.

* * * * *

Even Our Weapons Have Become Obsolete

The question as to the method the ACR will use to manage the 30 percent (and in the future it will rise to 50 percent) of resources which it plans to invest each year can appear to be academic only at first glance. The sum, which this year amounts to Kc5.5 billion, will be distributed among the entities of the market—among Army suppliers. More than 70 Czech firms showed interest in receiving Army orders just in conjunction with the contemplated rearming project. Perhaps what is elsewhere called the military-industrial complex is being born here in the form of a new anatomy....

The necessity to rearm the ACR was confirmed in November by Minister Holan himself in the press: "It is generally known that weapons and weapons systems which are in the possession of our Army are morally and technically obsolete." He also made it clear to whom the ACR will be turning with its purchases: "Everyone perhaps also agrees with the decision of the government not to compensate the national debt through buying military equipment from the countries of the CIS and to thus tie the security of the state to this region." In other words, the greatest chances are given to domestic and to Western suppliers.

The basic document covering the rearming of the ACR and, thus, serving also as a guide for possible suppliers is the Acquisition Plan of the ACR for the Years 1995-2005, with which representatives of enterprises and the press were acquainted in November 1994. Even this document, which came into being at the Ministry of Defense and within the General Staff in the first half of 1994, is based on the requirements involving defense capability as defined in the Military Strategy of the CR and is closely interrelated with the system of planning, programming, and budgeting, which has already been mentioned. In the process of creating this plan, the current status of ACR property was evaluated from the standpoint of utility value, life expectancy, structure, and volume. Developmental programs to support individual tasks of the Army were "filled" with necessary equipment, with priority going to the previously mentioned priority programs which formed the basis of the country's defense capability. The final plan will be adjusted on an ongoing basis in accordance with the amount of allocated resources and the conceptual principles involved in the further development of the Defense Department and the Army of the CR. The latter should, by realizing the plan, bring its equipment levels up to the level commensurate with being accepted into NATO. Although Minister Holan refused to talk about technical comparability with NATO by a certain date, he did promise that the ACR would be provided with "solid technical support" on the basis of the Acquisition Plan.

Domestic industry, which is considered by the Ministry of Defense to be the "potential future supplier of the majority of the significant commodities required by the ACR," is expected to get the lion's share of the Acquisition Plan orders. The only condition is the required technical and technological level of deliveries, where domestic manufacturers must not lag behind foreign competition. Nevertheless, from the very beginning it is clear that international participation will be necessary in a number of cases where a domestic development and production base does not exist for a sought-after weapon or weapons system. One way or another, moreover, even domestic suppliers will have to participate in international coproduction. The ACR itself cannot valorize any major project on the basis of its purchases, and assertion in other markets will be a matter of profitability for manufacturers. The Ministry of Defense promises that the ACR will "in turn" support the penetration of high-quality Czech equipment in foreign markets through its purchases and through its foreign contacts. Another form of assistance by the ACR for domestic industry is supposed to be the principle embodied in the Acquisition Plan, according to which "an important criterion for selecting a foreign supplier will be the share in coproduction offered to Czech industry or possibly the opportunity to market reciprocal products produced by the domestic base."

In selecting the specific supplier, the Ministry of Defense must strictly observe the provisions of the "Law on Placing Public Orders," dated September 1994. However, by referring to the "protection of secret facts in the area of defense and security," the ACR definitely has no intentions of making its purchases a completely public matter. In a number of instances, it will make use of Section 49 and Section 50 of the above law to place a public order through the form of a written invitation to interested parties. This gives rise to the curious question as to whether the "essential secrecy" might not become a cover for the interest interconnection between those portions of the ministry responsible for written invitations and for conducting selection proceedings with representatives of selected firms. The scandal involving the selection of a foreign supplier for electronic gear for the L-159 aircraft and involving the attempt to bribe the deputy minister, which ran in the press, could be one item of evidence indicating that such fears might be justified. Minister Holan promises to personally check on the results of selection proceedings; however, the requirement for a systems approach would more likely be served by the establishment of an effective mechanism of controls within the Ministry of Defense, as well as oversight by the Defense and Security Committee of parliament.

The Ministry of Defense published specific information about the kinds of projects and their costs only in outline form because more detailed specifications are already subject to the secrecy requirement. The Acquisition Plan for the Years 1995-2005 encompasses 22 areas of equipment and the ACR would like to acquire Kc120 billion for its realization. This sum, moreover, includes capital expenditures for construction (18.2 percent) and expenditures for the realization of the ACR ecological program (0.1 percent). Although the purely numerical operation indicates that the ACR would like to make annual investments which average around Kc12 billion, the 1995 budget allocates Kc5.5 billion for these purposes, and of this amount, only Kc4 billion for the Acquisition Plan. In other words, the new system of planning, programming, and budgeting will be compelled to demonstrate its promised flexibility from the first days.

The table below indicates the percentage share of individual groups of military equipment in total expenditures. As a matter of interest, it is possible to note that, for example, this year the ACR would like to purchase virtually all of its radio equipment, half of its reconnaissance resources, information systems, cross-country and transport automobiles, midrange transport aircraft, and some air traffic control devices, as well as equipment for air defense. In contrast, it will not be until around the year 2000 that plans call for acquisition of combat helicopters, antiaircraft missile complexes, or signal-jamming devices.

Share of Individual Areas of Armament in the Total ACR Rearming Expenditures Within the Framework of Its Acquisition Plan for the Years 1995-2005

Item No.	Equipment	Share (in percent)
1.	Armament, weapons, and ammunition up to 20-mm caliber, antitank guided missiles, guided and unguided aircraft missiles and bombs	12.4
2.	Armored equipment	2.0
3.	Artillery equipment, artillery ammunition, and road-blocking devices	2.3
4.	Radar devices	4.3
5.	Radioelectronic devices	3.0
6.	Line, switching, and terminal communications devices	2.9
7.	Special equipment and equipment for radioelectronic warfare	1.0
8.	Reconnaissance devices and systems	2.4
9.	Devices for topographic support	0.4
10.	Information systems	5.0
11.	Command and staff work sites	0.2
12.	Workshop equipment, workshops, and vehicle recovery devices	0.2
13.	Wheeled equipment, wheeled transport and cargo-handling devices	2.7
14.	Other devices for logistic support	1.3
15.	Other apparatus	0.1
16.	Security devices and items for the military police	0.8
17.	Individual protective gear	1.0
18.	Training facilities—simulators	0.4
19.	Combat aviation equipment, gear, and ammunition	27.9
20.	Devices, materiel, security equipment for flight operations	3.3
21.	Air defense devices	7.9
22.	Medical materiel and equipment	0.2

Note: The balance to make up 100 percent represents investments of a construction and ecological character.

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic

* * *

In conclusion, it remains only to be emphasized that the year which is beginning will be a time of important tests for defense. After 100 days of grace, the new minister will have to confirm the justification of his appointment. This year, the Army is supposed to attain its final strength of 65,000 men and, by 31 December, conclude its fundamental transformation. This year, we shall also learn how the new system of Army management has begun to function and how successfully its plan for rearming is being realized. The five international exercises within the framework of the Partnership for Peace project will also constitute an essential, albeit not totally comprehensive, verification check on the ACR. In brief, it is necessary to wish our symbolic "Army vehicle" bon voyage in 1995.

[Box, p 32]

The chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of parliament, Vladimir Suman, responded in writing to questions submitted by the weekly EKONOM on 19 December 1994 as follows:

[EKONOM] Soon, 100 days will have passed since the appointment of V. Holan to the office of minister of defense. How do you evaluate his first steps? How do you feel that he is succeeding in improving the reputation of the ACR among the public and in rendering its management more transparent?

[Suman] First of all, I would like to say that 100 days is a very short time for orientation in such a specific area as is represented by defense for a person who essentially had no contact with the Army before. It is in this connection that I value the fact that the minister did not adopt any fundamental measures during the first weeks of his tenure. This bears witness to his prudent approach. Even the other members of the Defense and Security Committee are taking the above 100 days into account.

On the other hand, however, I must admit that I expect the minister to make decisions during the first part of 1995 in a number of areas through which he will react not only by his attitude—which he has already expressed in a number of instances—but also by adopting systems-wide measures to resolve some negative manifestations (for example, the death of soldiers in conjunction with the guard detail, corruption) the tragic character or unacceptable extent of which is causing public indignation. Similarly, the minister will have to decide on measures which resolve important problems in the area of defense and in the Army particularly. And these decisions will have to include the responsibility of individuals and the verifiable and verified schedule of realization for these measures. Believe me, it is my personal experience that compels me to speak in such complicated terms—not every verifiable schedule is actually verified with consequences for those who have failed to fulfill that which they should have and could have.

I am happy to note that I fully agree with the views and activities of the minister in the foreign area.

[EKONOM] Parliament has approved the budget of the Czech Republic for the year 1995. In your opinion, does the allocation of Kc28 billion intended for military expenditures meet the needs of the ACR? Does it reflect the views of the Defense and Security Committee regarding expenditures for the Army?

[Suman] First of all, I must say that I consider the question as to whether the budget meets the needs of the Army to be highly problematic. We should really be asking whether it is realistic that by utilizing these resources for the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Defense the defense capability of our country is assured. It is very useful for all of us to realize that the purpose for expending these resources is not the existence of the Army, nor of the Defense Department, but the assurance of sovereignty, freedom for the citizenry, and democracy in this country. In response to the question posed in this manner, I must say that these expended resources fulfill two purposes. They support conditions for the transformation of the Army in all directions, of which—and I would stress this—questions of weapons systems are far from being the most important ones. Furthermore, this budget sends a signal, not only to our friends, but also to our potential enemies, that we are a country which, even though it has its economic problems which reflect the current phase of transformation in our society, is determined to devote an appropriate portion of its state budget to defending its country.

[EKONOM] In what stage of preparation, negotiation, or possible realization are the fundamental strategic materials—the Military Doctrine of the CR, the Concept of the Army of the CR, the System of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting of the Army of the CR?

[Suman] As far as the above materials are concerned, with the exception of planning, I have a somewhat different view from that held by the government. If I were to judge by the progress being made with respect to a number of materials having to do with the security of our country, I cannot escape the impression that the government is making efforts to restrict the influence of parliament to a minimum. For example, in recent days the government has repeatedly discussed material, the content of which is the military strategy of the Czech Republic, without submitting anything to the appropriate committee of parliament for discussion, and I emphasize that I am not speaking of approval here. The results of discussions would make it possible for the minister of defense, prior to submitting his material to the government, to evaluate any possible mockups made by members, all delegates could inform their political organs, and the coalition delegates would be informing "their" ministers within the government.

This would increase the likelihood that the decision by the government would be truly a coalition decision which would even take into account the views of noncoalition politicians. This is precisely what democracy is and particularly so in regard to questions having to do with such fundamental problems as is the security of the state. Based on the conduct of some members of the government toward parliament, I am compelled to deduce that parliament is an institution whose very existence troubles them. For me, this is, of course, unacceptable. Informal discussions with Minister Holan on this topic indicate that there is a hope that, regarding this matter, the committee will reach an understanding with him. Believe me when I tell you that that about which I speak does not represent any kind of prestige gains by politicians who are insatiably power hungry, but rather represents an expression of delegate responsibility to their voters for the realization of such policies for which they voted.

As for the system of planning, programming, and budgeting in the Army, this involves the takeover of the normal system of double-entry bookkeeping which never existed in the Army before. Furthermore, what is involved here is the fact that budgetary expenditures cover a period longer than one year so that those judging the budget would know what consequences their decisions will have in the outyears. The purpose of these measures is to gradually render the budget more transparent. This year, things are already substantially better than they were last year, and next year they will be better than this year. The Army is learning, and even we are learning. In this area, not only the proper directions have been taken, but substantial progress has also been made.

PRC's Qian Qichen Ends Official Visit

LD0404124295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Qian Qichen PRC vice premier and foreign minister, is ending his four-day visit to the Slovak Republic. He was received today by President Michal Kovac. Jan Baranek has more details.

[Baranek] Welcoming the Chinese guest, President Michal Kovac said Slovakia has great interest in its relations with China. The president then went on to note with satisfaction the growing development of friendly relations between the two countries, especially last year, when they were very intensive at several levels. Michal Kovac said he believes there is nothing to prevent their further development. The president continued by saying that Slovakia is aware that it is still going through transformation and facing various problems, and that it is necessary to stabilize the economic and domestic political situation.

Following this, talks continued behind closed doors. After the talks, we asked Vladimir Stefko, the Slovak president's spokesman, to briefly assess the talks between Qian Qichen and Michal Kovac, which have just ended.

[Begin Stefko recording] Qian Quichen, Chinese vice premier and foreign minister, who is finishing his several-day long visit to Slovakia, said his talks here in Slovakia with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, and Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk were very useful and productive. Many projects and ideas, born during last year's visit to the PRC by Prime Minister Meciar, were further developed.

President Kovac said relations between China and Slovakia are developing very favorably, there are no disputes between the two countries, and there are very realistic prospects for the development of cooperation in trade, economy, science, and education.

The Chinese guest said that Slovak goods, especially machinery, are well known in China and that China is interested in continuing these trade relations. At the same time, the Chinese vice premier and foreign minister relayed a formal greeting from the Chinese president to his Slovak counterpart inviting him to pay an official visit to China in the second half of 1995. He also said that President Michal Kovac's visit to China was viewed by China's leadership as a culmination of Chinese-Slovak relations so far. The president accepted the invitation. [end recording]

Hungarian Catholics Complain to Pope

AU0404135095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 1 Apr 95 p 7

[Article by TASR: "Hungarian Catholics From the Slovak Republic Complain to Pope"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest—In a letter sent to Pope John Paul II, more than 52,000 Hungarian Catholics living in Slovakia complain about their discrimination within the Church. The main motive of the letter is the pope's forthcoming visit to Slovakia, writes the Hungarian Catholic agency MAGYAR KURIR.

The letter states that the Hungarian minority makes up about 10 percent of Slovakia's population of 5.3 million but that, in contrast to the political sphere, the Hungarian minority has virtually no representation in the Catholic Church. There is not even one Hungarian in the 15-member Slovak Bishops' Conference and there are no Hungarian departments within the different religious establishments and movements for the renewal of active Catholic life.

Church authorities are sending to Hungarian believers priests who do not have a good command of the Hungarian language. The plans of the leadership of the Slovak Catholic Church concerning possible changes in the borders of dioceses fill Hungarians with apprehension because, in drawing up those plans, no heed is being paid to traditional ethnic territories. Many senior church dignitaries reject most of the Hungarian minority's specific demands, which suggests that historical reconciliation between members of different nationalities has not yet taken place in Slovakia.

"Our appeals for discussion on these burning issues have not been rejected en bloc, but the permanent postponement of the dates of possible meetings has virtually thwarted any constructive dialogue between the two sides. Moreover, reproaches that, by their demands, Hungarian Catholics damage the Slovaks' national and state interests affect us unpleasantly," the letter states, among other things.

[On the same day, on page 2, Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak carries a 250-word "gav"-attributed report entitled "John Paul II Changes Organization of Catholic Church in Slovakia," which reveals that the changes in dioceses referred to in the Hungarian Catholics' letter have already been implemented. According to the report, based on the pope's decision, the name of the Trnava archdiocese is being changed into Trnava-Bratislava archdiocese as of 31 March 1995 and a new Kosice archdiocese is being established as of the same date. As a result of these changes, NARODNA OBRODA reports, "the Slovak Catholic Church will be organized as follows as of 31 March 1995: The Bratislava-Trnava Archdiocese, along with the Nitra archdiocese and the Banska Bystrica diocese, form the Bratislava-Trnava church province and the Kosice archdiocese, along with the Roznava and Spis dioceses, form the Kosice church province. The Presov Greek Catholic diocese is subordinated directly to the Holy See."]

Commentary: 'Outrageous Letter'

AU0404135595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Jan Smolec: "Hungarian Catholics in Slovakia Are Supposedly Discriminated; Outrageous Letter to Pope John Paul II"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It has been known for some time that some Hungarian politicians in Slovakia want to achieve their irredentist aims little by little. First they came up with the demand for territorial and school autonomy. With yesterday's letter to the Holy Father in the Vatican, they made it clear that now they also seek a Hungarian church province in Slovakia. The next step can only be full autonomy.

We have given them a finger and yesterday they asked for the whole hand. What kind of a brazen and outrageous demand will the irredentists put forward tomorrow? Slovaks in Hungary would be happy if they had a Slovak teacher and priest. They cannot have them because Hungarian genocide had exterminated them.

Immediately after the signing of the treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic, the Slovak Government stressed that it never accepted, and did not enshrine in the treaty, any formulations based on recognition of the principle of a minority's collective rights or formulations that would permit the establishment of autonomous structures on ethnic foundations.

Duray Clarifies Territorial Autonomy Call

AU0404140595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 31 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray by Ondrej Dostal; place and date not given: "Coexistence Prefers System of Self-Administration to Territorial Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Coexistence congress [25-26 March] passed a resolution stating that, if a system of self-administration is not established in Slovakia, it will seek territorial autonomy.

[Dostal] Are you afraid that this will lead to an escalation of tension?

[Duray] The resolution does not assign the task to set up territorial autonomy. It is an alternative that will become viable if the effort to democratize the system of self-administration fails. The Hungarian coalition's endeavor is to establish a self-administered system and self-administered territorial units respecting, among other factors, the ethnic composition of the population. This is embedded also in the Komarno documents [January 1994, containing Hungarian minority demands]. If we do not succeed in bringing this about, we will push for the creation of territorial autonomy.

[Dostal] What is the difference between these two possibilities?

[Duray] The system of self-administration would be applied across the board, that is, throughout Slovakia, and could be set up by amending the law on communities. Territorial autonomy requires a special law. The first system is symmetrical; the second asymmetrical.

[Dostal] Which of the two does Coexistence prefer?

[Duray] The self-administration system.

[Dostal] If the self-administration system is rejected, is it realistic to expect any readiness to set up territorial autonomy?

[Duray] Should even the self-administration system as proposed in Komarno be rejected, it would mean that Slovakia is not ripe for democracy and does not even have a chance of joining the EU.

[Dostal] Why?

[Duray] The EU states have a very good vertically arranged self-administration system, with powers delegated to the lowest tiers in compliance with the subsidiarity principle. For the time being, such a system has been rejected in Slovakia. The project being emphasized, including in the government manifesto, does not respect the subsidiarity principle.

[Dostal] And what about the project of counties, for example?

[Duray] That could serve as a good basis for discussion. We do have certain objections to it, but these could be addressed in a discussion. Our objections to this are not the same as to the government's project.

Daily Views New Hungarian Party's Impact

AU0404151695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 31 Mar 95 p 4

[Commentary by Ondrej Dostal: "Hungarian Left Has Crossed Its Rubicon—The Die Is Cast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Plans to set up a left-wing Hungarian party have recently assumed more definite, though surprising, outlines. Of two obvious possibilities that offered themselves, a third possibility asserted itself in the end. The Hungarian People's Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity (MLHZP) is entering the Slovak political scene.

The first theoretical possibility was that the new entity would emerge as a consequence of carefully considered steps by the Slovak left, particularly the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), aspiring to appeal also to left-wing voters of Hungarian nationality. The second theoretical Hungarian left-wing option was the gradual transformation of the social platform emerging within the Coexistence Movement into an independent entity. None of this has materialized, however.

In the end, the reality looks quite different. The Hungarian left-wing entity will be born of the initiative of former Coexistence functionary G. Gyimesi, which originally appeared to be insignificant. Gyimesi's initial activities created the impression of Meciar's Trojan horse within the Hungarian minority, which discredited these activities in the eyes of Hungarian voters in advance. However, now that some SDL members, including former SDL Deputy Chairwoman A. Borzova, joined Gyimesi's initiative, the chances of this project have definitely grown.

It has been confirmed that, for the time being, the social platform does not intend to leave the ranks of Coexistence. Now that G. Gyimesi, whose reputation in circles close to the Hungarian coalition is not exactly the best, has established himself, this has become even less likely. The Slovak left, rather than steering the whole development itself, appears to be taken aback it. Moreover, relations between defectors and their parental parties are traditionally bad in Slovakia. In spite of this, the emerging MLHZP ranks the SDL and the SDSS among its closest partners. Given these circumstances and the still tense Slovak-Hungarian relations, it is questionable whether the possibility of a Slovak-Hungarian left-wing preelection coalition can be considered.

If not, the words about a Trojan horse would become relevant again. Risking the forfeiture of, possibly, up to 10 percent of votes that the Hungarian coalition currently secures for the standard part of the political spectrum would undoubtedly play into the hands of, above all, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and its satellites. Given the close margin between the standard and nonstandard parties, this could prove to be crucial.

The Coexistence and SDL defectors are therefore walking on very thin ice. But it is too late to turn back. The Hungarian left has crossed its Rubicon. The die is cast.

EBRD Conditionally Denies Loan for Mochovce

LD0404210195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] will not grant the expected loan to the Slovak Electricity Company worth 412 million German marks [DM], which is needed to complete the nuclear plant in Mochovce, until Slovakia agrees to close down the nuclear plant in Jaslovske Bohunice and raise the price of electricity, [name indistinct] EBRD spokeswoman in London told CTK today.

The spokeswoman emphasized that the board of the bank had been due to decide on the loan by the end of March. The decision was delayed at Slovakia's request.

French Management of Plant Withdraws

AU0404133695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by "is": "French Management Has Left Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—According to information obtained by SME yesterday, the French management from the Electricite de France (EDF) company has been withdrawn from the site of the Mochovce nuclear power plant until the Slovak Government decides on how the project will be financed. Jozef Guba, deputy director in charge of the "Management" project, told us in a telephone interview yesterday that, even though he does not avail himself of any official EDF standpoint, none of the French company's 30 employees turned up at the building site yesterday. As Guba went on to say, he learned from informal conversations that EDF employees working at Mochovce had been given leave and are waiting for the Slovak Government's decision on how the project's completion will be financed. Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik recently asked the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Board of Directors to postpone its decision on granting the Mochovce loan until mid-April. According to reports that have been leaked to the public, the reason for this request was Skoda Praha's offer, under which the completion of Mochovce would be financed by a consortium of Czech banks. [passage omitted]

Fedor Gal on Meciar, Klaus, Political Right

95CH0146A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 2 Feb 95 p 4

[Excerpts from an interview with Fedor Gal, professor of sociology at Charles University in Prague and former chairman of Public Against Violence, by Jozef Huebel; place and date not given: "One Man Cannot Impose Dictatorship on Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Huebel] Mr. Gal, what is your view from the distance of Prague of Slovakia on the threshold of its third year of independent existence?

[Gal] I get information about Slovakia mainly from the media, which I listen to, the press, which I read, and from meetings with friends. That certainly is not a representative picture of Slovakia. But it seems to me that what has mainly changed is the method by which the new power established itself. That method is communist from A to Z. It features a very aggressive assumption of positions, stresses personal work at the cost of finding solutions to substantive problems. It is a model that is built not only on loyalty, even servility, of sympathizers, but also on the fear of opponents. This model has been historically tested, but it has also historically failed. However, at the same time I have no doubts that Slovakia is a normal European country and that it is not condemned to some kind of balkanization. But I have to say that this kind of governing will cause Slovakia irrevocable damage.

[Huebel] The previous "non-Meciar" governments, Carnogursky's and Moravcik's, did not carry out such sweeping purges—if one can even talk about purges in connection with them. Could it be considered a mistake?

[Gal] Personally I would be very glad if what we call a revolution would be the last of all the revolutions which I have experienced, which my children and the children of my children will experience. But in this period, which we call, maybe a little imprecisely, revolutionary, such personnel changes are an organic component of a great nationwide transformation. But, the concept of a permanent revolution, which was introduced by Slovak nationalists and which entered the Slovak political scene with the phenomenon of "Meciarism," is for me absolutely unacceptable. A person should be a government official because he is adept at a certain type of work, not because he embraces certain ideology or because he loves a certain leader. A government agency functions properly when there are professionals working in it, and professionalism has nothing in common with ideology. An individual becomes a professional over many years. And if the heads of regional offices and heads of departments in ministries are replaced only because the government has changed, then we shall always have laymen and diletantes in important positions, and we shall be encountering not only problems of economic growth, unemployment, and crime, but also problems of the amateurism and incompetence on the part of those who should be solving those problems. [passage omitted]

[Huebel] Why did the Slovak right again fail to be a realistic competitor to Meciar?

[Gal] When I last visited Bratislava, Peter Zajac asked me: "Fedor, did we mess up? Isn't it our fault that things are the way they are today?" I see no reason at all why Slovaks should think of themselves as any different from the Hungarians, Poles, and goodness knows who else. In all those countries the postcommunist transformation has been following a similar course. After the initial enthusiasm and euphoria, people experienced difficulties and problems with which they had no experience and for which they were not prepared. In the majority of these countries basically postcommunist political groups came to power—if not in the first, then in the second elections. But here we must ask ourselves several basic questions. First, are these postcommunist governments still trying for a non-market, centrally controlled, planned economy? Second, is the creation of a normal political scene simply manna from heaven, or is it a dramatic and lengthy process? My answer is that it is a dramatic and lengthy process. The time for reflection has not arrived yet, but if we were to look at the future of Central Europe in some catastrophic or fatal light, then unforeseen problems cannot be caused by the course of everyday events, as we understand them today, but, for example, by an explosion in Russia, the application of an example which we have seen in Yugoslavia, the fragmentation of that area, radicals coming to power, and a mafia-style economy....

[Huebel] Can't we already see signs of something similar in Slovakia? Isn't Slovakia threatened by dictatorship?

[Gal] If Slovakia is threatened by dictatorship, then it deserves it. Slovakia's problem is not the problem of Meciar, but the problem of more than 30 percent of Slovak citizens who gave him his vote and who like his style of rhetoric and politics. Dictatorship cannot be imposed on Slovakia by one man—no matter how vigorous and how obsessed with visions of personal power he may be. A dictatorship also needs "masses" marching under the banner of the dictator. And it does not matter at all whether under Meciar's banner some competent person has managed to get into some top management position or aquired some property. If he is competent, his behavior will regulate the area which he is managing. But if he is not competent, then it does not matter under whose banner he marched there—he will cause a disaster and in the end will be out of the game. That is the first point. And second: I have been noticing that in Slovakia, very untransparently but quite evidently a generation of ambitious, young, and able entrepreneurs is growing up, for whom politics is by far not as important as it is for an uninformed and nonprofessional television viewer, who sees politics as a great show. They are people who conduct themselves by standard rules of the game valid in civilized Europe, and they will have tremendous influence.

[Huebel] But isn't Slovakia threatened, in view of the political situation, with an exodus of its top people, with a brain drain?

[Gal] I do no like to talk about it, but it is a fact: I have observed lately a massive exodus of high caliber people from Slovakia. However, these people, although they are called scum, traitors and bad Slovaks in the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, will be more useful to Slovakia than the professional disseminators of its "good name," such as, for example, Mr. Darm. If we want an open society, then with it comes not only the commutation of information and capital, but people as well. It seems to me perfectly normal if one spends part of one's life in Bratislava, part in Prague, and part in London. That we are not used to it, that is another matter. For an American it is certainly much easier to leave Massachussets and spend five years in New York or Washington.... But for a Slovak? I submit that if it were not for obstacles such as an apartment, job, work itself, or lack of money, we might be surprised how many Slovak citizens would pull up stakes tomorrow and go searching for work somewhere else. I repeat: to go looking for opportunity elsewhere, that, in the historical context is not an exodus.... [passage omitted]

[Huebel] As a prognosticator, what chances do you give to Vladimir Meciar's efforts to change the constitutional order by strengthening his own authority whether in the form of a presidential or a chancellor system?

[Gal] A prognosis does not predict what will happen, but what could happen under certain circumstances.... I maintain that under certain circumstances it is possible that Meciar will succeed in getting rid of the unstable, uncrystallized, broad-based Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], which cannot protect his back forever, and will create a presidential system in which he himself will become president. And at the same time I maintain that Meciar can find a long-term "solution" for his power ambitions also by creating a very radical, integrated political group with a smaller rank and file force than HZDS has today, and somewhere on the margin of the political scene he will become a kind of Slovak version of Le Pen. In the time of political crises his chances in elections will be better, in the time of stable development, worse. A further possibility is that Vladimir Meciar's third departure will be the end of his political career.

[Huebel] What is interesting, is the attitude of the Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, who welcomed the return of Vladimir Meciar. Why, in you opinion?

[Gal] I think that the reason is very simple. Vladimir Meciar is for Vaclav Klaus an alibi for the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Whenever you ask people in the Czech lands whether they would want to live in a state of which a part would be Slovakia with Meciar at the head, they answer no! They stigmatize him, they stigmatized him in a way that shifted the onus for the breakup to Slovakia and Meciar. From this point of view, he is a very "functional" partner for Vaclav Klaus.

[Huebel] But sometime in the past Vladimir Meciar also offered you the position of Slovak prime minister, while he himself was to be the minister of interior.... Are you not sorry that you did not accept the offer?

[Gal] After the passage of time, I can say that I met dozens of people whom Meciar offered all kinds of things. And I think that there exist hundreds of others to whom he also offered something, and that there are many among them who accepted. That is simply the way Meciar conducts politics. He offers you something, you take it, and then you become a pawn on a chessboard and he is making the moves. Or he offers you something, you do not accept it, and you become an enemy and an adversary.... Vladimir Meciar is not a politician trained in partnership relations.

[Huebel] You then never regretted that you did not accept his offer at that time?

[Gal] Never. [passage omitted]

Milan Markovic on Canceled TV Program

95CH0144A Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 28 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Milan Markovic, Slovak actor and journalist, by Pavol Minarik; place and date not given: "Slovakia Will Have To Wait Until Meciar Defeats Himself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Minarik] Slovak Television [STV] canceled your established program. What, then, are you doing now?

[Markovic] Same as before. I devote my time to my touring programs to which was added a non-television version of "Evenings With Milan Markovic," in which there is an almost unexpected interest. Politicians and other people active in public life present themselves to viewers in various towns in Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia, but in a program that is twice as long as the TV version and with the Komorniks group, who accompany me with selections of the most successful songs from last year's program. An expanded selection—17 songs—came out on an audiocassette of the Kosice firm UMG.

[Minarik] Did you expect that the new STV board will forbid you to perform?

[Markovic] There were indications of it already earlier, but we did not believe that something like that is still possible. Well, in the end they did find someone who resolved to take this unbelievable step: at the same time he was proclaiming respect for democratic principles and service to viewers, chairman Darmo canceled all of the most watched entertainment programs: "Halusky," "Apropo TV," "Evening With Milan Markovic."

It is like a dream. Six years after freedom of speech was restored, all the characteristic symptoms of totalitarian manipulation of citizens' thinking are returning, which always begins with taking control over the mass communication media. Television is already practically "cemented up," and radio is being worked on. We shall see what they do about the press, which is totally out of sync with the ideas of the governing coalition. On the coalition's side are only two or three periodicals whose ethical, linguistic, as well as journalistic level is simply awful. Cable television is expanding. It will be amusing to watch in how many places it will be necessary to "pull down the shades," how in fact they want to manage this in the midst of an awakened world at the threshold of the third millenium, and where they will find enough shortsighted and otherwise handicapped people.

[Minarik] Did someone tell you face to face about the decision to cancel your program?

[Markovic] Of course not, and nobody will ever tell me, either. The arguments of the current protectors of culture are as childish and ridiculous as they are unsure of themselves and as deficient is their knowledge of humor and satire, their history, and the exalted social mission of those artistic genres.

Otherwise they would probably have to feel ashamed of concepts such as "constructive" or "positive" satire. They have not the faintest idea of satire as an absolute concept without any kind of nonsensical adjectives. For the third week now chairman Darmo has not been answering the letters and faxes of Mr. Paczelt, director of the agency that used to produce "Evening With Milan Markovic."

[Minarik] What is he writing to him about?

[Markovic] We want to know the official reason for cancelling the program. The chairman is denying his presence, he is hiding, and does not take telephone calls. He must find it exhausting. There is only one reason for this: uncertainty and fear of himself. And it will only keep getting worse. There are petitions being organized and their numbers are piling up, which, I have to admit, surprised me. Several times I made a statement that a Slovak viewer may not even care what is being broadcast with his money. I apologize for having said that. In the end, this indifference may not be such a problem after all.

[Minarik] Under what circumstances would you decide to discontinue your program yourself?

[Markovic] In case there really was nothing to talk about. But actually there is no chance of that in this so severely tried country.

[Minarik] Why is the current power so afraid of satire? After all, in the final analysis it only helped it flourish....

[Markovic] If only someone would explain that to me! I can understand that an ordinary citizen, a person without any experience in this respect, for a long time without any contact with the free world and unused to freedom of expression, is surprised, nay, indignant when someone publicly pillorie government officials. He still does not know and will not comprehend for a long time that they are all his servants, not his masters. But that the highest representatives of the government actually follow a program of encouraging such prehistoric thinking, that an overwhelming majority of them are people inoculated against humor, incapable of even a suggestion of self-irony, that is a much more serious phenomenon than people think. For two years I have fended off taunting questions of Czech journalists, such as "How is your democracy doing?" or "How much longer will you be able to keep broadcasting?" and "When will you finally emigrate, Mr. Markovic?" I always answered these taunts with "When you have in the Czech lands a program similar to mine, then we shall have a debate about democracy." There was no reason not to compare ourselves, not to observe that in something we are even a little ahead. But the powers that be do not need anyone to popularize them. They have their own cabaret. An experiment which has no analogy elswhere in the world: in order to cut jobs, the king became at the same time the jester.

[Minarik] You are extremely popular in the Czech Republic, but a satirist's life is no bed of roses there either. Why?

[Markovic] I have not heard, however, that they are banned there. The fact that Czech satire may appear a bit toothless to you, as I often hear, is a matter of the satirists' approach, their viewpoint, the way they shape their material. After all, we cannot all be the same. I would be embarrassed myself if I were to imitate the humor of Sip and Uhlir, Pepa Dvorak or Bolek Polivka, just as nobody would be interested if they began to use my kind of humor. I believe that we complement each other quite well.

[Minarik] But I believe that Czech humorists are afraid of making jokes about Prime Minister Klaus the way you have made fun until recently of Prime Minister Meciar on television....

[Markovic] I would not say that they are afraid. Vaclav Klaus is not as rewarding a subject by far as Vladimir Meciar, who is, with his intolerance, transparent lies, constant fomenting of conflicts, and above all his inability to govern, simply impossible to pass up. However, if, for example, besides Klaus's diction the Czech satirists were to pay more attention to his autocratic and discussion inhibiting style of argumentation, tinged according to need with a sufficient dose of arrogance, if they did not allow many small affairs that are quickly shoved aside to just fade away, we in Slovakia would have to be very busy indeed to keep up with you.

[Minarik] I read in the papers recently that Markovic does not object to Meciar's mistakes, but to Meciar himself. Did it ever occur to you that this could be the case?

[Markovic] I do not quite understand this. Does it mean that I dislike his appearance, his race, religion, or the way he dresses? That is, of course, nonsense. I am not one of those who recognized at first glance who Meciar is. There was a time when I cheered him on and believed that he really is the man who can lead us out of the worst situation with his determination, aggressivenes, and uncompromising attitude. But that lasted only a short time. He himself opened my eyes, just as he himself will in the end be the cause of his third departure from the political scene. Unfortunately that is the way it is; we shall have to wait until he fouls out, until he defeats himself with his manner of governing, because nobody else will be able to do it.

[Minarik] The Slovak prime minister has never accepted your invitation to appear on your televized Evenings, but if I am not mistaken, he did appear on the radio program "Under the Pyramid." What happened between you two?

[Markovic] Something happened with him. It is difficult to make a precise diagnosis of what it was. He was a guest on "Under the Pyramid" at the time when the first rumblings about him were heard in the parliament. He came, he sat down with us backstage, a picture of misery, and hardly said a word. He made quite an impression, and even Peter Breiner himself, that uncompromising ironist and practitioner of sarcasm put in a word for him, that we should not use everything we had prepared against him. We helped him beyond belief. During the broadcast he sparkled with humor and could convince even a blind and deaf person of his charm and force of personality. But with the passage of time he obviously began to lose his sense of humor and also his assurance.

I have no doubt that he would easily explain to his voters why he accepted the invitation of the man about whom he laboriously made up lies in an effort to discredit him.

For example, in the Ranajky column in SMENA he maintained that he did not like me because I said: "Asses will only elect asses, just ones with bigger heads." Even then he could not come up with anything that could be believed. He probably did not count with the fact that for 50 years nobody ever heard me use vulgarities. It was the kind of pedestrian bon mot which he himself used, for example in the sports halls during the election campaign to ridicule Prime Minister Moravcik.

However, Meciar stopped believing in himself and was not even able to sit down in the fifth row in the auditorium and laugh—even though maybe with clenched teeth—at my monologue or my songs. He knew that he would thus knock many of my weapons out of my hands, yet he was incapable of it, he did not have the necessary strength. And he has less and less of it. The people with whom he surrounds himself certainly are not so intellectually equipped as to be able to keep him in proper psychological condition.

[Minarik] Is politics your avocation, or are you just unable to deny the journalist in you?

[Markovic] I apologize to all political scientists, politicians, and others similarly engaged, but I consider it practically a perversion to have politics as an avocation under our conditions. I only devote myself to it because I feel, I know, that it is necessary, that someone has to. True, there is also a little exhibitionism in it, which is inherent in every journalist and every actor. Well, I still move back and forth between these two professions. But it is only necessary to find someone who will do it better (and that, in view of my advertised obsolescence, should not be too difficult), and I shall vacate the stage. But until that happens, I shall stay, even though I can imagine much more attractive avocations, where my audience wants and perhaps even needs me. Governments will fall, politicians will depart and be forgotten. But humorists will be always be here. A human being, a healthy human being, needs humor more than politics.

Anniversary of Dissident's Death Remembered

95CH0151A Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by (ja): "Vlado Cech's Luhacovice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Luhacovice—"We do not deny any nation the right to an independent existence. But we consider the ability to live together a higher human value." Under this motto of Vlado Cech, a Czech-Slovak group met yesterday in Luhacovice to commemorate his tragic death. The participants recalled the connections between his life and current politics: He was a signatory of Charter 77, founder of the Movement for Understanding between Czechs and Slovaks, and founder of the weekly MOSTY, whose editorial office arranged the event together with the Heinrich Bolla Foundation. However, the the following topics were the basic focus of the meeting was the expert contributions concerning state citizenship, analyses of public opinion, ethnology, problems of the voucher privatization and many other matters. The two-day meeting demonstrated that both republics still need more than just the normal international relations, for the sake of all their citizens.

Protocol Signed on Settlement of Polish Debt

LD0404210295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 4 Apr 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish and Slovak delegations led by state secretaries and deputy ministers for economy and finance today signed in Javorina in the Tatras a protocol regarding the settlment of the Polish debt worth $28.5 million. Poland is going to pay off the debt in supplies of coal.

The leader of the Slovak delegation, Marian Mojzis, the state secretary for economy, said that the supplies will involve the type of coal that is currently imported to Slovakia and that the mining industry in Slovakia will not be threatened.

Foreign Ministry Official on Expansion of NATO

LD0504102195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Interview with Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, state secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, present as guest studio during morning news programs on 5 April—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Is there a new element in the U.S. position on the extension of NATO? I am asking Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, political state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. on 5 April]

[Szent-Ivanyi] I see two new elements in this position [referring to a previous news item on Clinton-Major talks and the U.S. position on the expansion of NATO]. The first is that this was the first occasion when the unconditional expansion of NATO, as an accomplished fact, was announced from the highest position—by the U.S. president. The other important message of this news is that all this was said in the company of John Major, a leader of an important European NATO member state, which implies that they also agree on this matter. Earlier this was not so clear for us. The English position was not so unambiguous, earlier. I think that these two facts are positive news.

[Announcer] Regarding Hungary, can any conclusion be drawn from this position?

[Szent-Ivanyi] From this fact we cannot draw any conclusion yet, because the expansion of NATO can take place in various ways, involving either four countries, or three countries, or two countries at the same time. Naturally, it is in our interest to be among the first group of countries.

Finance Official Views Budget Reform Tasks

AU0404165295 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 1 Apr 95 p 11

[Interview with Csaba Laszlo, deputy state secretary at the Hungarian Finance Ministry, by "Faggyas"; place and date not given: "The Burdens of Budget Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the plans, the Budget Reform Committee will hold its next—third—meeting in the middle of April, and will probably deal with the modernization of the tax system and the managing of our state debt. How will the government's stabilization program, adopted on 12 March, affect the reform activity? We asked Csaba Laszlo, the newly appointed Finance Ministry deputy state secretary, who is also in charge of supervising and coordinating the tasks connected with the budget and the reform of state administration.

[Laszlo] The package of stabilization measures adopted by the government on 12 March does not contradict the main guidelines of the budget reform. On the contrary, it gave a very serious impetus to the professional activity that has been going on for some months. The professional proposals can and must be worked out in various areas and in various work groups based on the aforementioned stabilization measures.

Interests and Arguments

[Faggyas] How do you evaluate the activity of the Committee so far?

[Laszlo] Positively. This body is a government committee; at the same time, we made sure that we involve all interested parties in this work, including independent and opposition experts. The main task of this professional forum is to prepare decisions by confronting and coordinating various interests and arguments.

[Faggyas] On what issues have you advanced so far?

[Laszlo] At our first meeting held at the beginning of February, the participants discussed the debate material, comprising the concepts of the state administration reform and its major areas. Although there was a serious debate on certain details, no one questioned the basic guidelines: a radical reduction in the proportion of state fund redistribution and a rational reorganization of the large-scale distribution system, as well as making it more efficient. One of the main elements of the reform—namely, the treasury management system—was the topic of our second meeting, held at the end of February. The debate was useful, and it also showed that considerable interests and differences of views are confronting each other on this issue. For example, we must decide on the relations between the Treasury and the financial bases of the local government and social security, and we must also work out the precise delimitation of the financing tasks of the Treasury and the National Bank.

A New Pension System

[Faggyas] Do the committee and the reform activity already have an accepted work schedule and deadline?

[Laszlo] We would like to adopt the detailed work program and statute of the Committee at our next meeting. I think that, in addition to the expected agenda of tax modernization and state debt management, other important issues might also be discussed, because the preparatory activity in the various work groups has accelerated. The way things stand at the moment, I see good chances of being able to prepare our main proposals regarding the reform of the state administration by the end of the first half of this year, by coordination with the stabilization package and the guidelines of the 1996 budget. According to the preliminary plans, this year and next year we must decide on every government measure connected with the reform, although their implementation will obviously take years. For example, according to our plans, the new pension system would come into force on 1 January 1997, but it would only become general after an interim period of quite a number of years. In addition to the fact that we think it necessary to create harmony between the long-term reform measures and the short-term stabilization measures, our main task in the coming weeks is to work out the macroeconomic budget policy framework that will determine the main economic policy guidelines and frameworks for the next three years, including the state administration reform measures.

[Faggyas] Regarding the latest government decisions and the expected government measures, most Hungarian citizens probably think, first of all, that the state administration reform means a drastic cut in welfare expenses and the abolishment of the often-criticized welfare systems that have nevertheless been regarded as an achievement....

[Laszlo] The essence of the stabilization package and the state administration reform is not only a considerable reduction in the state's funding of welfare expenses, but also that the principle of need, rather than the citizen's right, should be consistently asserted in the eligibility to budget funds for welfare expenses. The general waste that still exists in the system should be reduced, a waste deriving from the fact that people with medium and high incomes receive the same amount of social support as the poorest strata of society. For example, the issue is not that the state will take the family allowance away from every family; instead, families that are really in need will receive this allowance, and these families will often receive more than heretofore. Obviously, by knowing the detailed regulations and concrete measures precisely, it is possible to evaluate the conditions of eligibility and its implementation. It is the firm intention of the government to see to it that people who can bear more burdens should accept more burdens.

[Faggyas] Will the assertion of the principle of need lead to a more proportionate acceptance of burdens?

[Laszlo] We should speak of a fair acceptance of burdens, rather than a proportionate acceptance of burdens. Those who belong to the circle of people who have the most property and the most income in Hungary today should also put proportionally far more into the "common purse" than those who live on the brink of the subsistence level or slightly above it. Unfortunately, the socially restrictive measures that have become inevitable in the present situation prevailing in Hungary demand sacrifices from most people, but our goal is to make sure that these measures will have the least possible effect on those most needy. Although difficult and painful, the whole society must acknowledge the fact that, under the current development level of the Hungarian economy, the government can no longer accept welfare tasks that do not have the necessary material and financial cover. Our domestic and foreign state debt has reached a level at which it is impossible to maintain the current level of social expenses and welfare systems at the expense of further debts.

[Faggyas] When will the positive elements of the state administration reform be able to get the upper hand over the negative elements that dominate in the short term?

[Laszlo] The emergence and operation of economically more efficient and socially more just welfare and social systems will probably require several years. However, increasing salaries might counterbalance the decreasing state welfare payments. More income can be "left" in the competitive sphere by considerably reducing the proportion of the budget's income redistribution; thus, people engaged in economic activity will have more resources for development, investment, and job creation. Everyone will benefit from improving competitiveness and efficiency, because more income is thus created and, along with creating a lasting financial balance, this road leads to a lasting economic growth.

There Is No Other Choice

[Faggyas] Will the government have enough power to carry out its stabilization program in spite of the society's expected considerable opposition?

[Laszlo] Western experience shows that in places where the government was strong, consistent, and determined, in a few years they succeeded in rationalizing and balancing the state administration and in improving economic competitiveness and performance. We do not have any other choice, either, because delaying the inevitable measures would only further increase the difficulties and the problems, and as a result, even more drastic and painful measures would have to be taken later. We hope that most people will accept the restrictive measures and the new burdens if they see that the government is simplifying and reducing the expenses in the state administration and in the budget as a whole, and that the government is as strict in "catching" those who evade taxes and in collecting the many tens of billions of forints of nondeclared taxes and social security payments as in the welfare restrictions. Therefore, this package deal aimed at curbing the black economy is an organic part of the state administration reform.

Bank Governor Views Budget, Exchange Rate

AU0404163895 Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian 30 Mar 95 pp 25-26

[Interview with Hungarian National Bank Chairman Gyorgy Suranyi by Janos Eorsi, Ottilia Solti, and Peter Talas on 24 March; place not given: "We Would Need 370 Billion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [BESZELO] Can you tell us now on what conditions you said yes—after two months of consideration—to the prime minister's request that you should be the central bank chairman?

[Suranyi] I considered it very important that we should not need to interrupt the emerging growth; therefore, we should reduce the state administration's deficit gradually but very energetically within three years. I intended to have more independence on exchange rate policy. This does not mean that we need not coordinate all important exchange rate policy issues with the government, but the system that previously operated—the central bank could change the exchange rate by 5 percent between two government decisions—restricted the monetary policy in many ways, and gave scope for large-scale speculation. I also wanted to achieve a joint position on the way the central bank should participate in financing the budget deficit. It should not be possible, for example, to amend the law on the central bank according to budget needs (as happened in 1993). Actually, it will probably be necessary to amend the central bank law. At the moment, the Hungarian National Bank can finance the budget deficit to a maximum of 3 percent of budget revenue. The central bank would like to interpret this as a possibility rather than an obligation. We would also like to have this 3-percent limit applied on the whole, rather than the growth, of the budget's debts to the central bank. I also had a condition related to the post: I requested that some kind of consultations be held among the parliamentary parties on who was nominated to head the central bank—although this is not in the law on the central bank.

[BESZELO] Did you have a ready-made package to reduce the state administration's deficit—in addition to the recently published, or perhaps only partially published, measures?

[Suranyi] I did not have, and could not have had, a ready-made concept. This is not the primary task of the central bank. Our task is to assess the size of the state administration's deficit.

[BESZELO] Do you consider the 170-billion-forint package of measures that was announced on 12 March adequate?

[Suranyi] I see it as a very brave and very important step. However, we would probably need 370 billion....

[BESZELO] Three hundred seventy? How?

[Suranyi] If students protest about the 2,000-forint tuition fee while filling up a Trabant car with fuel costs this amount and all university students receive a 5,000-forint grant regardless of their financial circumstances, if they get upset about 2,000 forints, then naturally it is impossible to remove 370 billion forints from the budget—but the country will go broke. Three of the students who came up to [finance minister] Lajos Bokros [during a 22 March demonstration] were holding 80,000-forint radio telephones.... Naturally, I agree that those who are needy should not have to pay part, or any, of the tuition fee, or could even receive a grant.

[BESZELO] However, the tuition fee will bring in a ridiculously low amount, compared to the 370 billion.

[Suranyi] Indeed, and I told Bokros that he might as well write down twice the amount, because the outrage would be the same anyway. As a matter of fact, I cannot see why the government has to give family income supplements to 80 percent of families. I do not think that more than 60 percent of them need this, and this alone would mean a savings of 40 billion forints per year. We should introduce a system in which social insurance contributions are reduced to 20, 25, or 30 percent outside the government sector, but the retirement age has to be set at 65 years, no child care allowances or fees should exist, and the free medical care in its current form should also be ended. In the government sector, it is easily possible to control earnings, and even if people make an extra 30, 40, or 50 thousand forints on the side, this amount does not irritate people. Everyone can quote 100 such examples: Private schools with super high fees, and an entrepreneur who is sick for three months asks for a reduction. Eventually he is refused because the family assets turn out to be around 300-400 million forints. This is typical in Hungary today: the mentality, not the size of the assets. It also must be seen that in 1994, amidst the otherwise-justified dissatisfaction, we imported 103,000 new cars and another 50-60,000 cars less than four years old from the West. These imported cars amount to $1 billion out of the $11-12 billion total imports. Who is using them? Ghosts?

[BESZELO] Do you agree, though, that great care must be taken to reduce the budget deficit?

[Suranyi] Great care, but it has to be reduced so that we can give normal loans to the business sector, instead of grants. The business sector should provide another 200,000 jobs and pay more social insurance contributions and tax.

[BESZELO] Can the foreign debt be managed? According to some, Hungary, like Poland, should also reschedule its debts or have them canceled, because the debt burden is turning into an obstacle to any kind of economic progress.

[Suranyi] My main motivation is to try to avoid the Polish example at all possible cost. It is not at all a solution for a country if it loses its solvency. On the contrary, it means such a heavy burden that it would not even be compensated for by having half the debt canceled on paper 10 years later. In past years, the per capita value of foreign capital investment was $25 in Poland, as opposed to the $700 in Hungary: Such are the consequences when the market's confidence is shaken. Naturally, Hungary is not being helped by having to pay an annual $1.2-1.3 billion in interest as it tries to catch up and become modernized. However, first of all, this interest burden is only 2-2.5 percent of GDP and, in fact, if we assessed the GDP at a realistic rate based on purchasing-power parity, then this interest would be no greater than 1-1.5 percent. Second, if the deficit of the current balance of payments arose only from the existence of interest payment obligations, then we would be able to cover it from foreign working capital imports, and the foreign debt would thus become stabilized. We receive some $1.2-1.3 billion even without privatization. However, the balance of payments deficit was $3.5 billion in 1993 and $4 billion in 1994 and this is what we cannot cope with in the long run. It is impossible to live in such a way that the country is regularly consuming 7 to 8 percent more than it is producing.

[BESZELO] Educated critics agree with you in that the balance of payments deficit definitely must be reduced; however, they claim that the reduction of the state administration deficit does not necessarily lead to an improvement in the foreign balance. Gabor Oblath of the Kopint-Datorg [economic research institute] argued in an article in last week's FIGYELO that without the interest payments, the budget would be in surplus and, on the other hand, the interest payments do not support the statement that "we consume more than we produce." The interest payments, he writes, go directly abroad, or they satisfy domestic savers, whose money would lose its value without interest; therefore, the vast majority of interest that is paid domestically does not contain any real income.

[Suranyi] I believe that Oblath is completely mistaken here. If the interest as an expense only covers inflation and does not contain any real income and is thus fictitious, then it would also be fictitious as income. However, today, a large proportion of the interest paid out of the budget does not come to the central bank. Therefore, the interest becomes a real income of real income owners, and there is no economic sense in differentiating between interest income and other kinds of income. In addition, a significant proportion of the interest paid out of the budget is similar to the government's handing out donations. Out of the 450-billion-forint interest burden, some 100-120 billion forints has to be paid for debtor consolidation, which means that we are retroactively financing companies that have not been able to pay their debts.

[BESZELO] Another reason interest is a major burden on the budget and the economy is that, to be able to sell state bonds, the state offers higher rates than can be obtained on the market and ends up paying high interest on the state debt. Will the situation change when we have a sliding exchange rate as has been announced?

[Suranyi] At the moment, there is indeed a risk premium on the forint. Together with the 9-percent devaluation on 12 March, we have announced that, as a result of regular devaluations, a further 15- to 17-percent devaluation annually will ensue. About 5 or 6 percent annual interest can be obtained on foreign currency deposits and 21 to 23 percent on forints; however, if one invests in short-term state bonds, one can achieve an annual 31- to 32-percent yield. The 8- to 9-percent gap between the two expresses the risk that the market, owing to the very high budget deficit and the unpredictability of the exchange rate, was only willing to participate in financing the budget with risk premium. This of course costs the state and taxpayers very much.

I very much hope that in the market's judgment, our monetary policy is consistent, the budget is consistent in beginning to reduce the deficit, and so this risk premium should decrease. The yields calculated in foreign currency and forints should become equal in the long run; otherwise, devaluation expectations will increase and speculation against the forint will start. I am certain—and this is the key point of the system of preannounced sliding adjustments—that inflation expectations can also be reduced. Naturally, now, in the first weeks, inflation will increase; however, later, the market does not expect inflation higher than the level of the preannounced devaluation. Naturally, to achieve this, nominal wages and the growth of incomes will also have to follow this trend.

[BESZELO] The official medium rate of the German mark is 85.57 forints at the moment (24 March) and your sliding exchange rate indicates 95.10 to 96.50 forints by December. The foreign currency futures market is more pessimistic, promising 100 forints to the German mark in December....

[Suranyi] It is up to them. In my view, the decisions that the government will implement and the budget that will be proposed for 1996 will make it possible to maintain our exchange rate policy—and if this is so, there will be winners and losers in the December deals.

Rise in Illegal Border-Crossing Attempts Noted

AU0404180295 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 4 Apr 95 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "Trade in People Along the Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Border Guards initiated legal proceedings in 138 cases of smuggling of people in 1994. Most recently, 40 Turkish citizens were caught in Gyula in a truck transporting peanuts to Hamburg—we learned from Lt. Colonel Istvan Szoke, head of the Surveillance Department of the Border Guards National Headquarters.

Signs attesting to the smuggling of people and organized crime are present in 40 percent of the attempted illegal border crossings known to the Border Guards. However, this is extremely difficult to prove because, according to the way the Penal Code is formulated, the crime of smuggling people can only be described as such if the help to illegally cross the border is provided for money, or as part of an organized group of smugglers. Therefore, even if a person is caught at the border with a lot of hard currency, this is not enough proof. There were court sentences that penalized the person charged with smuggling people across the border with fines of 1,500 forints. The fact that no criminal procedures were initiated in 172 cases in 1994 because it was impossible to prove that the persons in question had anything to do with the organized smuggling of people across the border shows the difficulties in proving this crime.

Most smugglers of people are foreign citizens. In the course of this action, Hungarian criminals only carry out certain partial tasks: The organizers primarily make use of the Hungarians' knowledge of the location and of the border area. Istanbul is the largest distribution center of Filipinos, Turks, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis wishing to go to the West; practically every "transport" from Asia and Africa passes through Istanbul.

The next station is one of the bigger towns in Transylvania close to the Hungarian border—such as like Temesvar [Timisoara], Nagyvarad [Oradea], or Szatmarnemeti [Satu Mare]—because Romania has visa-free agreements with a lot of developing countries. The refugees hoping for a better life are gathered in two large residential areas in Arad. One type of people-smuggling takes place at the green border [an open field]: People are unloaded from the trucks before the Hungarian-Romanian border and they are taken across the border. Transporters with legal documents are waiting for them in the designated area inside the country. Hungarian and Slovak smugglers transport these people from Budapest to Germany, and they take their money too. The traffic mainly takes place on trains, because for the time being, there is no railroad control at the border between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Italy, via Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia, is the favorite destination of Africans and Filipinos.

The other method of smuggling people is the following: People are hidden among various goods in trucks or train carriages. Such people are mostly gathered by former compatriots now living in one of the welfare states. The so-called Chinese line that starts at Shanghai and heads for Germany via Moscow Airport, Moldavia, Romania, Rajka, and Bratislava is a good example. Because of the numerous colonies of their compatriots there, the Chinese prefer to go to the United States. Of course, this trip costs them about $30,000 or $40,000, but they have time to pay for the smuggling later, or they can immediately take up jobs with the mafia.

The third way of smuggling people is the use of forged passports. The Hungarian Border Guards initiated legal proceedings for the use of forged documents in 3,732 cases in 1994. Given the fact that it is quite easy to obtain documents and stamps in certain neighboring countries, quite professional forgeries also appeared at the Hungarian border—forgeries that the regular border guard was incapable of recognizing. The implementation of the government decision on the use of professional border guards is being completed this year.

People caught at the borders are taken to so-called community housing, where they are given basic supplies. With the help of the police and prison facilities, the border guards get information about these people in 72 hours and, if they are not eligible for refugee status, they are expelled from Hungary. Some 4-5 percent of these people keep returning when they have money to pay the smugglers.

It happened that the Interior Ministry had to pay for an airplane that stopped in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Switzerland recently suggested that the countries in question should coordinate the forced air transportation of illegal immigrants. The European countries also need to coordinate the training of customs professionals and to set up computerized systems. They also need to thoroughly coordinate the international agreements on expelling people, dealing with visas, and providing refugee status. According to Szoke, the wave of migration and the differences in the living standards of individual countries will only increase in the future.

Army Employees Union Protests Planned Layoffs

LD0404142895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army Employees' Trade Union has protested against the Defense Ministry's plan to lay off 3,000 civilian employees as of July and a further 3,000 civilian employees over the next 3 years.

Although the trade union does not reject the government's economic stabilization plans, it considers unacceptable the hasty steps preceding the parliamentary decision. The trade union demands that the Hungarian Army's personnel not be reduced before a parliamentary decision on Army reform.

Daily on Defense Secretary Perry's Moscow Visit

WS0504113895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Apr 95 p 5

[Commentary by Jan Skorzynski: "Raising the High Jump Bar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nyet, nyet, nyet [three preceding words transliterated from Russian]—this is what, according to a WASHINGTON POST correspondent, William Perry heard in Moscow in reply to proposals submitted by the Americans. A no to the attempt to stop Russia from selling nuclear reactors to Iran; a no to a cease-fire in Chechnya and to dispatching a CSCE mission there; a no to expansion of NATO to include Central European countries.

This last "nyet" sounded exceptionally strong. Even though the West keeps saying that Moscow does not have the right to veto decisions on the future shape of the organization, it is difficult to overlook the fact that NATO representatives are very carefully listening to the grumbles of dissatisfaction that are coming from the East. The a la Russe [preceding words in French] diplomacy, which is brutally frank, determined, and consistent, is taking advantage of indecision in the West and is beginning to bear fruit. Whether we want it or not, the Kremlin will exert influence on the decisions concerning NATO expansion. First, because it is not easy to ignore the stand taken by (still) one of the world's greatest military superpowers; second, because the policy of appeasement [preceding word in English] (placating by making concessions), pursued by the Clinton administration in the case of Russia, encourages Russian politicians to raise the high-jump bar and submit more demands and wishes to the West and to the rest of the world.

Recently the U.S. defense secretary had a chance to see it for himself. He was preceded by Secretary of State Warren Christopher during talks with Andrey Kozyrev in Geneva, as well as by other Washington politicians—all of them had similar experiences.

It looks as though submitting increasingly more compromise proposals in Moscow is yielding a result that is quite opposite to what is expected—instead of appeasing Moscow, it makes the Kremlin more adamant. When the West showed another two signs of goodwill—the announcement of President Clinton's visit to the Russian capital city and the offer to conclude a special treaty with Russia, which might be signed simultaneously with the expansion of NATO (EU proposal by Carcasonne)—Moscow replied by making an even firmer objection to the plans of extending NATO.

The issue of placing the NATO umbrella over Central Europe is still open. The discussion on this topic has only just begun in Western capitals, and it will not end very soon. The allies must decide for themselves whom they will admit into their organization, how they will do it, and when. However, what causes concern is the fact that a voice from outside NATO sounds increasingly louder in this debate.

Radioactive Isotopes Stolen in Wroclaw

LD0504111495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Containers with highly radioactive elements were stolen last night from a storeroom of isotopes in Wroclaw. The police say that any direct contact with these elements can cause death. Four brazen containers weighing two kilos each contain americium 241 and a 10-kilo leaden container is filled with cesium 137. The containers are marked with a symbol of radioactivity and have plates with a detailed description of the contents.

The search for stolen elements is being carried out by the police, civil defense, and municipal services. All cars leaving Wroclaw are being checked.

Episcopate Welcomes Church-State Relations Clause

LD0404135595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1320 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Apr—Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary general of the Episcopate of Poland, has expressed his satisfaction with the version on the constitutional provision concerning state-church relations, which was adopted today by the National Assembly Constitutional Commission.

He said: "This clause is acceptable and one should be pleased about it." He stressed that "it is a certain sign and signal that the Constitutional Commission is able to make concessions where there are reasons to make such concessions." "Let us hope this attitude will continue," he added.

When asked by a PAP journalist whether the sudden progress with regard to this issue has been a result of the recent talks between Primate Glemp and Prime Minister Oleksy, Bishop Pieronek said: "We were praying a lot for the Constitution to be acceptable to believers. Probably some supernatural forces have intervened."

Solidarity Leaders Debate Union's Future

WS0504105695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Dominika Wielowieyska: "Questions About the Future of the Union; 'Solidarity' Working or Ideological"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Krzaklewski wants to sign a contract with the rightist parties. Romaszewski prefers to form a party that would have statutory links with "Solidarity." Jankowski hopes the trade union will focus on specific issues.*

During a press conference on the 'Solidarity' trade union's program, held yesterday under the slogan "What is 'Solidarity' Like," Leader Marian Krzaklewski announced that in June the trade union is to enter into talks with right-wing presidential candidates. "Maybe if those who hold the most authority mediate, it will be possible to come up with a joint candidate. I will only serve them tea," he said when asked about his role in such mediations.

Krzaklewski also spoke of a political contract that the trade union could sign with rightist groups. Representatives of the rightist bloc who would enter parliament would have to implement the provisions of the contract: Fight for reform of the social security system, a referendum on the enfranchisement of citizens, and a pro-family tax system.

"Solidarity" Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski would like a social movement focused on the trade union to emerge, which could later turn into a political party representing the interests of all employees. "Only a trade union on this side of the political scene has powerful structures at its disposal," Romaszewski argued.

Senator Romaszewski claims "Solidarity" has already lost one chance to create such a movement when signatures were being gathered in support of the draft constitution. According to Romaszewski, the presidential preelections in "Solidarity" could provide another opportunity.

"I fear, however, that a long debate on the candidacy would only lead to the disavowal of presidential candidate Adam Strzembosz, with whom we feel the closest ideological ties," said the "Solidarity" senator.

Head of the Mazowsze Region Maciej Jankowski argued with Romaszewski: "The average age of the 1.5 million people who signed our draft constitution is over 50. That is no force for establishing a new party."

Jankowski distanced himself from the political projects of those who spoke before him. For him, it is most important that the trade union "render excellent services," taking care of specific issues such as bringing down high energy prices. Jankowski does not want to appeal to those who are "irate" because such people make a good constituency for Nazi parties. He said "Solidarity" fails whenever it becomes ideological. "People do not want any more slogans and programs," he explained. "Every week a monument is unveiled and anniversaries celebrated. I am not saying it is unnecessary, but we should not exaggerate."

Jankowski prefers to bet on pragmatists, not ideologists. "When I last went to church, I saw that the average age of those attending was 65," he said. "When asked what type of 'Solidarity' I want, I say—a working one."

No Endorsement for Kuron

WS0504105795 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by "PAD": "'Solidarity' Will Not Endorse Kuron"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The chances that the national congress of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 'Solidarity' ['S'] will endorse the candidacy of Jacek Kuron are purely theoretical," said ["S" Leader] Marian Krzaklewski after the session of the presidium of the National Commission.

"If the union were to support Kuron, it would first have to dissolve itself and establish a new organization," the "S" chairman declared. According to unionists, as the labor minister, Jacek Kuron "was a good speaker, which does not mean that the results of his activities were good." "S" accuses Kuron of being inefficient while trying to implement the "Pact on Enterprise." It also recalls that the problem of returning property taken over by the All-Polish Trade Unions' Agreement during Martial Law remained unresolved, and Kuron should have made efforts to settle the issue. In addition, according to "S," Kuron proved unable to resolve conflicts, which led, among other things, to the downfall of the Suchocka cabinet, in which Kuron was a minister. "Aside from that, Kuron is an advocate of a specific philosophy," Krzaklewski said. According to the union's leader, after the congress the Freedom Union became an even more liberal-secular party; during the sessions no one expressed any interest in the union, which consists of 2 million members, and its general social demands. "This practically makes cooperation with UW a rather remote possibility," Krzaklewski declared.

Council Discusses Tarom Crash, NATO, PFP

AU0404191495 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu today chaired the meeting of the Supreme Defense Council of the Country [CSAT].

After hearing a briefing presented by the ministers of transportation and interior on the work of the special commissions set up to look into the aviation catastrophe that took place on 31 March causing loss of human life and the destruction of a plane belonging to the airline Tarom, the CSAT recommended to the government that it continue the investigations until the causes of the catastrophe are cleared up. The CSAT also recommended that the government work out a program of supplementary measures to be implemented immediately regarding the thorough checking that should be carried out at airports to ensure the security of aircraft.

A communique issued by the presidency says that during the meeting, they examined the actions of certain irresponsible or malevolent persons who, through false alarms warning about alleged terrorist acts, try to generate a state of panic, obstruct the smooth functioning of certain public institutions—especially that of the Tarom airline—and the airports, causing major losses to those institutions as well as to the national economy.

In connection with this issue, the CSAT approved a draft bill on preventing and combating terrorist acts—a bill elaborated by the Interior Ministry—and decided to send it to the government and submit it to the Romanian Parliament to be passed in emergency proceedings.

During the meeting they also evaluated the results of Romania's participation in North Atlantic Cooperation Council activities, as well as the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program, and they established the objectives regarding Romania's relations with NATO over 1995. They assessed that our country has fulfilled its obligations pertaining to the actions agreed upon for 1994.

During the meeting it was emphasized that the participation of certain military units in joint actions within the PFP has allowed for useful exchanges of experience in the domain of military training and equipment. In that context, they reasserted Romania's readiness to join NATO and called for the avoidance of all discriminatory handling that could lead to regional security imbalances. With an eye to the prospect of joining NATO, the CSAT recommended that a medium-term program should be worked out to provide the Armed Forces with new combat equipment and logistics elements both by means of imports and by production cooperation with other countries, so as to increase the degree of interoperability among the military structures of the Romanian Armed Forces and those of the NATO member countries.

The CSAT examined the results of the Romania-United States bilateral work group meeting, which took place in Bucharest 2-3 February 1995, and approved the proposals that a study should be elaborated, with U.S. assistance, regarding the management of defense resources and management initiative of the regional air space.

After debates on the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Defense Ministry regarding Romania's participation in peacekeeping missions under UN, WEU [Western European Union], and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mandates, the CSAT assessed that by participating in UN missions in the Persian Gulf and Somalia, as well as in WEU actions monitoring the embargo on the Danube River in the context of the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Romania has asserted itself as an active peacekeeping factor. Therefore, the CSAT recommended to the foreign affairs and national defense ministries that they finalize organizing actions with a view toward participating, with a motorized battalion and a field hospital, in the peacekeeping mission in Angola, upon request of the United Nations, according to the approval given by Romania's Parliament.

They also examined and approved the proposals contained in the Romanian Government report on the strategy of preparing the national economy and territory for defense, so that—if need be—the passage can be made from a state of peace to a state of war, on the basis of the current, actual possibilities of our national economy.

The CSAT also examined and solved other problems regarding national defense and security, in accordance with its competence, established by law—concludes the communique issued by the presidency.

CDR Head Condemned for Offer To Join Government

AU0404121195 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Editorial by Anton Uncu: "Participating in the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Romania is currently facing such a serious crisis that the Democratic Convention could be called upon in a month or two to participate in the governmnent." This statement was reported by Romanian and foreign news agencies—a statement that came from Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and sole candidate of this alliance in the presidential elections. It was published in several dailies and has not been contested.

Things are starting to get very confusing. Mr. Constantinescu is giving political support to the government coalition that includes the most aggressive extremist parties: namely, the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] and the PRM [Greater Romania Party]. He also expects the CDR to be called upon, and so on and so forth. From the perspectives of this new statement, the first becomes logical—namely, to grant political support in exchange for participation in the government. However, the logical connection between the two declarations serves to emphasize and reiterate the lack of logical reasoning in the unfolding of the political process as a whole.

Again the CDR president has committed the error of making clear statements and deliberately neglecting nuances. "Could be called upon?!" By whom? The only person authorized to put out such a call is Romania's President Ion Iliescu. "To participate in the government?!" On whose side? Those to whom he has just granted political support—namely, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], and PRM [Greater Romania Party]? Such cooperation would become monstrous even if we were talking about just one party out of these four.

One might assume that the CDR leader is no longer bothered, as he was before, by having such teammates as Ion Iliescu, Adrian Nastase, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Gheorghe Funar, Ilie Verdet, Adrian Paunescu, and others. Or it may bother him, but if the nation's interests require it, he is ready to be sacrificed. What for? For a few ministerial portfolios blessed by the nation's current president?

It is most regrettable that the CDR president cannot or does not want to understand the effect that such statements have on the electorate, even if we accept that they are nothing but predictions. First of all, the voter will no longer recognize the CDR—or what is left of it—as an alternative of salvation from disastrous rule, but will see it, rather, as an accomplice to the country's disaster, ready to assume responsibility for the abuses and errors of those currently in power. The CDR slogan "Only Together Will We Succeed!" was devised as meaning to achieve a structural change in the government, not "to participate in the government" on the side of those who are responsible for the deep crisis we are talking about. Such a "participation in the government," a trap into which Mr. Radu Campeanu fell in the past in spite of our warnings, leads to the idea that this is the only thing in which the CDR can still trust and this is its maximum ambition. By agreeing to cooperate with Ion Iliescu under these terms and with the "red quadrilateral" in a new cabinet formula, Mr. Constantinescu and the CDR will partially share their destiny as well. If Ion Iliescu and the PDSR fail at the next elections, Emil Constantinescu will also fail. What if they win? That would be even worse for the "fellow travelers," who would be gradually eliminated, according to well-established methods.

What is Mr. Constantinescu hoping for? A PDSR-CDR government formula by eliminating the PUNR, PRM, and the PSM? Could this become viable? Perhaps! But viable only for those who are left outside this deal! Those might be the liberals, united in a great coalition and determined not to let themselves be allured by advantages and portfolios before the 1996 elections.

Might Mr. Constantinescu be seized by the ambition to change from the inside an alliance that is under Iliescu's spell into an efficient and democratic ruling instrument? That would top everything! I cannot believe it. However, I can believe that this cooperation is a mere fake, and Mr. Constantinescu is not considering it in the least seriously. Or he may hope that in two months the crisis will be so deep that early elections will become imminent and the one who will call the CDR to join in the government will not be Ion Iliescu but the Romanian electorate....

PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] spokesman Radu Vasile said yesterday, 28 March, that the CDR president's statement quoted by us "does not represent acceptance of the Convention's, and implicitly of the PNTCD's, cooperation with those currently in power" and that "the term discussed by Emil Constantinescu is only a prediction." Good if this were so—and we would also have understood it so, if the Democratic Convention leader had said from the very outset that cooperation with the parties included in the government was out of the question.

TANJUG Comments on U.S. Envoy's Departure

LD0404141195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1153 GMT 4 Apr 95

[By TANJUG diplomatic editor Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 4 (TANJUG)—The American ambassador to Bosnia, Viktor Jackovich, has officially confirmed that he will leave Sarajevo on April 19.

According to Ambassador Jackovich his departure is 'normal rotation' in difficult and risky conditions in Bosnia. Officials in Washington however claim that Jackovich 'for some reason' has become an embarrassment for the White House and had to leave his duty due to higher American interests, obviously more important than Bosnia.

Jackovich is of Croatian descent. U.S. President George Bush appointed Jackovich ambassador to Bosnia in 1992. Over a year he was constantly travelling between Vienna where his office was, and Sarajevo, where he had to go at least once a month.

In June 1993 he opened the American Embassy in Sarajevo. At the ceremony organized on the occasion, Jackovich made clear his unreserved support for the Muslims and for Izetbegovic's hardline position of a unitary Bosnia. His reputation has become that of a diplomat who is pushing too hard for the Muslims and most probably promising them what Washington was unable to fulfil.

His critical attitude of the Contact Group plan and strong opposition to the renewal of contacts between the U.S. Administration with the Serbian leadership in Pale were considered too importune. In any case, Jackovich's departure can be interpreted as a sign that Washington is starting to take a more realistic view of the Bosnian conflict and its possible solution. Besides that, Washington wants to reestablish harmony with its European partners and with Russia, especially in the Contact Group. By siding directly with the Muslims in the Bosnian conflict Jackovich simply started to get in the way. That is why he has to leave Sarajevo.

Will Jackovich have better luck in Ljubljana, where according to the State Department he will be chief of the American mission, remains to be seen.

Silajdzic: Government May End Truce With Serbs

MS0504091195 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 5 Apr 95 p 13

[Article by Patrick Bishop, incorporating remarks by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic: "Bosnian Leader Threatens to Drop Cease-fire"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo—The Bosnian Prime Minister Mr. Haris Silajdzic gave warning yesterday that his government would refuse to extend its shaky truce with the Bosnian Serbs unless they signed an international peace plan to divide the country.

"If we extend the ceasefire forever, we will just play into their hands," he said reinforcing predictions that the country is sliding into another summer of war.

"I don't see any hopeful signs," said Mr Silajdzic. The international community's concept of containment, he said "means death for Bosnia."

The ceasefire, agreed at the start of the year, is due to run out this month. It has been breached on numerous occasions by both sides, and yesterday there was continued fighting north of Tuzla.

Mr Silajdzic said his government had a duty to fight on. "It carries a message to our enemy that although they still have enormous quantities of everything they want, they still can't control the situation.

"We're better organised, we're producing more and more weapons and we're getting some from outside.

"If we don't do anything we'll have the international mediators, a chain of Chamberlains going to and fro to Belgrade forever."

Mr. Silajdzic ruled out the prospect of the Bosnians adopting terror tactics to command the world's attention. "We are too civilised for that," he said. "For better or worse we have not answered the call of blood and fire like those fascists around us."

Mr Silajdzic said the government was committed to a political solution. But as Bosnia prepares to mark the third anniversary of the outbreak of the War, such a settlement seems far away.

In Bosnian eyes the outside world has settled for the status quo and that suits the Serbs very well. "The international community opted for containment and that is also the strategy of Belgrade," Mr Silajdzic said.

"Belgrade wants to go one step further and legalise the status quo. I expect the international community will move to that next stage, which will mean the legalisation of genocide."

The transformation of President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia has been transformed from a war criminal publicly indicted by Washington, into a trusted partner in the peace process causes cynical amusement.

"If your kill one person they cut your head off," he said. "If you kill 12 they put you in a mental home. But if you kill 200,000 they invite you to Geneva."

Karadzic Views U.S. Role in Bosnia, Cease-Fire

AU0504092195 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 95 pp 14-15

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, by Zoran Petrovic Pirocanac; place and date not given: "This Is an American War for the Benefit of Germany and Against Europe. The International Community Must Figure Out How Many Dead It Will Bury for the Sake of Tudjman's and Izetbegovic's States."]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pirocanac] Many people believe that internal conflicts and problems in the Srpska republic [RS] are much more dangerous for you than attacks from outside. You have long sustained fierce attacks by some of your veteran colleagues, as well as by the supporters of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia [SKPJ]. Have you been knocked down by those attacks, or have you remained on your feet?

[Karadzic] We have not been knocked down. Simply, we have not accepted the political struggle yet. You see yourself that we do not fight our political opponents in that way. Many of them work illegally, recruiting new followers or spreading rumors. However, our democracy is so vital that we do not even have to comment on daily attacks against us. Of course, soon we shall have to accept the political struggle, to show the people the degree and nature of the propaganda spread against us.

[Pirocanac] What and whom will the people decide to support?

[Karadzic] We are sure that the people will recognize the truth. Of all the former Yugoslav republics we have been least involved in scandals. Perhaps in one single case we lost 3.5 millions [currency not specified], that were imprudently taken out of the country with the best intention, to buy oil. The other amount, 5 billion German marks, was not lost, because we bought oil, which was later illegally confiscated, and eventually we, that is, the importer, won the lawsuit in court. Therefore, such denunciations do not hold water! We know that some Yugoslav republics lost up to 100 million German marks in risky business with oil.

[Pirocanac] What about war profiteers, because your opponents are constantly pointing to that sensitive issue?

[Karadzic] Profiteers probably exist, but they are to be found precisely among our political opponents, rather than in the administration.

[Pirocanac] Where do you think we can find more profiteers who are RS citizens: in the RS or in Belgrade?

[Karadzic] All our profiteers mostly have their private businesses outside the RS, and for that reason they are vulnerable. There, they are exposed to investigations by local financial police, and they cannot pursue any independent policy, even though they call themselves independent. All of them are vulnerable because they are fishing in troubled waters. However, we do not care at all. In our republic we do not have many war profiteers. It would perhaps be even better if we had more of them, because we would have more oil and other goods. That problem affects us more in terms of morale than in terms of material welfare. But it is certain that some 50 to 100 people have acquired great fortune in this war, and much is known about that. We appreciate much more concrete information against profiteers, rather than rumors.

[Pirocanac] For some profiteers certain officers were saying that without them the tanks would have been definitely blocked....

[Karadzic] Well, it is questionable whether one who has imported oil and paid duties is a profiteer. In that case he is a legal profiteer. To earn money and acquire a fortune in a very short time can be accomplished only by those who do not pay customs duties and taxes. All our businessmen who pay duties and taxes are esteemed members of society. We do not intend to build any sort of communist or socialist society. This will be a country of returnees, because after the war we shall privatize everything and in such a way make it possible for each family in the RS to own a bit of what belongs to the state now. We only resent people who dodge paying taxes or duties. Nevertheless, had there not been private businessmen and their resourcefulness and adroitness, we would not have been able to import all the components necessary for the production of weapons and ammunition, as well as fuel.

[Pirocanac] What is the morale in the army and with people like now, in view of the severe denunciations regarding the war profiteers in RS?

[Karadzic] Even though they live in great poverty, people are very high-spirited. I cannot hide the fact that the greatest reason for our problems is the blockade on the Drina River. With our own economy we would be able to finance our war and provide for our people, if we had the economic communication with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. However, even without it we are coping, and in that respect people are quite positive, brave and optimistic. They do not want to accept any imposed solution. Neither does the army, even though our soldiers have not received salaries for quite a long time. Every soldier is aware that we cannot provide those salaries, that only 150,000 out of 1.5 million citizens work, which means 10 percent of products for 90 percent of consumers.

[Pirocanac] Carter has fallen into silence, he has simply disappeared from the stage. What is happening with him?

[Karadzic] The international community, and certain circles in the United States in the first place, did not capitalize on Carter's visit as well as they might have. He accomplished more than anyone else so far—the four-month overall cease-fire, that is, the cessation of hostilities. He gave time to the international community to reach an agreement. Some U.S. circles made a resolute start in the direction of searching for solutions and the continuation of the peace negotiations. However, other circles in the U.S. State Department resumed their policy of pressure, expecting that the Serbs would collapse and that they would have to accept the imposed solution. Of course, this war suits some people in America, and it will last until the United States decides to terminate it. This is entirely an American war, of course, for the benefit of Germany and against Europe.

[Pirocanac] Did you give up the Russian mediation and their assistance?

[Karadzic] We keep in touch with some very influential and important circles in Russia. Unfortunately, the Foreign Ministry of Russia also treats the Serbs separately, talking only with Belgrade and sticking to the principle of isolation of the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, they will later wonder why they are not included in some actions, but their ministry will be responsible for that. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry is not the only important institution in Russia. We maintain contacts with some other, very important structures in Russia as well.

[Pirocanac] The voices from the West are getting more and more excited when speaking about the settlement of the war, and more and more observers are openly expressing their fear of further escalation.

[Karadzic] The Serbs will never accept anything less than the state. Which means, the RS must be a sovereign and independent state. If it is necessary to save the face of the international community, then we shall consider the possibility of forming a union with others, and a union of the European type, of sovereign states. If it comes to a military, rather than political solution, which means, if the fighting is resumed, we shall not accept any cease-fire until the end of the war.

[Pirocanac] There are many indications from military sources that the other side is preparing for the continuation of the war. One speaks of the inimical state.

[Karadzic] With the blessing of the international community the Muslims are preparing an offensive. If they resume fighting, there will be no cease-fire until the end of the war! We shall accept only a definitely concluded peace agreement.

[Pirocanac] You mean the total defeat of the Muslims, do you not?

[Karadzic] Then it will be the total defeat of the Muslims. That is, they may terminate the war earlier, before the total defeat, only if they propose a total peace. However, if the fighting is resumed before the cease-fire expires, there will be no return of the territories. Then, it will be the soldiers who determine where the borders are. Exchange of territories comes into question only if it is bound up with a political settlement of the war. In case of a military settlement, it is clear that the factual state will be a definite demarcation.

[Pirocanac] You are being threatened from many sides. What concretely do you have at your disposal to react? What are those new weapons that you have and that you can use in case of the escalation of the conflict?

[Karadzic] We shall certainly use all available means. We have not used everything we have, but in that case we shall have to make use of all our potential.

[Pirocanac] Do you have enough of that?

[Karadzic] Let us recall what our officers were saying before: No one will be safe if we are attacked.

[Pirocanac] Who do you refer to by this threat and what do you mean by "no one will be safe?"

[Karadzic] None of our enemies in Europe will be safe in that case.

[Pirocanac] Including those in former Yugoslavia as well.

[Karadzic] Yes, certainly. We also have as an option the unification with the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], if the international community continues to violate our rights, and if it continues to favor our enemies. If it tries to keep us in a Muslim-Croatian state we shall unite. They ought not to have any doubts about that. We shall defend ourselves together and our state will never ever be a part of any other again.

[Pirocanac] You say this despite the fact that the Serbs, at the moment, are entirely surrounded by NATO?

[Karadzic] Yes, that is a rather bleak picture. The international community is not giving up the accomplishment of its plans that are, unfortunately, clearly anti-Serbian this time, which will probably bring about a great European or world war. We shall never ever accept such conditions to be dictated to us. We shall never accept the Bosnian Muslim state. We shall never accept the Croatian state. The international community will have to figure out how many dead it will have to bury for the sake of Tudjman's and Izetbegovic's states.

[Pirocanac] What is the best solution for the Serbs in such a situation?

[Karadzic] I think the best for them would be to unite, all of them, and better today than tomorrow.

[Pirocanac] You have probably noticed the change of terminology used by the West's politicians recently: They no longer speak of either the RS or the RSK. They only speak of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Those terms were used recently by Al Gore as well, when he met with Tudjman....

[Karadzic] Yes, in that respect they stick to their recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the reality is quite different. So much the worse for them! They are presenting a situation that is very much different from reality. Bosnia is divided in three parts, with three sovereign peoples living in three territories, and it has been so for quite a long time. The Muslims have no authority in either the Serbian or the Croatian territories, nor do the Croats have authority in either the Serbian or the Muslim territories, nor the Serbs in the Muslim or Croatian territories. Simply, three Bosnias already exist, even though the Americans are making efforts to preserve the Muslim-Croatian Federation. Likewise, Croatia has no sovereignty over the territories controlled by the Serbs. The sooner the international community recognizes the reality that has come about in the course of the four-year war, the better for us and the international community.

[Pirocanac] You have to admit, though, that the international community is still powerful in dictating solutions to the weak....

[Karadzic] The international community does not have a means to form or preserve other states. They can be preserved only by their peoples. Since Tudjman and Izetbegovic are not able to do that, they have to satisfy themselves with the territories they are able to control.

[Pirocanac] Simultaneously with all the pressures from abroad, problems are caused by political inter-Serbian conflicts as well.

[Karadzic] As for those conflicts and the political struggle that is being imposed on us, it has not harmed us that much, it has just saddened our people a little. It is clear that those conflicts are synchronized, and that their aim is to diminish the authority of the government, as well as to create a chaos, in order to frustrate our plans.

[Pirocanac] Do you have a feeling that at the recent time President Milosevic, despite his typical discretion and reticence, is moving toward the conclusion that one ought to stick together?

[Karadzic] We do not have enough information about that, although there are indications of his having seen through the intentions of the international community to humiliate the Serbs and bring them to their knees. The only weapon that the international community has at the moment is our discord and unsynchronized policy. I think that the international community, if all the Serbs took a single stance, would have to accept that eventually.

Karadzic Asks UN for Fuel for 'Spring Sowing'

AU0404201095 Paris AFP in English 1950 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has asked UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi for 30,000 tonnes of fuel for "spring sowing," according to a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman in Zagreb.

Christopher Gunnes said the request was made about three weeks ago, adding that "any request for petrol has got to go through the (UN) sanctions' committee."

Bosnian television Tuesday [4 April] showed a copy of the letter, saying Karadzic had called on UNPROFOR to urgently provide Bosnian Serbs with 15,000 tonnes of fuel for agricultural purposes. He also asked UNPROFOR to approach the UN sanctions' committee for permission to buy another 15,000 tonnes. It was understood that Akashi had written back asking for details on how the Bosnian Serbs proposed to use the fuel.

Bosnian Serbs are currently denied fuel in line with UN sanctions imposed because of their refusal to accept an international peace plan which would require them to surrender part of the territory they conquered in three years of war. The Bosnian Serbs, who obtain their fuel through smuggling, have recently complained about the effect international sanctions have on their self-proclaimed republic.

For the past few weeks, they have consistently barred UNPROFOR fuel convoys from besieged Moslem-held enclaves, including Sarajevo.

HDZ: HSS Not Honoring Bonn Agreement

AU0404191195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Concerned by the hindering of the Bonn Agreement, the Croatian Peasant's Party [HSS] of Bosnia-Herzegovina today issued a statement for the public. The party believes that the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite committing itself to certain obligations, is only formally retaining authority in the Federation, without any real effect or (?effort). In today's statement, the HSS claims:

It is unforgivable that the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not honoring the obligations to which it has committed itself before the international community, particularly those set out in the Bonn Agreement, for which it gave guarantees and for which concrete deadlines have been set. The HDZ's conduct regarding cooperation with the Party of Democratic Action continually relegates the essential issues of the Federation—and with them the survival of the people—to the level of relations between the two parties. This reduces political pluralism and the role of the Republican and Federation Assembly in creating state policy, and represses the people's enthusiasm and awakened will. All this is objectively to the advantage of the HDZ's extremist wing, which has been waiting for a long time for Croats to disappear completely from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would enable them to proclaim the Federation project as superfluous.

The situation on the ground in places where the Party of Democratic Action has absolute authority [words indistinct]. A favorable atmosphere in which Croats can exercise their rights and national interests cannot be created with such a policy. By not honoring the aforementioned obligations, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not only calling into question the position of Croats in

Bosnia, but also the general interest of Croats, and is making the Republic of Croatia's and its leadership's international position increasingly difficult, reads the statement issued by the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commentary Criticizes Izetbegovic at SDA Session

AU0404204495 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 95 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Sabic: "Izetbegovic's 'Package' for the Croats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the moment, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by a diplomatic offensive and our military counteroffensive, Alija Izetbegovic believes. He stated this on Monday at the session of the Main Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. Having later assessed that the Muslims were successful both in the political offensive and in the military counteroffensive, the SDA president stated that, in the last month of the cease-fire, more intensive dynamics of the "external factors as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned" should be expected, which, in his opinion, should be manifested in "April being crowded with visits and pressures."

Izetbegovic then presented 25 points defining the positions on "certain issues," the first being: "Our goal remains an integral, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Federal organization is possible and desirable, but the Federation should be the Federation of cantons and not ethnic territories. The latter would encourage ethnic cleansing."

In the second point, he gave a somewhat extended definition of the political goal of his party: "Our goal is a democratic state; a multiethnic and multiparty one. This orientation gives great advantage to our political model before the obviously retrograde, one-ethnicity, one-religion, one-party concept of Karadzic's SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], or Boban's HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. Our democratic concept is imperative for our political and military victory in this war. Without this concept there can be no integral Bosnia."

Izetbegovic thus put his federal partners on the same plane as Karadzic's Serbs. Apart from the fact that it is very obvious that he—and not only once during his speech—considers "Boban's HVO," which, according to the Federation Constitution and the already achieved agreements, should be one of the two constituent parts of the federation armed forces, the same as the army that still destroys Bosnian towns and kills innocent people, it is also evident from the above two points that Izetbegovic's consideration of the Federation does not match the talk about the state community of the Croats and Muslims in the circles that are most often called friends of the Federation. It most certainly does not match what his federal partners consider to be the Federation, but it also does not match what he himself said in one of the points that followed, which is that Karadzic's acceptance of the Contact Group plan is the condition for the extension of the cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina and one of the conditions for achieving peace in the Balkans. The plan that anticipates the division of the territory according to the 51:49 ratio is even considered by the members of the Contact Group to be a practical division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two parts that would formally stay within the internationally recognized borders, the connection between which would yet have to be agreed upon. For instance, Contact Group member Michael Steiner stated recently that, with the implementation of the plan, two entities should be made—the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity—of which some kind of union should be made some day.

Since the very beginning, the Muslim leadership has seen the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation as the way to reintegrate the HVO-controlled territories and a transitory stage in the establishment of the integral Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Izetbegovic's speech before the Main Committee of the SDA shows that he is not willing to make any concessions regarding this. He is obviously not too interested in the fact that Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic signed an agreement in Bonn with which it was (again) confirmed that, with the Federation consolidated, both the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the executive authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina should stop functioning. This is understandable, since, with the consistent implementation of the agreement—that is, the Federation Constitution, which was only reconfirmed in the agreement—as far as the jurisdiction of the republican bodies is concerned, including the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency of which Izetbegovic is head, only the international representation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain. The constitution says that this state of affairs should remain the same until the final peace agreement is reached.

Izetbegovic's speech has again confirmed that the Muslim leadership is not too delighted by the fact that the federation should take over power, not only from the authorities at the HVO-controlled territories, but also at the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. As long as this is so, it may be said that the negotiations on the final solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still at the beginning. Naturally, the Federation is a Federation of cantons, as defined by the Constitution, but everyone who decides to say a few words about this complex project should ask themselves what the cantons are for after all. Is their purpose the equality of the peoples, or were they made only to make the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina complicated?

"The demands for us to respond in kind to the enemy in everything are unacceptable. Why? The first reason, and the difference, has to do with principles. We are democrats, and they are fascists. The second difference is that they want Bosnia to be divided, and are demanding a part, while we want an integral Bosnia within the internationally recognized borders. (...) After all, we are a state, and they are parastates. Our Army is an army, and what they have are para-armies, and that is a difference we should bear in mind," said Izetbegovic, parastates and para-armies being in the plural, which should indicate that the "they are fascists" also relates to the Croat leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question arises—what is this for if the issue concerns the people who are in Silajdzic's government and who sit at assembly sessions? If the intention is not to repeat again the oft-repeated claims that it is precisely the Croat side that is responsible for the fact that the implementation of the Federation Constitution has been going so who knows the answer.

Report Analyzes Recent Army Offensives

AU0404152995 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Mar 95 pp 8-9

[Article by Denis Kuljis: "At Minus 20 Degrees Celsius and Deep Snow, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Has Taken the Roof of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Opened the Way Toward Jajce!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Forty days before the cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to expire on 20 March at 0430, the Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] Army launched an attack on two important strategic posts.

The Zenica and Krajina Corps of the B-H Army attacked the Serbs' position on Mt. Vlasic from two directions, while the Tuzla Corps started an offensive on Mt. Majevica.

Having concentrated its forces in Ljuta Greda and Meokrinje, the Zenica Corps succeeded in breaking through the Ugar River basin on the Vlasic plateau, deep in Bosnian-Serb controlled territory, winning control over almost the entire plateau. After just four days of fighting, it also took the Opaljenik radio-communicational center, including the most important telecommunication transmitter under Serb control in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, through the gorges of Mt. Galica, the 7th Krajina Corps achieved a breakthrough from the western side of Mt. Vlasic, thereby half encircling the Serbs and taking over control of Mt. Galica.

Approximately 3,000 Serb civilians—inhabitants of six villages at the foot of Mt. Vlasic—fled. The Serbian defense, organized on just one front, simply fell apart, while the soldiers of the 22d Serbian infantry brigade from Kotor-Varos, who had sustained severe losses one month earlier at Mt. Galica, did not offer any firm resistance. The relay station staff was fully surrounded for 48 hours, but they eventually managed to break free and link up with the main forces. The weather conditions on Mt. Vlasic were terrible and the temperature sank to minus 20 degrees Celsius, while snow drifts were higher than 1 meter. The snow-drifted roads prevented the Serbian reserve forces from initiating a hasty counteraction. Without reinforcement and artillery support, the Serbs had no chance of withstanding the much stronger forces of the B-H Army. The joint success of the 3d and 7th Corps is important not only because they took the crucial relay station. From Mts. Vlasic and Galica, the Serbs controlled the entire Lasva valley and were able to reach Travnik, Novi Travnik, and Zenica with their artillery fire. If the B-H Army succeeds in keeping the newly captured positions that overlook the entire Bosnian Krajina toward Banja Luka, they will find themselves in a much more favorable operative position, with a good base for attacks against Jajce and Kotor Varos.

Battles for the Transmitter

After eight days of fighting, the Serbs have stabilized their defense and launched a counteroffensive. The most severe fighting is taking place around the Babanovac sport facilities on Mt. Vlasic.

On the other part of the front, the 2d (Tuzla) Corps launched a much broader offensive on the northeastern part of Mt. Majevica, which is controlled by the Eastern Bosnian Corps based in Bijeljina. Simultaneously with the offensive at Vlasic, the 2d Corps launched an offensive against the Serbian positions on the front from Celici to Teocak. The primary goal of the offensive is to take control of the relay station at Stolice, by which, in coordination with the Vlasic operation, the communication between Banja Luka and Pale would be almost completely cut.

The Bosnian forces entirely surrounded Stolice for almost four days, after which the [Bosnian Serb] special police forces, under the command of Goran Savic, made a breakthrough toward the relay station. Although the 2d Corps' attack is still in progress, the Serbs will undoubtedly attempt—by adding new forces—to strengthen their position at the relay station and the road that leads from Bijeljina via Ugljevik and Banj Brdo to the highest elevation 916, where the relay station is situated. Adjacent to the relay station itself, there is a very important facility, namely the Ugljevik thermal power station. In order to make it operational, the Serbs have started constructing a network for electric energy from Ugljevik to Banja Luka through the Bosnian Posavina [Sava River basin] in order to terminate drastic restrictions of electric power in Bosnian Krajina. Therefore, they will endeavor to continue the offensive at any price in order to push back the forces of the B-H Army 2d Corps to their initial positions.

This is already the second time that General Sead Delic is launching major attacks to win control over important positions on Majevica. Last autumn, in operations in almost the same direction, he took Lisaca Hill near the transmitter. Even though his forces captured 64 Serbian soldiers against 16 casualties on their side, they penetrated only 500 meters across a 700-meter front into Serbian territory. With the second prong of the attack, that is, Toromanici-Banj Brdo, Cviljevina-Adzica Kosa, and Kostici-Brezovica, two brigades of the Tuzla Corps were almost completely wiped out. According to hospital data, they had 362 lightly or seriously wounded soldiers. The exact number of dead is not known, but it is known that several officers of the brigades that carried out the operations lost their lives in the fighting.

At the time, shortly before the signing of the four-month cease-fire, the Tuzla Corps, which represents almost a third of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's troops, was rather short of weapons, principally heavy artillery, and it was limited because of weak logistical support.

Only 40 Bullets per Soldier

The Tuzla Corps has around 45,000 soldiers under arms. However, the average ammunition allocation for small arms has been only 40 bullets per soldier. Only one third of the soldiers are completely kitted out with uniforms. Food is also insufficient—they have only supplies of flour.

The worst situation is with heavy artillery. At the time of the signing of the cease-fire the mixed artillery division had only one Orkan and one Oganj multiple rocket launcher, two 128-mm and two 107-mm multiple rocket launchers. It had all together four howitzers, two 155-mm and two 122-mm (D-30 type). The mortar battery had six 120-mm mortars. The division has also one mortar battery with four 120-mm barrels and eight 82-mm barrels. Of artillery weapons the division has two ZIS 76-mm guns and one B-1 hill gun of the same caliber. The division has several 107-mm and 128-mm single-barrel rocket launchers. Though the number of weapons is small, not even a fifth of the ammunition needed per weapon has been provided during the course of the war.

Because of the long demarcation line, the division has never succeeded in acting independently and has changed position more than 30 times.

Some heavy artillery can be found in the brigades, that is, in the operative groups, but it is insufficient for more major operations. The 1st Operative Group in Bosanska Posavina has the largest number of soldiers. It covers a part of the front from Gradacac to Celici and all together numbers 20,000 soldiers, with five tanks (three T-55s, one M-8 and one captured T-34). To these forces one should add four armored vehicles taken over from the Tuzla units. As for artillery support, it has one 120-mm D-30 howitzer and one 100-mm gun. The situation with antitank weapons for small and medium-range operations is considerably better. The 1st Operative Group has a great number of RPG-7s and Osas [portable rocket launcher], and a considerable quantity of Chinese and Russian-made Red Arrow and Fagot antitank guided missiles.

These antitank missiles are sufficient to halt a massed Serbian tank attack, but for offensive actions toward the Posavina corridor they are insufficient.

The second strongest group of the Tuzla Corps is the 5th Operative Group, which covers the northeastern front from Majevica to Tuzla. It is composed of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Tuzla Mountain Brigades with an average strength of between 2,200 and 2,500 men, as well as the 251st Mountain Infantry Brigade numbering 900 soldiers and the Panthers, reconnaissance-commando unit numbering 60 soldiers. To these forces one should add the Tuzla police, whose 1,180 members are often involved in operations on the front. Though it is the second largest group in terms of numbers, according to well informed sources, the 5th Operative Group is technically and materially the best equipped one.

To cover the short supplies of ammunition, in Tuzla the Army has started up its own special purpose production in the Factory of Transport Devices in the workshop at the Tuzla Salt Works, the steel foundry, and the foundry of nonferrous metals in Tuzla. They mostly manufacture mortar shells with short fuses [fugasni], cumulative [cumulativni], and incendiary charges. The KHK [extension not known] and Soda Lukavac factories are engaged in the production of other types of artillery ammunition. However, the materials used and the technology of manufacturing are far from being satisfactory in term of the norms in ammunition production, so its combat effect is considerably poorer. Thus for artillery ammunition spent shells are being used, while for heavy 12.7-mm machine guns only armor-piercing shells are being manufactured.

In view of the disastrous state of the Tuzla Corps, the strongest and best equipped corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the key question arises: To what extent are government forces really able and equipped to carry out offensives to liberate the occupied territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Late last year and early this year the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army began to make considerable changes in its organization. In the majority of corps, divisions have been formed to be able to undertake broader offensive actions.

The Forming of Divisions

So far several infantry divisions have been formed, mostly on the basis of the old operative groups. So the operative group in Gorazde has been transformed into the 81st division, directly subordinated to the Sarajevo [1st] Corps. In central Bosnia two divisions are being formed. However, the Bihac [5th] Corps will maintain its brigade organization, because its size does not exceed one and a half brigades.

However, forming divisions in itself does not mean any considerable reversals at the front. The insufficiently equipped Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, particularly in terms of heavy artillery, cannot guarantee the full effect of divisions in possible offensive operations. For the neutralization of enemy forces, when preparing an attack with a division, the minimal support requirement is approximately the equivalent of one artillery regiment, which is hard to accomplish even at the entire corps level, but even then there is not enough ammunition.

The second important question is the possibility of ensuring logistical support through extensive offensive operations. The daily requirements for ammunition, food, medical supplies, and water amount to several dozen tons, whereas the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina survives only thanks to humanitarian aid.

The third, and perhaps the most important condition for the functioning of the reorganized Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is the ability of the command staff to plan, prepare, and execute operations with these divisions. Even though the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has initiated extensive education of its commissioned officers at the School Center in Zenica, it is impossible to learn the knowledge and skills necessary to command larger strategic forces in a three-month course.

Though the armed resistance of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina is phenomenonal, particularly since they formed the army under total siege conditions without any material resources, if the current tempo of its development continues one cannot expect it to achieve its full offensive potential for as long as two years. Until then, raids carried out by smaller formations in badly protected spaces between the Serbian defense lines can be expected, so as to maintain at least some initiative at the front.

Pejanovic, Turkish Ambassador View SCC Trip

AU0404162295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and president of the Serbian Civic Council [SCC], today received Sukru Tufan, Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The topic of the talks centered on the SCC delegation's first visit to Belgrade and Podgorica prior to the upcoming second session of citizens of Serbian nationality.

Upon thanking the Turkish ambassador for his visit and expressing satisfaction with his interest in the SCC delegation's visit to Belgrade, Pejanovic said:

The visit of the SCC delegation to Belgrade and Podgorica is a turnabout in the Bosnia-Herzegovina drama and peace process, all the more so as the delegation members were given a warm reception, their political arguments acknowledged, and they had the chance to talk to the representatives of the official Serbian authorities.

Ambassador Tufan expressed particular interest in the chances of Slobodan Milosevic recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I expect positive progress as Milosevic has accepted cooperation with the international community, which in turn accepted Milosevic as the main factor of establishing peace in the Balkans, Pejanovic said. He informed Ambassador Tufan that the SCC of Bosnia-Herzegovina, within the framework of the delegation's upcoming visits to the United States, Moscow, Belgrade, and Athens, was also contemplating a visit to Ankara.

Bishop Atanasije Threatens President Milosevic

95BA0204D Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 pp 8-9

[Article by Ivan Ugrin: "'We Got Rid of Milos, and We Can Also Get Rid of Sloba!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bishop Atanasije of Zahumlje and Herzegovina was recently a guest in a session of the "National Assembly of the Srpska republic" in Samac and addressed the "deputies" in a speech that OSLOBODJENJE published from Pale under the headline "They Are Preparing Another Jasenovac for Us." It is no news that representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church are engaged in politics; for that matter they are among the principal strategists of the ideology of Serbian expansionism, but the way in which Bishop Atanasije attacked Slobodan Milosevic in his speech in Samac is of interest.

"That man quarreled nearly two years with the Slovenes when there was no reason at all and he clawed and scratched and fought to preserve Yugoslavia. Now he wants to uphold the defunct Contact Group at any price as he did that little congress when he experienced the fiasco of the Communist Party—and to our detriment, in order only to extend his neocommunist regime, which does not differ a whit from the Broz regime," the bishop said at the outset, as yet altogether mild in his tone.

He continued: "I have in my hands data about that man's lies. Lies one after the other. He thought that he had lied to Vance, but now Vance's signature is coming back and will cast us once again into the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] tomb. I say that in the long term the misfortune of the Serbian people is that kind of tyrant, that kind of despot, who does not ask anyone, who does not consult with anyone, and is not accountable to anyone. Milosevic has sullied a divided Serbia in the same way that Tito did."

Atanasije had called upon Milosevic to submit his resignation even earlier, and he repeated that before the "deputies" of the "assembly" in Samac, as a "precondition of a better future" for the Serbian people. "He has experienced failure wherever he goes, and the next one, I pray to God I am not a prophet, will be Kosovo! He opened the Dubrovnik theater of war and thus the glorious Herzegovinians were left with half of Trebinje Opstina. There can be no question of an outlet to the sea with that kind of policy."

"We have been reduced to the Belgrade Pashaluk and to the policy that the Belgrade Pashaluk represents. And why? Because of the ambitions of one man whose Serbian legitimacy I dispute on the basis of character, not to mention belief and spirituality," the bishop said.

Then Atanasije arrived at his own area, and he said: "He went to Hilandar, but he did not cross himself or kneel, nor should he. But when he went to Gazimestan, he did not visit Gracanica, where there are 350,000 people, but rather came by helicopter by way of his communist sky."

Later in the speech, the bishop even issued an open threat to Milosevic: "Mr. President, Serbia took off the head of Karadjordje, and it freed itself. Serbia got rid of Milos. Do not think that you are indispensable. And when Milos took Karadjordje's head to the pasha in Belgrade, the pasha began to titter, just as these people will titter (Atanasije is referring to the Contact Group): the signature, gentlemen, on this plan. The signature! Everything else since passes like cold water, only the signature. And the signature means a very great deal!"

And finally: "Until just recently the entire West was calling him all kinds of names, but today he is just an ordinary toady. He should be ashamed that Kinkel recently praised him: Let Milosevic break down Karadzic, and the sanctions would be removed."

That was the speech of the bishop of Zahumlje and Herzegovina in the "Assembly of the Srpska republic" in Samac. It is said that the tongue expresses what a man has in his heart. Atanasije has little faith, but a lot of politics. If nothing else, he showed at least how much the Serbian Orthodox Church "loves" Milosevic and indicated that that "love" could cost Slobodan his head, if one is to believe Bishop Atanasije. But just remember that this is a Serbian business.

Report on HVO 3d Motorized Guard Brigade

95BA0204E Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 10

[Article by Zeljko Maganjic: "War Is Their Destiny"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "No, God help us, I certainly would not want the war to end now; what we are fighting for would be unfinished," said Ivana and his friends in the 3d Motorized Guard Brigade of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], the Hawks.

War is their destiny, the entire story that they carry with them from battlefield to battlefield, the story that they do not tell in public. There are the two war stories of one brigade and the two war stories of every man in that unit, which is made up of young men and women from the Lasva Valley, Zepce and vicinity, and Kiseljak. "We are people from the enclaves," one of them would say through laughter as we got ready to take the hill. The first war story went back to 1992 and the war against the Serbs in Bosnia. A real war drama then played out in the war with the Muslims. This is the story these fighting men do not want to talk about. One can suspect the reason for their silence about that period of the war. The federation comes ahead of personal feelings, political and other views, and they respect this like good soldiers. One can conclude from the brief sentences on the topic of the war with the Muslims that this was bloodier and more difficult than anyone can imagine who was not in the "enclaves" at that time.

The Bursts of Fire Are Communication

The second war story of the 3d Motorized Guard Brigade of the HVO, the Hawks, begins on Kupres. Units of this brigade took part in battles to free the Kupres Plateau, and to this day they have remained throughout the theater of Livno, Glamoc, and Kupres. The commanders in this brigade, Lieutenant Stjepan Biljesko Mican and Major Drago Dujmovic, assistant commander for political activity, spoke about this:

"Our brigade has been very effective in this large and difficult theater, and little is said about us, because there have been the fewest problems involving us," said Mican and Dujmovic, which is not hard to believe, because spending an entire day in the field with these lads offers a rather good picture of the brigade and especially its organization and discipline. One gets the impression that discipline is sacred to the Hawks. They told their story with no additional grimaces.

Our destination is Golija; a new Japanese off-road vehicle and a driver experienced in driving cross-country on snow are a condition for reaching the base safely, which is at the foot of one of the peaks of Golija. From there one can view part of Glamoc and Glamocko field.

Here, the pines have married the icicles. Even when there is no wind, it is smart to wear a handkerchief up to the eyes here, because your face is burning from the ice needles that mercilessly bore into the eyes. A burst from a heavy machine gun is heard from a neighboring peak. The white winter camouflage uniforms I see are a good place for writing messages, such as "kill me"! The view of Glamoc, Glamocko field, and the "famous" gypsum factory Glama. Empty. Those commonplace sounds that reach the woods from afar are absent here. Bursts of gunfire are the only communication between the outposts on Golija and Glamoc.

White and Multicolored

We made a selection in the team that went up to the post. Those wearing the camouflage uniform can root for any team, while the fighters in the white uniform can only root for Hajduk.

In one of the villages of lower Livanjsko field, which the HVO captured during fierce military operations last November and December, we report to the Command and speak briefly to Commander Ante Jukic. I ask him how it is to wage war against the chetniks after the war against the Muslims?

"We are a Guard brigade of the HVO, and it is our place to wage war against the enemy. We will wage war against anyone we are ordered to wage war against." Jukic is clear.

On Staretina, they walk with their rifles at the ready. The soldiers show us bunkers that the chetniks dug after the fall of the first battle line in Celebici and things they left as they fled over Staretina. A bit away from the trench a "soldier" made from a raincoat has been set up as bait for possible chetnik hit-and-run attacks.

"And what if this fake soldier brings them over?" I ask.

"Well, we just wish they would come, so we could mix it up, so we would not be bored," Ivan said, a soldier who has been wounded more than once.

"Their strategy is to cut us off in the rear, and they think that we would flee to the other side across the field," the commander added.

"And they really think that we would run. What fools, just think of us—running," Ivan cannot get over it, and his fellow fighters are issuing salvos of laughter. One of them asked when he would get a permit from the commander to go to town?

Nowhere Without a Permit

"No going into town, no taking a walk. The cafes are not open, anyway," the commander replied.

"It has nothing to do with the cafes, man. I found a girl in Livno." I passed over that dialogue in silence so that I could later ask Commander Jukic about those permits to go to town, and I learned that no soldier of this brigade can leave the position for a minute without a mandatory written permit.

After the tour of the battlefield that was excellently organized by Maj. Dujmovic, it was time to talk to the "boss of the position," the commander of the Hawks, the 3d Motorized Guard Brigade of the Vitez Corps District, Colonel Ilija Nakic.

"This brigade was formed in the most difficult times for us and our population in central Bosnia, the Lasva Valley, Kiseljak, Zepce, and Usora. In Busovaca, we celebrated the first anniversary of its existence on 25 January of this year. Members of the 3d Guard have taken part in all the battles to defend and liberate Croatian territories in Herceg-Bosna, and quite a few of our fighting men took part in the big battles during the Homeland War in Croatia, and so our fighting men have immense experience since 1991," Col. Nakic said.

"The members of the 3d Guard Brigade did not commit a single incident or outburst after the signing of the Washington agreement with the Muslims, although there was good reason to do so," said the commander of this brigade, adding that this is proof of the greatness of this brigade and the quality of the organization, and behind that, he said, there is the immense war experience of the Guard, the officers, and the noncommissioned officers who have gone through our military schools.

Before we parted, I asked the fighting men if they had anything to add or to particularly emphasize for the newspapers up there on the outpost in the winter?

"I want to go home," shot one of them, and the others supported him with a burst of laughter.

Martic's Statement on Resolution 981

AU0404200895 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In response to UN Security Council Resolution 981, the RSK [republic of Serb Krajina] President's Information Service issues the following statement:

The resolution was adopted after consultations between Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, special envoy of UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, and delegations from the RSK and Croatia.

The latest resolution does not take into consideration suggestions put forward by RSK representatives during the meeting with Mr. Stoltenberg, nor those contained in President Martic's letter to Secretary General Butrus-Ghali of 31 March 1995. We remind the public that RSK President Milan Martic also gave a serious warning to Mr. Stoltenberg and to the UN Security Council saying that if views of the RSK were ignored, we would revise our approval of the retention of UN forces in this region. The president's view was endorsed by the people of the RSK, most political parties and other organizations, municipal assemblies, as well as by informal groups of citizens, and they all demanded that the RSK leadership be resolute and preserve the sovereignty of the country and the global national interests.

Everybody agrees that Resolution 981 undermines the peace process. The Security Council did not support the peaceful policy that the RSK advocated from the start. Quite the contrary, it rewarded the Croatian policy based on ultimatums and pressure that jeopardizes all achievements regarding the peaceful solving of the conflict between the RSK and Croatia. This Security Council decision could have far-reaching consequences for the frail stability of this region.

As certain contacts with relevant international factors are being made in order to consider all aspects of Security Council Resolution 981, RSK President Milan Martic will soon inform the public about his views on the matter, the statement by the Information Service of RSK President Milan Martic concludes.

Babic Rejects Resolution

AU0504090695 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 3 Mar 95

[Speech by Milan Babic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in Krajina; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] People in the republic of Serbian Krajina are well aware that it will be quite some time before confidence is restored between the Serbs in Krajina and the Croats in their state of Croatia. The Serbs still remember very well not only the atrocities and crimes committed by Franjo Tudjman's followers, but the hundreds of thousands of innocent lives of innocent Serbs murdered by Ante Pavelic's Croatian Nazis, who were buried in mass graves and left on the green fields of Jasenovac [Croat concentration camp in World War II]. For more than 100 years, under the dictatorships of various Croatian leaders, from Starcevic, Frank, and Pavelic, to Josip Broz [Tito] and Franjo Tudjman, the Croats have been committing unprecedented genocide against the Serbs in Dalmatia, Krajina, and Slavonija. Every time in history when, under the patronage of great powers, any kind of Croatian state is established, the Serbs from Krajina are exterminated, killed, and expelled. The council of the great world powers wants to recommend the leadership of the Croatian state to this generation of Krajina Serbs as well, but they must realize that not a single living Serb in Krajina will accept or come to terms with that. No Krajina Serb will hang himself with an ustashi rope.

Three years ago, we begged our brothers in Belgrade not to abandon us, not to take our joint state away, not to leave us in such unreliable hands as so-called international protection. They assured us that the so-called UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] would remain in Krajina until a referendum was organized for people to decide about their own future. As if the whole world had not witnessed three referenda confirming our determination to unite our country, Krajina, with the mother country of Serbia and with our brothers in the Srpska republic! Instead of the right to self-determination, we are being offered subordination to the Croatian leadership. The unfortunate Vance Plan was a disguised protection that many people in Krajina saw through. UN Security Council Resolution No. 981 is the same thing, but this time in a much more transparent wrapping. If it had not been for the Vance Plan, this would not have happened either.

Instead of the status of a so-called protected territory and UNPROFOR, we are being offered a UN Confidence Restoration Operation, as they call it. As if we had not gone through one confidence restoral after the ustasha bloodbath in World War II! That restoral of confidence leads us from the dictatorship of Croatian communists to extermination, exile, and repeated aggression by the Croatian Nazi state of Franjo Tudjman against the Krajina Serbs. The last restoral of confidence resulted in the exile of half of the Serbs from Tito's former Croatia. The Krajina Serbs, who had the strength to resist the terror and who have strong ties with Krajina, remained in Croatia. There cannot be another confidence restoral with regard to the Croatian state until it recognizes the republic of Serbian Krajina, a democratic country of all Krajina's inhabitants, created as a result of the will of the Serbian nation. The so-called Vance Plan provides for zones protected by the United Nations as different parts of Croatia, while it was formally still a part of Yugoslavia from the UN viewpoint. This UN Confidence Restoration Operation, as they call it, has the political intention to treat the Krajina Serbs as a part of the Independent State of Croatia [[Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska; World

War II Croatian state], as stated in Article 5 of the Resolution, in those parts of Croatia.

Indeed, the resolution does urge the sides to negotiate. Krajina will probably continue to negotiate on all controversial issues, but it will never allow the sovereignty or control of the Croatian state over its territory.

It is my view that this UN Security Council resolution is very general and is primarily a political act with an absolutely unacceptable political intention. It also has certain operational elements that could be useful to Krajina, such as the deployment of UN forces along the separation lines between the republic of Serbian Krajina and Croatia, which we demanded when the Vance Plan was being drawn up. But it also contains certain operational elements that could cause irreparable harm to Krajina, such as the intention to deploy UN military forces along the border between the Srpska republic and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], which we will never allow. For the time being, this does not produce any results in itself. But in the next couple of weeks, we will have to ask envoys of the UN secretary general to explain which technical details can be incorporated in the new mandate that is still to be drawn up and which details we cannot allow to become part of that mandate at any cost.

The government and the state leadership of the republic of Serbian Krajina already presented their opinion of the text of the Resolution at its preparatory stage. Croatia is laying too much emphasis, quite unrealistically, if I may say so, on their success with regard to the Resolution. But Tudjman does not have much reason to gloat over the Resolution, as it could eventually backfire on him.

Lezajic Opposes UN Plan

AU0504090995 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 3 Mar 95

[Speech by Krajina Serb "Assembly Chairman" Rajko Lezajic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest UN Security Council Resolution No. 981 of 31 March, 1995, is actually completely unacceptable to us, that is, unacceptable to the republic of Serbian Krajina. I must admit that certain elements of the Resolution are useful such as UN forces being deployed along the separation line. This part is acceptable to us. But what we find not only absolutely unacceptable but even intolerable is that UN forces are supposed to be deployed between the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Srpska republic and between the republic of Serbian Krajina and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Furthermore, the mere mention of the UN mandate in Croatia clearly shows that the Security Council and great powers are intending to place the republic of Serbian Krajina into a ghetto of the Independent State of Croatia [Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska: World War II Croatian state], which—and let me make this absolutely clear—is absolutely unacceptable to the republic of Serbian Krajina. Let me remind you of the decision made by our assembly, when we broke off, suspended negotiations, which makes it clear that all talks and negotiations are postponed until the UN mandate is extended in its present form, as it is now. The Resolution shows that the mandate has been radically changed and I must say this is unacceptable to us.

I must say that, when we met with Mr. Stoltenberg here, we told him quite unambiguously that the UN forces must be called UN Forces for the Demarcation Between the republic of Serbian Krajina and Croatia. That kind of mandate would be acceptable to the republic of Serbian Krajina. Any kind of coexistence or restoring of confidence is out of the question. The mere mention of confidence restoral is utopian, not only for the Serbs, but also for the Croats. The Croats are also aware that Serbs and Croats cannot coexist in this region. We can only live next to each other, each nation in its own country. In other words, let them live in their Croatia and we will live in our country, the republic of Serbian Krajina. Only so can peace be restored in this region. I think that over in the past four years we have proven that we can live next to each other and I think that this is the best direction for negotiations and talks and that it would be best to discuss and talk about demarcation. There will be no restoring of confidence; it is ridiculous, to say the least.

The people know what they want. They said what they wanted in 1990, after the secession from Yugoslavia. And that is why the people of the republic of Serbian Krajina created their Krajina, their own country, the country of the Serbian nation and all the citizens who live in it. But I must say that the latest Resolution actually undermines the Vance Plan. And this takes us back to the stage before the Vance Plan. And that is why we have every right to demand that the Yugoslav Army and the state of Yugoslavia return to the republic of Serbian Krajina.

New UN Mandate Starts Out 'Mired in Confusion'

AU0404141195 Paris AFP in English 1323 GMT 4 Apr 95

[By Alain Navarro]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, April 4 (AFP)—The restructured UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia began its mandate this week mired in confusion, with both the Croatian Government and Serb secessionists threatening to bar peacekeepers from key regions under their control. Although UN officials breathed a sigh of relief last Friday [31 March] when the Security Council adopted a resolution renewing the peacekeepers' mandate for eight months, the application of the resolution has quickly degenerated into a show of force between Zagreb and the breakaway Serbs.

The Serbs reject the proposed deployment of UN troops along Croatia's borders with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as demanded by Zagreb in return for allowing the UN troops to remain in the country. The troops would observe though not move to prevent material and men crossing between Serbia and Serb-held areas of Croatia and Bosnia.

The Serbs are also upset that the United Nations buckled under Zagreb's demands that the mission in Croatia be renamed UNCRO—the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia—despite their opposition to the name Croatia being in the title. Zagreb, for its part, announced Monday that it plans to order some 1,500 peacekeepers out of western Slavonia in coming days.

The region is one of four "protected areas" located in the east of the republic. It is inhabited by a Croatian majority but borders eastern Slavonia, where separatist Croat Serbs have declared part of their self-styled Krajina republic. The UN troops, part of the UN Protection Force whose mandate expired on March 31, provided a buffer between the separatist Serbs who seized control of eastern Slavonia in a Belgrade-backed war of secession in late 1991, and Croatian forces aiming to reimpose Zagreb's sovereignty over the region.

A senior Croatian official said the area that the UN forces would be required to leave was "no longer a UN-protected area." The UN has responded to this latest quagmire in the Yugoslav crisis by saying it will pull out of Croatia if necessary. "My only answer, which I have often repeated, is this: We are ready to pull out if one of the parties does not want us," UN peace mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said Monday. "The UN has enough other commitments to fulfill worldwide."

Meanwhile the UN's special representative to ex-Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, and the commander of UN troops in ex-Yugoslavia, General Bernard Javier, are to head to New York this weekend to discuss the latest developments and try to come up with a solution. "There is a great deal of confusion and anything is possible," a high-ranking official at the UN headquarters in Zagreb said.

"We urgently need clarification on this issue" before a new resolution is adopted at the end of the month specifying the number of troops to be deployed in Croatia and the terms of their operation, he said.

Another headache that needs to be resolved by June 30, the deadline set by the resolution for outstanding issues to be dealt with, is the name of the operation. "If we have to quickly remove the insignia UNPROFOR from the peacekeeper's sweaters to replace it with UNCRO, I wonder where we can find 10,000 local seamstresses to do that," said UN spokesman Christophe Guness.

UN Banned From Entering Separation Zone

LD0404172195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1625 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, April 4 (TANJUG)—The Croatian authorities are banning U.N. force members from doing their duty in the area of separation with Krajina Serbs, coordinator for civilian affairs of Sector East of the U.N.-Protected Areas Phillip Corwin told TANJUG on Tuesday.

Since the title the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is practically no longer valid after the adoption of Security Council resolution 981, Corwin explained that the only title which this mission could use would be United Nations until new information was received.

Corwin said relations between the U.N. and the Croatian authorities were undefined. Signs with the title UNPROFOR still have not been removed in Sector East, the U.N.-Protected Area based in the eastern Serb Krajina town of Erdut on the Danube River.

U.N. spokesman in Zagreb Michael Williams told a press conference on Tuesday that the peace force would not abandon current positions until details of the operative plan for implementing resolution 981 are worked out. The resolution on the peace force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia extended the mandate until Nov. 30, and gave a new title to the mission—U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation (CRO).

Under this resolution, details about the number, function and deployment of the UNCRO force are to be determined by the end of April with a new Security Council document.

ASH Welcomes Copenhagen Agreement

95BA0204C Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by A. Malenica: "The Agreement Is Window Dressing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Croatian citizens are being subjected to a new manipulation of the controlled media close to the government, who are trying with incomplete information to persuade the domestic public that the most recent agreement between Tudjman and Al Gore in Copenhagen is yet another victory of Croatian policy. But actually what happened was inevitable. Pressure was put on Croatia with the threat of political, economic, and financial measures, so that in the end the president had to give in.

This is how Miko Tripalo, president of ASH [Action of Croatian Social Democrats], assessed the agreement between Tudjman and Al Gore in a news conference held on Wednesday.

"For a long time, our president has stubbornly stuck with his decision to reject the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate without consulting with our allies. Nevertheless, it is much worse that in the last six months the Croatian parliament, the people, and especially the displaced persons, as well as all the opposition parties, have been faced with a fait accompli, while all that time they were ruthlessly manipulated by the leadership of the incumbent party," Tripalo said.

"Back when the vote was taken in the parliament, when we supported rejection of the mandate of the peacekeeping forces because they are ineffective, ASH warned that there were reasons for renewing the mandate. We were afraid that military conflicts would flare up," Tripalo said. The decision to deny the mandate to the peacekeeping forces, formulated as an ultimatum, presented Croatia in the eyes of the world as a country committed to war, and in the end we did not derive profit from that.

"ASH nevertheless welcomes the agreement between Tudjman and Al Gore, because it has taken us further from a war that would be disastrous for Croatia. But in those elements that are known, that agreement is more or less a piece of window dressing," the leader of ASH said.

"The facts indicate that the UN forces are remaining as a buffer between the Croatian Army [HV] and the rebellious Serbs, while their presence on Croatian borders will be symbolic," Tripalo said in conclusion.

Weaknesses of Serbian Defense Noted

95BA0204B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Mario Galic: "Fraternal Aid Unfeasible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For a long time now, we have been hearing messages from Martic and "company" to the effect that if the Croatian Army [HV] were to attack the "krajina," the Bosnian Serbs would rush to the aid of the "krajina people." The statements of the "krajina" leaders go so far as to openly admit that they could oppose Croatia only for a few days, but with the help of their brothers in Bosnia they would certainly succeed in defending the "krajina." The "Supreme Defense Council," the joint defensive body of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, has even been established to emphasize the determination of the joint fighting effort. If the Marticites are really relying on the chancy military aid of the Bosnian Serbs, then they can immediately begin to pack their suitcases.

Why? Because the army of the Bosnian Serbs is in a very awkward position, and Mladic needs at least as many more fighting men than he has now if he wants to successfully patch up all the holes in his defense. The strengthening of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the announced beginning of the spring offensive will make the situation that much worse for the Bosnian Serbs, and the shortage of men will become still more obvious. There are two facts that prove that the situation with the Serbian army is not as good as represented by the Serbian generals. First, the Serbs in Bosnia have lost more territory in the last 12 months than they have managed to gain. Although it is only a matter of a few percentage points, this is still proof that a balance of power has been achieved between the Serbs on the one hand and the Croats and Muslims on the other.

The second fact is that for five months now they have been involved in heavy fighting with the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The greatest burden of that fighting has been borne by the Serbs from the "krajina" and the Abdicites. As the date approaches for the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to leave Croatia, the "krajina people" will be able to set aside fewer and fewer fighting men for the fight against the Muslims. So, the forces of the Bosnian Serbs will soon have to take over that task as well. And that means a few thousand more fighting men not available on other battlefields.

At the same time, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has for a long time now been successful in pressing the Serbs to the north from Mt. Vlasic. The last such offensive action, conducted in late February, resulted in 350 refugees and the capture of three Vlasic villages by the Muslims.

But Mt. Vlasic is by no means the most critical part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least not as far as the Serbs are concerned. For them, the most critical parts are the very long battlefronts—Brcko, Mt. Ozren, and Bosansko Grahovo. The mysterious night flights over Tuzla and the alleged advancement of weapons to the 2d Corps there could be an indication of an offensive in which an attempt will finally be made to cut the corridor in the Sava Valley in Bosnia. For now, the Muslim forces have reached Brcko itself and thus forced a shift of the corridor to roads going right along the bank of the Sava. That is an exceedingly unfavorable solution for the Serbs, because strong forces of the Croatian Army are on the other bank of the Sava. Thus, the Muslims could cut the corridor even now, but they need a large quantity of weapons to hold the new positions even after a major counteroffensive by the Serbian forces, which certainly would follow in order to open up the corridor once again. It is precisely because of that complicated situation concerning the vitally important corridor that Mladic must permanently keep his highest-quality forces in the Sava Valley.

The preparations of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina for an offensive against the so-called Ozren pocket have become increasingly noticeable in the recent past. If the Muslims succeeded in taking Doboj, the few thousand Serbs who are now on Ozren would find themselves completely surrounded. That would open up the opportunity for the Muslim forces to take Ozren completely, which would essentially improve the position of the 2d Corps. The way would be opened for a further penetration along the valley of the Bosna River. The end result would be a still stronger threat to the corridor.

The third critical region for the Serbs occurred by surprise and was altogether unexpected. In a short time the well-organized and conducted offensive of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Livnjacko Polje took the Croatian forces within reach of Bosansko Grahovo. Because a vital highway connecting Knin and Banja Luka passes through that small town, the extent of the danger to the "krajina" capital is clear. Another such offensive and the HVO will enter Grahovo, thereby blocking all highway traffic. Because, for the present, there are no signs that the Serbs could neutralize the 5th Corps and thus open the railroad line that goes to Bosanski Novi and Banja Luka via Bihac, Grahovo will for a long time continue to be vital to keeping Knin alive.

In addition to the places enumerated above, Sarajevo and Donji Vakuf are also potential places for major conflicts, and taking them would open up the possibility of penetrating through the valley of the Vrbas all the way to Jajce. A possible linkup of the forces of the Croatian Army and the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina would create opportunities that would make it possible to organize an offensive whose ultimate objective would be penetration to Banja Luka.

Although Karadzic has joined Martic in assuring the Serbs of reliable military assistance of the Serbs in Bosnia to those in Croatia if the Croatian Army attacked the "krajina," Mladic knows that this is just a story to calm the public, aware that it is only a matter of time before the army of the Bosnian Serbs begins to yield in a massive way to the assaults of the Muslim and Croatian forces.

Incidentally, if the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina cuts the corridor, and the Croatian Defense Council takes Bosansko Grahovo, why would the Croatian Army attack the "krajina" at all?

Opposition Calls For No-Confidence Vote

95BA0204A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 95 p 40

[News release by Dr. Petar Vucic, chairman of the Croatian Constitutional Bloc: "Illusions From Copenhagen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The decision to expel the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in Croatia was only a specious campaign maneuver. Unfortunately, it has turned out once again that Croatian state policy has been opportunistic and cowardly, and the state leadership incompetent, lacking in courage, and at a loss when it comes to liberating the occupied regions of Croatia. The supposed vigor of the state leadership is mere rhetoric and a pitiful gesture on the part of fainthearted men who do not have confidence in their own people, but look for a solution from the hegemonies of the East and West, from those who for an entire millennium have been deaf to the Croatian question and who also aided and abetted the aggression against Croatia in 1990.

All the "perspicacity" and "wisdom" of the state leadership has come down to capitulation. The incompetence of a policy is being covered with talk about international interests. As though someone else were threatened, not the Croats.

The Serbs can rejoice, because while they found allies for bringing down the international order, the Croatian state leadership was unable to find an ally for defense. Croatia has once again fallen into the Serbian expansionist trap of supposed negotiations, which actually amounts to consolidating Serbian power in the occupied parts of Croatia. These apparent efforts at resolution could last 1,000 years, because it clearly is in their interest. That is the final upshot of that "wise" and "perspicacious" Croatian policy.

The Croatian state leadership is allowing itself to be convinced that Croatia, because it is a small state, is a decisive factor for world order and peace. This can flatter megalomaniacs and provide a cover for cowards. It is ridiculous for that leadership not to see that what we have done has helped Milosevic consolidate the expanded Serbia that has already been created. How can they fail to see that Croatian territory is being used by the great powers for territorial bargaining and satisfaction of territorial ambitions, not only to satisfy the ambitions of Serbian expansionism, but also to buy peace in the Balkans?

It is incredible that Croatia has accepted the role of victim, that it is being sold out and thrown to hostile neighboring states in parts as bones are thrown to dogs. The Croatian state leadership will truly deserve just as much credit for creating expanded Serbia as Milosevic does. If it were not tragic, it would really be comical.

We call upon the Croatian parliament to vote a lack of confidence in such a policy, to vote a lack of confidence in the Croatian Government and all its bodies, as well as in the president of the state and his policy, and to immediately seek a scheduling of an election both to the parliament and for president of the Republic of Croatia. It is high time to put a stop to this tragic series of actions by the domestic authorities and foreign hegemonies, which will lead to the certain destruction and tragic end of Croatia. A new parliament and a new president of the Republic of Croatia are the only solution for Croatia. We call upon the entire Croatian people to immediately seek the scheduling of an election and to rid themselves of the illusions of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. The people who lost the war are now losing the peace as well. They will bear sole responsibility before history, because by the act of extending the mandate of the UNPROFOR they have created conditions for a public rebellion and refusal of obedience to all state authorities, which, it seems they are not, because the decisions about Croatia are not being made by them, but by their patrons. That is why new elections are needed to bring resolute and able people to head the state, people able to finally resolve the Croatian question, of which liberation of the occupied part of Croatia is only a part, states a news release of the Croatian Constitutional Bloc, signed by its chairman, Dr. Petar Vucic.

Prime Minister Crvenkovski Interviewed

BR0404122695 Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Apr 95 p 2

[Interview with FYROM Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski by Remy Ourdan; place and date not given: "Belgrade and Athens Are Coordinating Their Policy Against Skopje"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ourdan] What is your government's main concern?

[Crvenkovski] The main concern? There are many competing concerns...We have problems which we share with all the former Socialist countries—the social tensions resulting from the economic reforms, the fall in production, the increase in unemployment, the resurgence of nationalism. What is specific here is that all these problems are occurring at a time when we are trying to consolidate Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] international status. However, Greece is trying to block this process. It is taking advantage of its EU membership and its good relations with the United States. The result is that the Greek embargo has been going on for more than a year, prompting losses of around $500 million for our economy.

[Ourdan] How does the government plan to deal with the question of ethnic minorities?

[Crvenkovski] Solving the ethnic problems is still the key question. I think that there is a real quality in human relations here, that Macedonia is a rare example of coexistence, because the different ethnic groups are represented in Parliament, and in the government. But some demands go beyond the framework of the Macedonian Constitution, as recently happened in Tetovo. If we authorized teaching in the mother tongue up to university level, we would form ghettos. The case of the so-called Tetovo university was in fact a purely political action.... It was an attempt to unite the Albanians, increase tension, and divide the communities. It is interesting to study the way in which Albania and Kosovo have interfered in our country's internal affairs. The only solution to the ethnic problem is to have discussions in parliament, and not in the street.

[Ourdan] Do you hope for a quick end to the blockade imposed by Greece, which is still demanding that you change the republic's name and flag?

[Crvenkovski] We are still ready to sit round a table, even if it is difficult to negotiate calmly while the embargo continues. But what would become of our sovereignty if we allowed our flag and the symbol of our country to be imposed on us? That would be contrary to all international principles.

[Ourdan] Do you think you are safe from the Serbian hegemony that is active in the former Yugoslavia?

[Crvenkovski] The fact that Serbia has not recognized Macedonia is significant. Officially, the Serbs explain that by solidarity with their Greek ally. But there are undoubtedly more serious reasons. Belgrade and Athens are coordinating their policies, and Milosevic (the Serbian president—LE MONDE editor's note) dreams of a confederation between Serbia and Greece, sweeping the Macedonian state from the map.

Both Sides Said To Blame for University 'Events'

AU0404204995 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by "S.C." on news conference by the DAA-LP on 2 April; place of news conference not given: "Authorities' Irresponsibility Caused Radical Demands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reason for a news conference held two days ago by independent deputy Hisen Ramadani and the DAA-LP [Democratic Alliance of Albanians-Liberal Party] was the change of the party name from the Albanian Democratic Alliance-Liberal Party to the Democratic Alliance of Albanians-Liberal Party, as well as several aspects of the present political and economic situation in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. This change, as it was emphasized, was not actually a change in the name, but was aimed at avoiding the word Albanian—which, when translated into Macedonian, implies affiliation to the state of Albania.

Speaking of the concerns of the DAA-LP regarding the economic and social trends in our country, the president of this party, Dzemil Idrizi, emphasized the following: "It is a fact that the government has not yet succeeded in halting the negative trends in the economy. On the other hand, we have not yet started a real privatization based on economic criteria with a public approach and an efficient evaluation of the capital. If we carry out privatization, or if we stick to state property at any cost, it can cause great damage with severe consequences!"

Idrizi and Ramadani reviewed the events connected to the so-called Albanian university, and they pointed out that there is still no willingness to balance relations under the existing conditions. "The DAA-LP considers that the events connected with the university reveal errors on both the government's side and the side of the political subjects of Albanian in Macedonia. The authorities acted inappropriately as regards the need and the demand for the formation of a teachers college for Albanian staff, which was an action conducted with great responsibility within the frameworks of the institutions where discussions were held and the authorities of Skopje University informed. This irresponsible attitude was doomed to result in radical demands by radical subjects and groups. Many of the Albanian political subjects, who were discouraged by the authorities' inconsistency, have also failed, because they allowed a noble initiative to be conducted in haste, and thus failed to concider all the possible implications," Idrizi stressed.

As the DAA-LP emphasized, it opposes reducing issues regarding interethnic relations to a simple assembly procedure and outvoting because, as they pointed out, it can lead to negative political consequences.

Daily Views 'Division' in Islamic Community

AU0404205095 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Apr 95 p 4

[Commentary by Jugoslava Dukovska: "Religion of National Colors: Yes or No?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is it true that there is a division within the Islamic religious community, the second largest confessional community in the country, that according to some views is also being manifested on a national and sectarian basis? Recently there have been such claims and hints from various places. Therefore, the Istanbul weekly NOKTA emphasized in a review on the Islamic religious ambience in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] that the change in the political system of the "smallest Balkan state" made it a place where many sects with various religious and nationalist tendencies have taken root. NOKTA also indicates that the Muslim community in Macedonia has recently experienced an expansion of Shiites of Iranian origin, particularly in the western regions of Macedonia, where mostly Albanians live. Although this newspaper and numerous experts in this field indicate that the alleged penetration of extreme Islamic fundamentalism and the attachment to the Shiite wing of Islam under the influence of various religious and foreign humanitarian organizations in Macedonia is a major problem, another problem is the division of the Muslim community on a national basis. Recently, there has been a strong belief that the members—the top officials, that is—in the ICM [Islamic Community of Macedonia], of which the majority are of Albanian nationality, are ardent nationalists. Muslims of other nationalities note this as well.

Only in Albanian

This is illustrated by the fact that in many mosques where sermons were traditionally in Turkish, Macedonian, or Bosniak, they are now performed only in Albanian. According to Turkish believers, this has become more frequent in the last few years. The newspaper MAKEDONIJA ZAMAN, published in Skopje in Turkish, openly accuses the ICM leadership of racism, and it finds the major reason for this in the book entitled *Albanians in Macedonia*, published by the ICM *Mesihat* in which "hostile feelings against Islam and the Turkish Empire" are stressed particularly. The editor of this newspaper, Dzemal Dogan, gave the following statement to the newspaper DOKTA: "Can we call it other than racism when a high official expected to represent the Muslims starts shouting that he is an Albanian?" Dogan also points out that, instead of religious books, the *Mesihat* publishes books about Albanians, and he demands the resignation of the *Mesihat* president.

This topic was brought up very concretely at a news conference held by the chief of the Islamic Community of the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Jakub Selimovski. Selimovski was at the helm of the Islamic community in Macedonia for many years, and although he no longer participates in the religious power of the country, he is still well-informed about the situation. His public address was provoked by an attack on his personality that was broadcast by private television stations throughout the country, and according to what he claimed, the attack was prepared by a certain Albanian Committee for Safeguarding National Unity in Geneva that has close links with the *Mesihat* (executive body) of the ICM. This videotape accuses Selimovski of dividing the ICM and of being a "traitor to the religion and the Albanian people." Regarding the division that was also confirmed by the *Mesihat* itself, Selimovski says that it has been caused by the current autocratic and centralized ICM leadership, and by manipulations of the Albanian population, which is by a severe abuse of people that are basically indisposed to separation from their religious brothers. "Stressing Albanian national interest and national divisions can cause damage to the small area in which we live," Selimovski says. "The Islamic community cannot and must not be a political organization," he emphasizes, "but, like all the other religious communities, it should restrict itself to confessional activities only. In our country, all nationalities have their own political parties that strive for the protection of their national interests, and therefore it is unnecessary to politicize religion."

Conflicts and Disagreements

We often hear it said that Selimovski's public address can be considered as his personal settlement of accounts with the ICM and that his views are closely connected to the present state policy (Jakub Selimovski was considered close to the political elite during the last years of the former Yugoslavia, as well as to the present Macedonian authorities). However, not everything is as smooth in the Islamic community as some ICM leaders try to present. This is revealed by numerous separate tarekats (Muslim religious brotherhoods), as well as by some separated local units of the Islamic Community (Tetovo and Prespa), and even by some mosques that are independent from the ICM.

"We are categorical in rejecting the claims that there is a division within the Islamic religious community," Zenun Berisa, ICM secretary, claims. "There is no such national division because the national structure of the employees corresponds to the national configuration of the Islamic population. There are Albanians, Turks, Macedonians, Muslims, Romanies, and Bosnians in all ICM bodies." It is impossible to have a national division within the ICM, because it cannot function uninationally.

As far as the evident examples of conflicts and disagreements within the community itself that resulted in local divisions are concerned, Mr. Berisa explains that there are unsatisfied individuals inside the community and that their dissatisfaction is due to their personal interests. Nevertheless, he notes that there are cases in which there are manifest political influences, particularly in Tetovo; and according to what he says, the problems in the Tetovo Islamic community are incited by, and are in favor of, the local authorities. He refuses to describe this as interference by the Albanian national parties, and instead justifies the problems through local patriotism. Regarding the "university events" on which the Islamic religious community has refused to comment so far, and regarding which it has acted as if it were disinterested, Mr. Berisa stated as follows: "There is no life without science and knowledge, and this is stressed in the Koran. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to be wise in dealing with science and education. Any educational discrimination against citizens is considered evil. The least painful is the wisest way to accomplish the goal, and at this moment, this is to resolve the issue within the institutions of the system. We believe that the complications occurred because the authorities were slow in resolving this question."

Kucan, Mitterand Discuss EU Associate Membership

AU0404171995 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon, President Milan Kucan will return from Paris where he attended the opening of a retrospective exhibition of Slovene painter Zoran Music last night. The occasion was also attended by French President Francois Mitterand.

Both presidents used the opportunity to exchange opinions about topical political issues. They discussed the Slovene political and economic rapprochement with Europe. Kucan expressed hope that the Slovene-EU associate membership talks will end soon and that the document about it will be signed during the French presidency of the Union.

Government Passes Budget Proposal

AU0404210295 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Mar p 1

[Article by Miha Jenko: "Proposal of Budget Without Consensus of Three Ministries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 27 March—Last night, the government—without the consensus of the minister of science and technology, the minister of culture, and the minister of agriculture and with reservations and remarks by the transportation minister—passed a proposal of this year's budget in the amount of 510.4 billion Slovene tolars and forwarded it to parliament. Of this sum, approximately 320 billion tolars represent fixed obligations of the state, while approximately 20 billion tolars of obligations were transferred from municipalities. Speaking about other expenses, all national programs (with the exception of the highways' fund) will be trimmed down, Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari said at today's news conference.

The deficit in the total scope of public expenditure is supposed to reach roughly 1.5 billion tolars, which is three times less than last year. The share of public expenditure incomes and expenses in the GDP should subside, according to the minister: The incomes, which were 47.1 percent of the GDP last year are expected to decrease to 46.2 percent of the GDP; public financial expenditure (which includes the budgets of the state and municipalities, as well as the expenses of the pensions, disability, and health funds) will amount to approximately 14 billion tolars. With the envisaged income of 521.7 billion tolars, the state budget will have a 11 billion tolar surplus.

The essential precondition for the passing of the budget in the parliament is, according to the minister, the previous passing of the law on purchase price [kupnina]. We are expected to gain approximately 13 billion tolars from the privatization purchase prices: the Ministry for Economic Relations and Development would get 3.1 billion tolars for the export agency; the Ministry for Economic Relations 2.9 billion tolars (for the closure of mines, financial rehabilitation of companies, and so forth); the Ministry of Agriculture 910 million tolars; the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Science and Technology 1.3 billion; while the remaining 3 billion tolars would be spent on purposes that have "political and social dimensions."

In conformity with yesterday's harmonization, the Ministry of Transport and Communications will get an additional 3.5 billion tolars in loans; the Finance Ministry will financially service the capital of the railraod loans to the amount of 500 million tolars; the Ministry of Agriculture will get an additional 500 million tolars, as will the the Ministry of Culture; while the joint services department and the government information technology center will get an additional 1.5 billion tolars, primarily for rents. According to Gaspari, the coalition partners will probably propose amendments that are supposed to adjust accordingly the expenses of the budget users who are not under the government's jurisdiction (the State Chamber, the State Council, the Constitutional Court, the Accounting Court, and so forth).

France Arhar Reelected Governor of National Bank

AU0404171495 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 1 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by "U.M.": "Arhar Remains Governor"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana—At yesterday's session, the State Chamber deputies extended the mandate of Dr. France Arhar, governor of the National Bank of Slovenia, for another six years. Sixty-four deputies voted in favor of his nomination and nobody voted against. The governor thanked them for their trust and said that trust, precisely, is the precondition for successful work in the sphere of finance.

He is convinced that the Central Bank is an institution that must generate stable money. "I will strive that the young Slovene tolar will win its place in the company of prominent foreign currencies." He also advised deputies to keep the firmness of the tolar in mind when passing this year's budget, as this is the only way to the future prosperity of the country. [passage omitted]

Federal

FRY, Greece To Eliminate Visas

95BA0206D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by A. Knezevic: "Negotiations Soon on Elimination of Visas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs [SMIP] recently delivered to the Greek side the draft of an agreement on reciprocal elimination of visas. At SMIP, they expect a favorable response, and direct negotiations would follow in the very near future.

We were told this yesterday in connection with the Greek-Croatian agreement eliminating visas, by Rade Bogdanovic, who heads the sector for consular affairs of the SMIP.

The draft of the treaty on reciprocal elimination of visas pertains, so we have learned, to all types of travel documents. What is most interesting to the general public is that this means that tourists should soon be able to enter Greece without setting aside a more than token amount of money and without the unpleasant waiting in front of the Greek Embassy.

Last year, we recall, about 200,000 citizens of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] visited Greece, and there were also many Greek tourists and university students who came to our country.

In spite of certain interpretations to the effect that the present visa regime might still remain in effect, primarily because of the considerable financial benefit to both countries, Mr. Bogdanovic assured us that the FRY and Greece are far more interested in eliminating travel restrictions of this kind.

The Greek-Croatian bilateral agreement is interpreted in SMIP as a desire on the part of Greece to extend the number of countries with which it has eliminated visas. Before the treaty with Croatia, agreements were reached with Slovenia, Hungary, Romania....

Of neighboring countries, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has a visa regime only with Albania. At SMIP, they say that Yugoslavia is ready to sign an agreement eliminating visas on the basis of reciprocity with certain other countries as well. The SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] had such relations with 60 countries, but some of them, especially the western states, canceled those treaties on their own initiative after the economic sanctions of the UN Security Council were put in effect. On the basis of reciprocity, the FRY has instituted visas for citizens of those states.

Economists Warn Against Government Control

95BA0206E Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 9

[Article by R.N.: "The Yugoslav Economy at a Crossroads"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The three-day meeting of Yugoslav economists on Kopaonik ended with a warning that the Yugoslav economy and the entire society are at a very important crossroads right at the end of this quarter. The message that the economists sent to the Yugoslav scientific community, political community, and general public says that we now face a choice of whether the market economy will expand, a modern economic system will be built, and we will join the world economy, or we will sink into general administration, adopt internal sanctions, and shut the economic system off from the outside world entirely.

"The way to solve the accumulated problems that have arisen because of the slowing down of the overall transition of the Yugoslav economy seriously threatens the basic postulates of the market system contained in the Program for Monetary Reconstruction," the message of the economists said.

Yugoslav economists therefore say that the foundation of stable and expansive economic development must be a policy of sound money and stable prices, a clear system of property relations, financial discipline, the concept of a modern enterprise in which the question of ownership and management is settled, the openness of the Yugoslav economy to intensification of external and internal competitiveness, a policy of a realistic exchange rate, and a tariff system compatible with the organization of world trade. In this connection, there is also the requirement that prices and salaries be formed freely, except in the government and monopoly sector, that the budget be balanced, that public expenditures be reduced, and the tax system patterned after advanced economies.

The economists also warn that there is a danger in extending the temporary measures even after 31 March and that the consequences of that will result in all-inclusive administration that will completely suspend the market economy and affirm the gray economy. That is why the economists insist all the more on the building of market institutions and the conducting of an economic policy that will affirm the interests of business and a sound market economy. Without such an approach, there will neither be economic growth nor preservation of stability, in the judgment of economists that was set forth in the message from their three-day conference on Kopaonik.

Serbia

Commentary: U.S. Intelligence Aiding B-H Army

AU0404191095 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Mar 95 p 4

[Commentary by Miroslav Lazanski: "Who Is Watching Us From the Sky?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Vienna DIE PRESSE, pilotless aircraft that are carrying out reconnaissance of Serbian territories and positions in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Muslim Government in Sarajevo take off from the airport on the Croatian island of Brac and the whole operation is supported by professionals of the U.S. secret service. DIE PRESSE has also published the statement issued by a European officer in Zagreb "that Israeli pilotless aircraft of the I-2 type, manufactured according to a U.S. license, are stationed on the island of Brac."

Apart from that, the Austrian daily states that U.S. professionals involved in reconnaissance operations in Bosnia use spy aircraft of the Gnat-750 type, which have high-quality sensors for ground reconnaissance.

Supporting One Party to the Conflict

The latest offensive by Alija Izetbegovic's army against the positions of the Army of the Srpska republic proves that, at every moment, the Muslim Army has very precise and high-quality intelligence data about the distribution of the Serbian forces. Muslim Army strikes against Serbian positions show that the Muslims are excellently informed about weak and "uncovered" points between certain Serbian units; information that cannot be gathered in the field, but only from the air.

Since the Muslims do not have reconnaissance aircraft, it is obvious that NATO or U.S. aviation, supported by space satellites and pilotless aircraft, performs this task for them. If this is stated even by the Viennese DIE PRESSE, Washington can be asked the following question: "What is the next U.S. step in the direct involvement in someone else's civil war?"

Cheap Spies

Facts such as that there are U.S. military allies associated with Alija Izetbegovic's government Generals Galvin and Sent [name as transliterated], that there are direct arms supplies to the Muslims within the Padobran [Parachute] operation and through the airport in Tuzla, and that intelligence and reconnaissance data gathered by U.S. professionals and equipment is delivered show that the United States is firmly supporting one party to the conflict on the territory of the former central Yugoslav republic—the Muslim side. This is not the way in which the bloody tragedy in Bosnia can be brought to an end, this is a model of behavior criticized publicly even by Lord Owen.

The pilotless aircraft used for the reconnaissance of the Bosnian Serbs' positions are flying robots of Israeli origin from the I-2 mini-RPM system with perfectly developed optoelectronic reconnaissance appliances. This type of pilotless aircraft, designed according to a U.S. license, is manufactured by the Israeli aircraft industry and is bought by U.S. military forces because it is cheap. The miniaircraft is equipped with television cameras mounted on a stable platform made of plastic. The go-home principle enables a multiple use of the pilotless robot after the performance of a computer programmed task.

These pilotless spies who work in the sky are very economical and thus attractive because, in contrast to the prices of combat aircraft, which are rising, the prices of pilotless aircraft are falling. Pilotless robots perform tasks that cannot be performed either as cheaply or as well by combat planes. They can be launched from a ramp on the ground, from an aircraft carrier, from a ship, and even from a submarine during underwater operation.

Modern concepts for the development of pilotless aircraft can be divided into three groups: Robots for low altitudes and short range (for reconnaissance on the front and laser marking of targets as a aid to infantry), aircraft for high altitudes and long reconnaissance operations, and aircraft-robots for low altitudes with a large operational radius.

Pilotless aircraft for long reconnaissance operations (Gnat-750's) are used in Bosnia. They can stay in the air for more than 50 hours, they fly at an altitude of up to 22 km and can photograph facilities and positions even from 1 km up. These are flying robots manufactured by Boeing and Sperry [name as transliterated].

All this shows that West intelligence services have given up the performance of their priority tasks—such as intelligence support for ground teams—in a low-intensity conflict such as the one in Bosnia, and offer open support for military units, in this case to the Bosnian government forces. By helping Alija Izetbegovic's army directly, pilotless aircraft in the Bosnian sky enable his army to maintain the tempo of their combat operations.

SPO Deputies Stage Walkout of Assembly

AU0504112395 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Article by Zoran Vaskovic from the Serbian Assembly]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Discussion on the government's report on its work in the past year started 30 minutes ago. Prior to that, deputies had spent an hour listening to responses to yesterday's speeches and then responses to responses. [passage omitted]

A few minutes ago, the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] deputies staged a walkout from the session. They did this at the request of Vuk Draskovic, who demanded that members of special police units be removed from the vicinity of the Assembly building.

Assembly Chairman Dragan Tomic said that, as far as he he knew, no special police were present around the building. This is all for now from the Republican Assembly building.

Serbia, Greece Sign Economic Agreement

95BA0206F Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 11

[Article by S. Andric: "Constant Cooperation With Greek Businessmen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Serbian Employers and the Association of Exporters of Northern Greece have signed in Belgrade a Memorandum on Establishment of Close and Permanent Cooperation. It is supposed to contribute to the development of commercial and business relations between its members, which are Greek and Serbian enterprises. Cooperation is based on ethnic, religious, and cultural relations between the peoples of Greece and Serbia, but also on common interests in the economic and social development of these two peoples.

According to the Spanish Model

While quite a bit has been said in our public about the visit of the Greek delegation to Serbia, the work of the Union of Serbian Employers has not had very much publicity so far. It was established in the early fall of last year, and it has used these few months to prepare for getting its start in domestic business life.

According to Dragoslav Petrovic, general secretary of the union, it was established in a coordinated effort with the unions of West Europe, and it has been using the experience of Spain, a country that has quite a few similarities to ours. Its basic objective is to protect the interests of employers and owners, to establish communications, to present the business view, and above all to cooperate with organizations and associations in our country. So far, relations have been established with the advanced countries, especially in West Europe, and firm guarantees have been reached that future business cooperation between Serbian and Western business people will be conducted exclusively through the union. This is all the more important because the money funds intended for specific programs of certain domestic companies will be loaned out through the union as an intermediary. The red thread running through all this is privatization, without which the operating room of all unions is, for all practical purposes, restricted and limited.

"The initial operation of our union was preceded by consultations in Brussels and The Hague with the organization of the European Movement, the European League for Economic Cooperation, the European Union of National Confederations of Industrialists and Employers, the European Union of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, and the National Christian Union of Dutch Employers," said Slavenko Grgurevic, member of the union's board of directors. "It would not be immodest for us to say that the door has been opened to us everywhere, our work was given full-fledged support, and everywhere there was agreement that all future delegations and projects would go through us as contacts. We are still communicating, but we have met almost all the conditions for full-fledged membership in the European Union."

The Greeks Are Representing Our Interests

"In order to create, maintain, and facilitate contacts and cooperation between Serbian firms and their counterparts abroad, the union has trade offices in many countries, in cooperation with their national organizations of employers," Petrovic said. "The task of those offices is to maintain contacts with foreign business and financial circles and also to make their own study of measures being undertaken by administrations and multinational organizations headquartered in world centers."

The Greek partners will represent our interests in the Europartenariat, the program of the European Community to stimulate development of the underdeveloped regions by encouraging small and medium-size enterprises. All members of the EC and another 32 countries outside it are taking part in this program. The members meet twice a year. The next meeting will be 20-21 March in Dortmund. A meeting of firms from the Balkan countries is also scheduled for December in Thessalonica; the topics are to include postwar reconstruction of the Balkans as an extremely important region to European and indeed world business.

More than 12,000 companies attending more than 45,000 meetings have taken part in meetings of Europartenariat since 1988. Judging by the reports from previous meetings, 60 percent of these meetings led to further contacts, while 40 percent resulted in the signing of contracts between companies from the host regions and visiting firms.

In the Union of Serbian Employers, they emphasize the extremely good cooperation with the Institute of Economic Sciences, and they stress their openness to associations of private entrepreneurs in the republic.

Kosovo

Serb Scholars Demand Expulsion of Albanians

AU0504114395 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No. 586, 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A symposium entitled "Population of FR Yugoslavia, with Special Focus on Kosova and Metohija" was held in Prishtina, capital of Kosova, between 30 March-1 April 1995. A great number of Serb intellectuals and scholars on demographic issues were reported to have participated. Serbian media have offered wide coverage on the proceedings of the "scientific symposium," referring to it as a very significant event in offering insight into resolving population issues in Kosova in the run-up to the incumbent 21st century. The Prishtina-based Serbian daily JEDINSTVO carries today the text of a declaration adopted in the gathering regarding the moves the self-styled Yugoslavia should undertake in order to "improve the demographic evolution in Serbia."

The Declaration calls on the Serbian regime to undertake decisive steps towards the change of the ethnic composition of Kosova, expelling as many as 400,000 Kosova Albanians, branded in it as "Albanian emigrants in FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]" as well as bringing in thousands of Serbs instead. Amongst others, Serb scholars call on the regime to ensure legislation towards staging an urgent census in Kosova, in order to establish the "real picture regarding the number of population in Kosova"; a selective population policy in relation to the natural growth of the population in the country and redress "the demographic balance"; "exploit international standards for 400,000 Albanian emigrants in FRY, who have gravely disturbed the ethnic balance in Kosova and Metohija"; "revise the deeds of purchase on real estate concluded between Serbs and Albanians in Kosova and Metohija in the period 1966-1990": "adopt a law governing permanent settlement matters for refugees from former Yugoslavia in Kosova (around 400,000)"; "adopt a law on providing employment opportunities in Kosova and Metohija for all higher educated people, including young talents, from our country (rump Yugoslavia) who are jobless"; "adopt a law on giving stipends and loans to all those students, who, once graduated, would be willing to work and live in Kosova and Metohija," etc.

The Declaration further calls on the Serbian regime to review its policy in economic, social, educational, etc., to ensure changes in Kosova which should affect its very fabric and separate identity in all aspects, taking demographic issue as a point of departure. The Declaration, teeming with sheer lies, urges the institution of a coercive ethnic balance in Kosova. The Serb scholars call for a substantial reduction of Albanian population, alongside with a substantial increase of Serb population, in Kosova through governmental policies. The Serbian slanders on "400,000 emigrants from Albania" have been talked to death. The former Yugoslav parliament established in late eighties, in the wake of similar slanders of "hundreds of thousands of emigrants from Albania," that the number hardly exceeded 700! It has to be multiplied with 560 to make the alleged number of around 400,000 emigrants! The figure of 400,000 Serbs to be settled in Kosova was first announced by Serbian President Milosevic in Fushe-Kosova (Kosovo Polje). Serbia has adopted legislation to ensure a massive-scale colonization of Kosova, the last piece of legislation being the decree adopted by "Yugoslav" Government in January this year. The Serbian regime has gone too far in defying the world. Yet the international community (the UNCHR first and foremost) knows that providing "permanent residence" does not comply with a "refugee status." Serbia, through its Refugees Commissariat's Chairwoman Bratislava Morina, has vowed to see that Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia be provided "permanent residence" in Kosova. It goes without saying that this is a policy bespeaking an ethnic cleansing practice as it comes in the wake of Serbian brutalities against the Kosova Albanians to force them flee. Last but not least, Serb "scholars" should be taken seriously: it was Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Dobrica Cosic, later President of Yugoslavia, and others) who has masterminded in the eighties the war of aggression Serbia was to wage on non-Serbs in the early 1990s. The Serb scholars' schemes have proved to be only Serbian regime's designs worked out by "people of science and knowledge."

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